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Even a purely moral act that has no hope of any immediate and visible political effect can
gradually and indirectly, over time, gain in political significance.
— Václav Havel
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ABSTRACT
The sentiment that civilians should be protected in war is reflected in the set of legal,
moral, and political strictures known as the civilian immunity norm (CIN). This norm is
paradoxical in the sense that although it is widely considered settled, meaning it generates
a strong consensus in the international community among states and even among publics,
it is also quite fragile in actual battlefield conditions, when the protection of civilians
often gives way to military necessity. The norm came under considerable stress during
the height of the Global War on Terror, when many argued that the norm must be relaxed
in order to effectively fight non-state actors. Viewed through this lens, a rather
remarkable development occurred in the U.S. military under the War on Terror, when,
faced with strategic failure in Afghanistan and Iraq, rather than escalate force against
civilians for the sake of “winning,” the military changed its definition of “military
necessity” to more closely reflect the constraining normative environment. Despite a
growing research agenda centered on issues of civilian immunity, it remains unclear what
effect the CIN has, if any, on such developments. When does the CIN matter? More
specifically, when does it alter short term strategic choices and even long term doctrines?
This study employs a constructivist approach, arguing that democracies will
choose strategic outcomes that strengthen compliance with the CIN when they see the
constraining normative environment as a key part of the strategic environment.
Legitimacy is argued to be the causal mechanism driving interests and identities to align
viii

more closely with the human rights-based aspects of the international order. My
argument, based on a social conception of power, hinges on the observation that state
interests change over time and that this is evident as sovereignty-based attitudes toward
civilian casualties move toward a more constraining, human rights-based outlook. I
identify three conditions under which this occurs: when the normative/discursive
framework of protecting civilians is seen as essential to delegitimizing the enemy; when
the legitimacy of the initial invasion is in question, and civilian casualties are seen as
damaging to the international image by increasing that gap; finally, when regaining a
monopoly on force is seen as impossible to achieve through material force alone because
civilian casualties increase support for the insurgency. Together, these provide the
conditions under which aligning with human rights-centered norms eventually come to be
seen as the only viable strategy in fighting insurgencies.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The civilian immunity norm (CIN) is the formal term assigned to the set of legal,
moral, and political strictures meant to regulate state behavior toward civilians in war.1
As with all international norms, the CIN represents “collective expectations for the
proper behavior of actors with a given identity.”2 In an increasingly constraining
normative environment wherein publics at all levels (domestic, regional, even global)
expect moral behavior in war, many believe that it is no longer possible for democracies
to inflict large-scale damage on civilians.3 This is often attributed to material factors such
as developments in precision weaponry and global communications; however, such
observations assume rather than demonstrate that technology alone can account for the
causal power of social pressure. Despite a growing literature on state behavior toward
civilians, little attention has been paid to the effects of the CIN itself on military strategy,
1

By formal, I refer to its legal form as codified in the Laws of War (also known as the Laws of Armed
Conflict, and more recently as the body of International Humanitarian Law or IHL). The norm is comprised
of four principles with corresponding rules and expectations for behavior: distinction, proportionality,
precaution, and military necessity. It is also referred to as the non-combatant immunity norm, though noncombatant has a more technical meaning that includes those soldiers not participating in combat. I use the
term “civilian immunity norm” since I am less concerned with the legal technicalities than I am with the
commonsense, generalized expectations of various international publics.
2

Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 5.
3

See Judith Gail Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality, and the Use of Force by States (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 137; Richard D. Rosen, "Targeting Enemy Forces in the War on
Terror: Preserving Civilian Immunity," Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 42, no. 3 (2009): 730.
Rosen argues that even the appearance of civilian casualties can undermine support for military operations.

1

2

the aspect of state behavior most directly responsible for the treatment of civilians on the
battlefield.
Though it is sometimes assumed that democracies treat civilians better because of
pressure issuing from their own domestic publics, the historical record is mixed on both
state behavior and public expectations. Democratic publics are often divided when it
comes to civilian casualties of foreigners, and democracies sometimes, with or without
the support of their publics, escalate force against civilians, especially when faced with
strategic failure.4 This occurred on a large scale in World War Two and to a lesser degree
in Vietnam. Since Vietnam, however, the norm has made significant legal progress,5 and
we have seen at least two conflicts—Iraq and Afghanistan—in which democracies, when
faced with strategic failure, have strengthened efforts to comply with the CIN instead of
overriding it. Moreover, in these cases, decision-makers transformed military doctrine to
reflect a broader institutional commitment to civilian immunity. When does the CIN

4

See Alexander B. Downes, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victimization
in War," International Security 30, no. 5 (2006). Democratic publics have been shown to support such
actions against foreign civilians in exchange for security, while at the same time maintaining a belief in
their nation’s humane identity. This has been the case in the twentieth century in the United States. See for
example, Sahr Conway-Lanz, Collateral Damage: Americans, Noncombatant Immunity, and Atrocity After
World War II (New York: Routledge, 2006). Michael Walzer supports this tendency in normative theory
for exceptional cases only, for what he terms “supreme emergencies,” in Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral
Argument With Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
5

This refers to the Additional Protocols of 1977, wherein the rules and principles protecting civilians that
existed within the just war tradition were spelled out in great detail in international law, for the first time
ever. See, for example, Michael Bothe, Karl Josef Partsch, and Waldemar A. Solf, New Rules for Victims of
Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
(The Hague; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982); Claude Pilloud et al., Commentary on the
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva; Norwell,
MA, USA: International Committee of the Red Cross: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987).

3

matter? More specifically, when does it alter short-term strategic choices and even long
term doctrine?
The debate about civilian immunity matters in practice for obvious moral
reasons—the suffering of innocent human beings in war is a perennial humanitarian
concern. The issue of how norms matter also reflects the broader theoretical debate about
the extent to which power-seeking states can act morally in the international arena. Few
issues capture the tension between principle and power better than how states engaged in
war respond to moral pressure by multiple publics—not just domestic publics. On the one
hand, constructivists and liberals claim the CIN as one of the strongest, most settled, of
all international norms and see it as a great achievement of international law.6 On the
other hand, realists and sometimes rationalists emphasize war as the closest
approximation of an anarchical environment whereby states can be expected to disregard
norms in the pursuit of power. Most agree that the international commitment to protecting
civilians is constantly endangered by a lack of compliance on the battlefield, when
civilians are particularly vulnerable to the exigencies of states’ (and increasingly nonstate actors’) strategic calculations.7 Even when states do comply with the laws meant to
protect civilians, the legal limits of the CIN allows for significant unintentional but
6

See Helen Kinsella, The Image Before the Weapon: A History of the Distinction between Combatant and
Civilian (Cornell University Press, 2011), 3.
7

This is true with other norms as well, particularly with more foundational norms such as sovereignty and
human rights. I will argue in this chapter that what makes this norm unique is that it is suspended between
these foundational norms and as such provides a lens through which to examine the relationship between
morality and power. For an explanation of the commitment versus compliance problem more generally,
see Thomas Risse-Kappen, Steve C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights:
International Norms and Domestic Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

4

foreseeable harm.8 This particular norm thus occupies the extremes of the morality
versus power debate, in practice as well as in theory.
This study employs a constructivist approach, arguing that democracies will
choose strategic outcomes that strengthen compliance with the CIN when they see the
constraining normative environment as a key part of the strategic environment.
Legitimacy is argued to be the causal mechanism driving interests and identities to align
more closely with the human rights-based aspects of the international order. My
argument, based on a social conception of power, hinges on the observation that state
interests change over time and that this is evident as sovereignty-based attitudes toward
civilian casualties move toward a more constraining, human rights-based outlook. I
identify three conditions under which this occurs: when the normative/discursive
framework of protecting civilians is seen as essential to delegitimizing the opponent;
when the legitimacy of the initial invasion is in question, and civilian casualties risk
damaging the state’s international image by increasing that gap; finally, when regaining a
monopoly on force is seen as impossible to achieve through material force alone because
civilian casualties increase support for the opponent. Together, these provide the
conditions under which aligning with human rights-centered norms eventually come to be
seen as the only viable strategy for democracies fighting insurgencies.

8

This refers to the doctrine of double-effect, commonly known as collateral damage. See M. A. Michael
Carlino, "The Moral Limits of Strategic Attack," Parameters 32, no. 1 (2002); T. A. Cavanaugh, DoubleEffect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Colm
McKeogh, "Civilian Immunity in War: From Augustine to Vattel," in Civilian Immunity in War, ed. Igor
Primoratz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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The Puzzle: Morality in War
Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is
also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the
requirements of successful political action.9
Few political acts carry greater moral significance than killing civilians in war.
To kill innocents in the pursuit of state interests violates the essence of respect for
humanity, a key value in the international normative order.10 Yet international society
also recognizes the sovereign state as a war-making body and aims to limit—but not
outright prohibit—the killing of civilians. Reflecting the tensions within the international
order between sovereignty and human rights, the CIN is suspended in the ambiguous
space between military necessity and respect for humanity. Even a cursory glance at
history reveals, however, that civilians tend to lose when moral principle confronts
military strategy.11 The popular view that holds it is no longer possible for democracies to
inflict large-scale damage on civilians12 runs counter to most theories of realism, the

9

Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and
Peace, brief ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993). “Six Principles” excerpt available online, accessed
February 14, 2013, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm.
10

Respect for humanity refers to the moral imperative that human beings ought not be treated as a mere
means to an end. This foundational limiting principle is best known as Kant’s “Formula of Humanity”: “So
act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same
time as an end, never merely as a means,” in “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,” in Immanuel
Kant: Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
429.
11

Downes, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures”; Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan BalchLindsay, "Draining the Sea: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare," International Organization 58, no. 2
(2004).
12

See Gardam, Necessity and Proportionality, 137; Rosen, "Preserving Civilian Immunity," 730. Rosen
argues that even the appearance of civilian casualties can undermine support for military operations.
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paradigm most closely associated with military affairs. This is because war is the realm
of force, in which the possibilities for moral action are thought to be severely
diminished.13 Proscriptions against killing civilians are therefore often assumed to run
against the logic of force; that is, international norms appear as external, even artificial
constraints on pure strategic action.14 My argument is that this understanding derives
from a conventional reading of realism that places morality in opposition to power, with
the result that too little attention is paid to the possibility that successful political action
sometimes requires moral constraint.15
Amoral versus Ethical Realism
Conventional interpretations of realist IR draw on broader disciplinary
assumptions about the state’s relationship to violence. The very definition of the state
used in political science is drawn from Max Weber, who describes the state as that body
which maintains a “monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.”16 Realist IR expands
this focus on violence to define the dynamic between states. Classical political thinkers
such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes have been interpreted as sharing an
ontological perspective centered on the idea of an amoral realm of international politics,

13

See Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Howard, and Peter Paret, On War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1984).
14

For a realist position on norms, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International
Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (1994).
15

An international norm is commonly defined as the “collective expectations for the proper behavior of
actors with a given identity,” Katzenstein, Culture of National Security, 5.
16

Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (Fortress Press, 1965).
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whereby force or the threat of force is the defining characteristic of relations between
states.17 Machiavelli is often credited with ushering in the rational utility of violence
approach, which elevates the national interest and frees violent political action from the
strictures of conventional ideas of morality. The insights of Hobbes have also informed
realist IR in that while the state’s use of force settles questions of ultimate authority and
provides internal stability and security for the population, no such possibility exists for
relations between states. Neoclassical realists such as Morgenthau emphasize that the
state’s use of force is directly related to its security obligations toward its own population
as well as the survival needs of the state itself:
the individual may say for himself: ‘Fiat justitia, pereat mundus (Let
justice be done, even if the world perish),’ but the state has no right to say
so in the name of those who are in its care … Realism, then, considers
prudence-the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actionsto be the supreme virtue in politics. Ethics in the abstract judges action by
its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judges action by its
political consequences.18
This assumption of amorality is even more striking in neorealist, or structural
realism,19 since classical and even neoclassical thinkers at least thought it necessary to
discuss the relationship between morality and power. The tide may be turning, however,
and the idea that morality is a problematic but enduring dimension of international
17

For a discussion on amoral versus ethical realism, see Jack Donnelly, "The Ethics of Realism," in The
Oxford Handbook Of International Relations, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford; New
York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
18

Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition, Revised,
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 4-15, accessed February 2, 2011,
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm.
19

Typified by Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979).

8

politics is once again gaining a foothold in the international relations literature, especially
in the English School and in some forms of constructivism.20 Contra Kenneth Waltz’
assertion that only material capabilities produce change in structure,21 an increasingly
sophisticated literature is beginning to treat ethics not as an artificial, external
intervention into the logic of power politics but rather as part and parcel of the structure
of the international political order itself.22 As Hall attests, the conceptual line between
power and morality is hard to sustain when one moves from abstract theory to history,
since we know, for example, that “moral authority was employed as a power resource to
construct and define the rules of a hieratic, feudal-theocratic social order.”23 Moreover,
recent works of political theory on classical realist thinkers like Thucydides, Machiavelli,
and Hobbes have emphasized the profound moral concerns that animated their work,
which becomes evident once their writings are adequately historicized. About Hobbes,
for example, Marius Hentea detects that “the need for a clear standard, which has the
power of a genuine morality, is what Hobbes wants.” He adds that “it is the demands of

20

This is less true in some other post-positivist approaches such as critical theory, feminist IR, and poststructuralism (post-modernism). All of these approaches tend to distrust claims about morality in IR,
viewing such claims as indistinguishable from the exercise of power. My approach and assumptions are
closer to both constructivism and the English School in that I believe that the employment of ethics both
constrains and enables power, but that ethics entails foundations separate from and thus distinguishable
from power.
21

Waltz, Theory of International Politics.

22

For an explanation of the constitutive function of ethics, see especially Mervyn Frost, Global Ethics:
Anarchy, Freedom and International Relations (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge,
2008).
23

Rodney Bruce Hall, "Moral Authority as a Power Resource," International Organization 51, no. 4
(1997): 592.

9

self-preservation in the state of nature and the desire for religious salvation [that] lead[s]
men to behavior that is at war with those ends—it is the moral need for peace which
informs Hobbes’ discussion.”24 Hentea’s study throws into question the use of these
early thinkers to support later IR theories that assume a binary opposition between power
and morality (and as a result the irrelevance of morality to power politics).25
While conventional interpretations of realism as “amoral” render moral norms
invisible, ethical readings of realism offer a useful starting point for investigating the
effects of moral norms. Hans Morgenthau, though distrustful of moralistic foreign policy
to the extent that he actively sought to disentangle considerations of morality from
political interests, nevertheless conceded that morality functions to set the outer limits of
what is politically possible.26 From this conception of power—as social as well as
material—it becomes possible to think of these ethical boundaries as internal to the
relations between states to the extent that they are embodied in international norms.

24

Marius Mihai Hentea, "Realism's Classical Tradition: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes" (Harvard
University, 2007), 260.
25

Jack Donnelly also persuasively argues that realism entails its own ethics: “A defensible realist ethic is
perhaps best seen as a warning against the inappropriate application of moral standards to international
political action,” in Donnelly, "The Ethics of Realism," 157.
26

The actual quote is “moral rules do not permit certain policies to be considered at all from the point of
view of expediency,” Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 225. Examples of this
revisionist interpretation of Morgenthau includes A.J.H. Murray’s observation that “Morgenthau adopts an
Augustinian, rather than Hobbesian-Machiavellian, moral framework,” in "The Moral Politics of Hans
Morgenthau," The Review of Politics 58, no. 1 (1996): 81; also “Morgenthau’s realism attempts to
recognize the centrality of power in politics without reducing politics to violence,” on Michael C. Williams,
"Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral
Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 58, no. 4 (2004): 633.

10

Norms: Commitment Versus Compliance
Norms, provide some degree of stability in the international order by creating
predictability, even in times of war. Like any social resource, however, they can also be
used for change and are subject to change themselves.27 As will be shown in chapter two,
the CIN has a long history and is closely tied to the foundational international norms of
both sovereignty and human rights. Like both of those norms, it is somewhat paradoxical
in the sense that it enjoys a wide consensus on moral, political, and legal grounds, yet this
alone does not predict compliance in particular cases. That is, though the CIN is
entrenched in the international normative order, both in international law and in global
public sentiment,28 it remains contingent and fragile in that it is often violated by states
and non-state actors alike.29 Indiscriminate targeting and other forms of civilian
victimization still occur, especially in cases of ethnic and intrastate warfare, and as will
be shown later, this has been the case in both Afghanistan and Iraq.30 The International
Committee for the Red Cross, the organization charged with providing humanitarian

27

See Wayne Sandholtz and Kendall W. Stiles, International Norms and Cycles of Change (Oxford; New
York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
28

The legal norm was strengthened through the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions,
whereby civilian protections were specified and codified for the first time. See Judith Gail Gardam, NonCombatant Immunity as a Norm of International Humanitarian Law (Dordrecht; Boston; Norwell, MA: M.
Nijhoff Publishers, 1993).
29

See Alex J. Bellamy, "Massacres and Morality: Mass Killing in an Age of Civilian Immunity," Human
Rights Quarterly 34, no. 4 (2012): 2.
30

Downes, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures”; Valentino, "Draining the Sea.”
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assistance and promoting the laws that protect victims of war, states that “in
contemporary armed conflicts, the challenge of upholding humanitarian values is not the
result of a lack of rules but a lack of respect for them.”31
Significance of CIN in GWOT
This commitment versus compliance paradox became especially salient during the
Global War on Terror (GWOT), a far-reaching military response to what was seen by
some as an act of war waged against the international order itself. While many
understood the far-reaching response of the GWOT as a threat to the longstanding antitorture norm, it was also a precarious time for the CIN. The post 9/11 years produced
much public debate about the changing nature of war and whether current norms
regulating when and how force is used would give way to the new security environment
that seemed to make it impossible to maintain a distinction between civilian and
combatant.32 This anxiety becomes clearer when we consider that there are a variety of
strategic outcomes that affect civilians in war.
Counterinsurgency and Civilians
Civilians have been largely absent from the study of strategy, with two notable
exceptions: the total war era of World War Two when the strategic bombing of civilians
was rationalized as necessary to break the morale of the enemy, and more recently, in
counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency refers to the range of strategies states employ
31

ICRC Webpage, accessed October 30, 2012, http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/contemporarychallenges-for-ihl/index.jsp.
32

On the debate, see Rosen, "Preserving Civilian Immunity."
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when fighting non-state actors who reject the authority of the ruling regime and seek to
take over the reins of government. The population figures into counterinsurgency since,
as Mao famously pointed out, it is the sea in which the insurgents swim.33 Separating
insurgents from the population is key because the people are potential supporters,
providing cover, sustenance, and recruits. However, the mere presence of an insurgency
does not determine a specific strategic response. Despite the recent conflation of
counterinsurgency with population protection, state behavior toward civilians in
counterinsurgency has varied dramatically; population protection is only one of a variety
of choices states use to defeat insurgencies. Counterinsurgency strategies can use more or
less force, and civilians can be seen as objects to be coerced and manipulated,34 or they
can be seen as actors, even as the center of gravity. The French in Algeria, for example,
employed multiple strategies, from punishing civilians to protecting them.35 While
strategic failure often precedes any wartime innovation,36 including counterinsurgency,
whether or not change occurs and what form it takes is not determined by the mere

33

John Mackinlay, The Insurgent Archipelago: From Mao to Bin Laden (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2009); Sam C. Sarkesian, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: Theories, Doctrines, and Contexts (New
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2010).
34

Daniel Rothbart and K. V. Korostelina, Why They Die: Civilian Devastation in Violent Conflict (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011); Daniel Rothbart, K. V. Korostelina, and Mohammed D.
Cherkaoui, Civilians and Modern War: Armed Conflict and the Ideology of Violence (New York:
Routledge, 2012).
35

For the logic of this type of counterinsurgency in the case of Algeria, see David Galula,
Counterinsurgency Warfare; Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964); David Galula, Pacification
in Algeria, 1956-1958 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006).
36

Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1991).
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recognition of an insurgency nor of battlefield conditions alone. The example of the U.S.
military’s failed attempt to shift its doctrine to a more systematic strategy of civilian
protection in Vietnam is one such example.37
Variance: Strategic Interaction Matters
The variance described above allows for the identification of conditions under
which compliance with civilian-centered norms comes to be seen as strategically
important. Since in most forms of contemporary warfare the fight takes place “among the
people,”38 civilians ever present; to what extent each side considers civilian casualties as
permissible is a key strategic consideration. This is especially true in insurgencies
involving guerrilla warfare wherein a weak party is pitted against one or more strong
parties. As Arreguin-Toft wrote in 2001, multiple strategies are possible when engaging
in asymmetric warfare. How force is used is key, but only in relation to the strategy of the
opposition. He states, for example, that “barbarism,” or violating established norms
against killing civilians, is a strategic choice that can win or lose a war. The French in
Algeria, for example, suffered reputational damage even after defeating the insurgency.39
Martin Van Creveld, Israeli military historian, suggests this stark choice as well when he
presents two methods of counterinsurgency that allow for strong actors to prevail: the

37

Joseph Roger Clark, "Innovation Under Fire: Politics, Learning, and US Army Doctrine" (The George
Washington University, 2011).
38
39

Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: the Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Knopf, 2007).

The film, Battle of Algiers, depicts this lesson, and is often shown in military classrooms; Galula,
Counterinsurgency Warfare; Galula, Pacification in Algeria.
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strong party must either be prepared to use indiscriminate force wholeheartedly and
unapologetically, as did Hafez al Assad in Syria, or it must show great restraint, even at
the expense of significant casualties, as did Great Britain when dealing with Northern
Ireland. Van Creveld points out that most counterinsurgencies that have failed have
employed a middle-ground approach.40
That strategic or even doctrinal change could follow a variety of paths is
confirmed by historical patterns of war more generally. With increasing interest in state
behavior toward civilians in war, a body of knowledge is beginning to accrue about how
states behave toward civilians in war. Despite claims of democratic peace, the first major
quantitative studies on state behavior toward civilians in war have offered little support
for a consistent pattern of moral conduct by democracies in war. History shows that
democracies will victimize civilians when leaders believe it brings them strategic
advantage, and this is especially the case when the other side breaks the rules.41 Placed
into historical context, then, it is quite remarkable that, when faced with a foe in Iraq who
refused to be bound by the laws of war, “the US military shifted from a strategy that was
accepting of even large numbers of civilian casualties to, as Ricks put it, ‘a strategy

40

Martin Van Creveld, The Changing Face of War: Lessons of Combat, from the Marne to Iraq (New
York: Presidio Press, 2006).
41

Downes, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures.” The term civilian victimization is defined by Downes
as either the direct or indirect policies that inflict suffering on civilians in war for war aims.
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founded in the concept that the civilian population isn’t the playing field but rather the
prize, to be protected at almost all costs.’”42
C.O.I.N.: A Radical Departure
The strategic change adopted by the U.S. military is embedded in a broader
doctrinal shift known as C.O.I.N. (counterinsurgency), which first arose in response to
developments in Iraq and was later adapted, albeit to a lesser extent, to the conflict in
Afghanistan. Doctrine differs from strategy in that, while strategy shifts with conditions,
doctrine is meant to establish a more stable, permanent orientation toward fighting wars.
This doctrinal shift is fairly remarkable because, as military scholars have explained,
C.O.I.N. marks a radical break with the past Weinberger-Powell doctrine of
overwhelming, decisive force.43 Whereas the Weinberger-Powell doctrine held that long,
open-ended commitments were to be avoided,44 it also reflected confidence in the idea
that more force, albeit in the beginning, was key to winning in a combat situation: “if our
vital interests are involved, we are prepared to fight. And we are resolved that if we must
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fight, we must win.”45 Viewing the failure in Vietnam as partially a result of not using
enough force in the beginning to produce a decisive outcome, Weinberger aimed to
“avoid the danger of this gradualist incremental approach which almost always means the
use of insufficient force.”46 The Powell Doctrine affirmed the previous doctrine and
added that the U.S. should “use overwhelming force in order to achieve a decisive
outcome, always have an exit strategy, and emphasize low casualties.”47
C.O.I.N., on the other hand, emphasizes the “paradoxes” of counterinsurgency:
“Sometimes, the more force used, the less effective it is,” and “sometimes, the more you
protect your force, the less secure you may be.”48 The adoption of this approach is the
result of a process of institutional learning about the relationship of force to political
goals in a changing strategic environment.49 C.O.I.N. clearly emphasizes the strategic
preference for population protection over killing the enemy; in this sense civilians
become the new “center of gravity,” and killing them comes to be seen as a strategic
45
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deficit.50 While this process of transformation within the military has been well
documented through the lenses of personalities, leadership, and bureaucratic politics, no
studies thus far have explicitly linked the impact of civilian-centered ethical norms to the
civilian-centered doctrinal outcome. What is specifically lacking is an explanation of
whether and how the civilian immunity norm has shaped the perceptions of interests and
identities.
Effects of Norms: Identity and Interests Matter
That norms matter in international politics broadly has been established since the
mid 1990s; how they emerge, spread, and gain acceptance has been well documented.51
Though norms are often treated as dependent variables or outcomes, they have been
shown to causally matter in at least three ways: they serve as evaluative points of
reference; they exert regulative effects on behavior; and they exert constitutive effects on
identity and interests. Whether and how norms matter in the relationship between
morality and power in the realm of force is unsettled. Military strategy, in particular, has
been assumed to most closely approximate pure strategic interaction in the service of pregiven state interests, in the sense that the logic of force serves its own end of “victory.”
Winning is defined in coercive terms as when one group overcomes the ability of another
to resist its will. If even military strategy, under certain conditions, can be explained as
50
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international norms-driven social action, the assumption of amorality in anarchy becomes
more difficult to sustain. And understanding what those conditions are has foreign policy
relevance that transcends military strategy.
Norms: Constraining and Enabling Effects
Much of the literature on the civilian immunity norm since the war on terror
began has been evaluative and legal, asking whether the content of the norm sufficiently
protects civilians, whether it is attuned to the changing realities of war, or whether the
norm can be expected to survive intact if it disadvantages states to the benefit of non-state
actors (insurgents, guerrillas, or terrorists).52 In the course of this growing interest in the
norm, a just-war revival has resulted in a fresh look at the normative assumptions, moral
reasoning, and political context that grounds the civilian immunity norm. While my focus
is neither evaluative nor legal, normative political theory in this area, though distinctly
ethical in its approach, nonetheless informs my study since I am interested in the
empirical effects of moral or ethical norms. Just war theorists assume a connection
between theory and political practice; they critique the civilian immunity norm as
containing tensions between military necessity, an enabling principle, and proportionality
and discrimination, its two constraining principles.53
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Understanding this sheds light on how states might maneuver within the norm—
by using its concepts to both enable and constrain the killing of civilians. Proportionality,
for example, is based on double-effect reasoning, which limits the unintentional but
foreseeable harm done to civilians to that which provides military advantage. The
concept of military necessity might then lend itself to rhetorical expansion in order to
accommodate more casualties.
Regulative Effects of CIN: Internalization and Institutionalization
Norms are most often thought to exert regulative effects on behavior. These
effects, as applied to the CIN and the Laws of War in general, are more associated with
the stability of the social order than with change. Norms are thought to function
endogenously through a logic of appropriateness (what is the “right thing to do” in this
case); or in cases of norm compliance problems, a logic of consequences is applied,
usually involving exogenous factors. Both of these explanations have been employed to
explain the civilian immunity norm. Ward Thomas demonstrates that through the gradual
internalization of the civilian immunity norm inside the military, along with its
institutionalization at the international level, the US was able to make considerable
progress toward norm compliance in the area of strategic bombing. According to this
study, the mindset and the lack of reciprocity that allowed for the atrocities of World War
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2, such as the firebombing and atomic bombing of Japan, would be much less likely to
occur today.54
The cases of Iraq and Afghanistan throw this into question, however, since both
conflicts demonstrate variance in behavior toward civilians, indicating independence
from a generalized internalization of the norm. However, regulative effects would be
expected to constrain the range of strategic choices to exclude especially punitive
strategies that would escalate force against civilians in order to defeat the insurgencies.
When Norms Break Down: Lack of Reciprocity
Other cross-national studies that take into consideration strategic interaction have
shown that CIN compliance is more problematic, however, and that behavior toward
civilians hinges on reciprocity now just as it did in World War 2, in the absence of strong
norms.55 Reciprocity remains fragile between states, and a particular state’s behavior
toward civilians in war is not necessarily contingent on whether it was a signatory to the
Geneva Conventions.56 These studies, focusing on states, obviously do not apply in the
same way, if at all, to case involving non-state actors. Downes, however, includes nonstate parties to the conflict and argues that whether or not norms break down is
contingent on how desperate the state is to win, reduce its costs, and whether or not the
54
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war is a war of attrition (which includes guerrilla wars).57 This partially answers my
question, but it looks only at intentional civilian targeting as an effect of strategy (such as
in wars of attrition that eventually target civilians). My question is concerned both with
constraints on strategic choice and with explaining why even unintentional civilian
casualties are being avoided. That is, the CIN in my case is being tested as an input or
independent variable shaping the decision to adopt a strategy and doctrinal outlook.
Downes’ use of strategy as an input is thus not well suited to my question because it does
not explain how certain strategies are chosen over others when more than one choice
exists.58
Compliance Through Reputation
Finally, the compliance literature also employs the concept of reputation.
Reputation is a broad concept in IR and is generally used in the state-centric, mostly
rationalist sense of signaling strength or resolve to other state actors in conflict
57
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situations.59 As applied to international law, it is considered one of the strongest
explanations of both compliance with and violation of legal norms,60 but it has been
found to be a relatively weak indicator of compliance with the laws of war.61 Studies that
examine how violations of the civilian immunity norm impact reputation are lacking,
despite a growing sense that the US reputation suffers when it is thought to kill too many
civilians. This is perhaps, as Sharman suggests, because social costs do not enter into
consideration due to the prevailing rationalist definitions of reputation that dominate this
literature. Furthermore, this concept of reputation is inherently state-centric because it
assumes only states or domestic publics can impose costs on other states. Reputation on
this account is a property concept62 based on a “collection of individual beliefs” about the
“degree to which an actor reliably upholds its commitments, based on a record of past
behaviour.”63
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This concept has been used in the conflict versus cooperation debate to explain
why a state goes to war (when its reputation as a superpower is threatened, for example)64
and why it upholds international agreements.65 Its focus on state-to-state relations offers
little in the way of understanding how a state fights wars against non-state actors and
what connection such struggles may have to its changing perceptions of its own interests.
Rachel Brewster, in responding to the idea that American reputation suffered when
George Bush was suspected of breaking the laws of war regarding torture, considers this
and rejects it, suggesting that image is not the same as reputation: “For better or worse,
bad actions that are not predictive of future behavior, because the regime has changed or
because the strategic situation is different, do not lead to reputational costs.66
Image: A Social Definition of Reputation
A constructivist understanding of reputation, on the other hand, is defined by
general beliefs about the “referent’s character or nature, based on a range of information,
associations and social cues.” This understanding, suggested by Sharman, is the one I
adopt because it is more appropriate to my question.67 The social conception of reputation
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is inherently relational and thus lends itself to strategic interaction of a social nature. As
in all social situations, reputations are subject not just to ownership (wherein good
behavior piles up like a bank account) but to strategic management.68
Constitutive Effects of Norms
The notion of image or social reputation fits well with what are known as
constitutive effects of norms. This effect is least likely to be tested, or even understood as
relevant, by those studying the strategic importance of civilians in war.69 Constitutive
effects are marked by the interdependence or even co-determination of identity and
interests. This notion has been applied to security most famously in Katzenstein’s 1996
edited volume on the social constructedness of national security interests: “Identity is a
short-hand label for varying constructions of nation and statehood” and “culture is a label
that connotes collective models of nation state authority or authority carried by
convention or law.” 70 Security interests, on this account, must be understood in terms of
norms as well as material factors because norms are embedded in culture and provide
collective expectations. This concept is familiar when it is applied to the role of military
organizational culture in shaping policy, to strategic culture more generally, to the
construction of new norms such as intervention, and to the formation of international
68
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organizations such as NATO.71 That the CIN exerts constitutive effects is central to my
argument since identifying with “protecting civilians” is often central to the legitimacy
claim employed for the use of force in the first place. The language of CIN is
constitutive in that it provides the social power to shape perceptions of identity and
interests.
Alexander Wendt provides an explanation of how identities and interests are
shaped through social interactions. To think of political interactions as social means that
identities and interests are co-constituted within a particular social order. The social
dimension of power is inherently communicative in that it allows an actor to control
interactions by defining the terms within which those interactions occur. One aspect of
this is role-taking, which “involves choosing from among the available representations of
the Self who one will be, and thus what interests one intends to pursue.”72 Another is
altercasting, “a technique of interactor control in which ego uses tactics of selfpresentation and stage management in an attempt to frame alter’s definition of the
situation in ways that create the role which ego desires alter to play.”73 Social power is
indicated by the successful achievement of defining the identity of the self and of the
other’s identity as well. According to Wendt, “ego tries to induce alter to take on a new
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identity (and thereby enlist alter in ego’s effort to change itself by treating alter as if it
already had that identity.”74
Since the goal is to delegitimize the non-state actor altogether, the aim in this case
is not so much to get the actor to accept the identity preferred by the ego but rather to
push the alter off the stage altogether. However, engaging in war against said actor
(through the GWOT) has already elevated the status of the actor to that of a serious
challenger. This forces the identity of the ego toward that of defender, particularly if the
power interests of the ego push against the limits of the prevailing normative order.
Constitutive effects are present when ego (or alter for that matter) behaves a certain way
because its identity must fall in line with its interests. If behavior does not match the
preferred identity, either the identity must change, the interests must change, or the
relationship between the two must be rearticulated to allow for the contradiction.
Furthermore, that there is a “stage” implies the presence of an audience. Who the
important audience is thought to be at any given moment provides cues to which norms
are persuasive in achieving the desired identity and interests.
The Strategic Importance of Ethics in the War of Ideas
If we think of ethics as always present though not determinative, anarchy begins
to approximate a more “realistic” social setting. Jack Donnelly describes this as the view
that many people actually hold about IR, which is the recognition that “statesmen are
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subject to demands of competing systems of values.”75 As with any group-based social
setting, the primary tension is always marked by the tension between particularist versus
universal values. If a state at war most often follows a particularist value system,
indicating a primary ethical obligation to its own group, then shifting toward a more
universal ethical system indicates that it has come to recognize the social value of
demonstrating a commitment to ethical treatment of the members of other groups.
Translated to war, this means that the state as social actor is attempting to communicate
to an audience its moral identity. Granted, its wish to communicate the vital interests of
the war effort to its own domestic public is a constant. This public is generally
understood as the most important public since it must support the war effort, and in a
democratic society, it also holds the power of electoral punishment as well.76 In the case
of counterinsurgency, a state may wish to signal resolve and strength to its allies and to
its enemies, or in an attempt to intimidate the local population. The lesser understood
choice has to do with why ethics would enter into a state’s relationship to occupied
publics and the international or global publics that identify with that population. This is
explained through the “War of Ideas.”
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The Global “War of Ideas”
One of the key observations sparking this study is that the military literature
began to express a concern for communicating a more ethical U.S. image to potentially
hostile publics around the same time as the strategy in Iraq changed. That the U.S. began
to emphasize the importance of winning its global “war of ideas” against al Qaeda and
extremist Jihadism as a matter of security in the war on terror suggests that ideational
factors play a likely role in the overall strategy change. Military scholar Echevarria
explains that
Officials and analysts alike continue to underscore the importance of the
“war of ideas” as an integral part of the larger war on terror. The U.S.
National Security Strategy (March 2006) declares that “From the
beginning,” the war on terror “has been both a battle of arms and a battle
of ideas—a fight against the terrorists and their murderous ideology.”
Likewise, the U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (September
2006) states that “In the long run, winning the War on Terror means
winning the battle of ideas.” Similarly, the … U.S. National Strategy for
Homeland Security (October 2007) affirms that “the War on Terror is a
different kind of war—not only a battle of arms but also a battle of
ideas.”77
The War of Ideas is the ideological aspect of the war on terror, as Echevarria
states above. It is essentially a public relations war meant to counter the global Jihadist
ideology competing with the U.S. global ideological vision.78 Battling anti-Americanism
post 9/11 was the vague goal of the War of ideas, but the shift in focus from a war of
ideas as a civilian matter, that is as a public diplomacy matter, to a military “war of
77
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ideas” suggests that decision-makers began to see the ground wars as directly connected
to the larger ideological war. The link between the two is the desire to control the
perceptions of the audiences each side was trying to affect, mostly the Muslim and Arab
communities within a larger, diffuse global public. Writing about the ability of Jihadists
to master strategic communications and win the support of Arab/Muslim audiences,
Bockstette writes that
their communication goals are aimed at legitimizing, propagating and
intimidating. They craft their strategies based on careful audience analysis
and adapt their messages and delivery methods accordingly, adhering to
the fundamental rules underlying any communication or public relations
campaign. Their skillful use of the mass media and the Internet to
compensate for asymmetrical disadvantages has enabled them to keep
generating new generations of jihadist terrorists. This information
asymmetry must be undermined in order to counter the threat of a growing
radicalization of the Muslim community. Ensuring one’s own credibility
while undermining the jihadists’ credibility is one of the key elements to
winning this battle. 79
One of the key ways Jihadist use strategic communication is for the
“legitimization of their movement and the coercion and intimidation of their enemies.”80
Therefore, the war of ideas is about countering the ability of the opposition to control the
strategic narrative. This is reminiscent of the Cold War public diplomacy project and thus
may not seem new or relevant, but its focus on gaining the support of foreign publics for
a global war on terror is peculiar to the times. It has not been made theoretically evident
79
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why the US requires the support of foreign publics for its military actions, and how
support for US military operations is connected to winning the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. My argument is fairly intuitive but overlooked—that a key strategic
communication resource is the appeal of the CIN and its association with the U.S.
identity and ideology. Embracing and co-opting the strong global sentiment in favor of
protecting civilians from harm in war is the key idea linking the strategy in both the
operational and the ideational wars. Whereas Jihadists have a cultural “in” to targeted
audiences through the discourse of Islam, the U.S., in order to compete, must appeal to its
universal, human rights-based values and language in a way that has global appeal. The
civilian is one of the few universal concepts that can bridge competing cultural and
religious systems. Put simply, the U.S. later had to put its money where its mouth is by
attempting to live up to its professed values.
Interestingly, this link has not yet been made explicit, let alone theoretically
explained, by anyone to date. Nowhere in the above article does the word “civilian”
appear as part of the war of ideas, though Echevarria does cite world public opinion polls
that measure changes in Muslim and Arab public attitudes toward the U.S. in terms of
how “threatening” they view it. It requires only a short jump in logic to realize that
publics are comprised of civilians; they are the biggest part of civil society and thus are
likely to perceive the projection of U.S. power as threatening to themselves in terms of
threats toward civilians more generally. This is less the case for domestic audiences, but
truer for the publics of U.S. allies, and perhaps greatest for Arab and Muslim publics.
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Perhaps more importantly, the fact that the two sides of the global war on terror--the
material and the ideational side--come to be seen over time as strategically intertwined
suggests the possibility that the civilian immunity norm may form an assumed but
important part of the normative backdrop for both forms of the war and thus may inform
actual military strategy in ways not made explicit in a way intelligible to the study of
international relations.81
A more explicit concern for how foreign publics view civilian casualties is
evident in the type of research feeding into the military. For example, RAND
Corporation, whose research serves the policy needs of the U.S. Department of Defense,
completed an in-depth empirical analysis of public and press reactions to civilian
casualties in multiple conflicts involving the US.82 This concern for civilian casualties
has been linked more explicitly to strategy in recent times, but it was present to a degree
in the early years of the war on terror. The observations of military analyst Marcus
Corbin, of the Center for Defense Information in Washington, predate the RAND study
by three years: "Nowadays civilian casualties, and even specific incidents, can have a
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strategic effect on a conflict out of all proportion to their size, especially in an age of
instant video transmission around the world.”83 Retired Air Force Col. Sam Gardiner
explains, "In our war games, the bad guys gave up fighting us directly ….They moved
into cities. They attacked our supply lines with explosives. They wore civilian clothes.
They took hostages. They responded to our new weapons by forcing on us the dilemma
of killing civilians and of their killing of civilians."84 Rosen, a professor of international
law and a colonel in the military, argues that this is a distinct disadvantage for Western
states, especially since the “international community, including the media, focuses
inordinately on the perceived missteps of Western states as opposed to their adversaries’
violations of the law of war.”85
Reconciling the War on the Ground with the War of Ideas
The idea that democratic states must exhibit restraint assumes that civilian
casualties entail political costs for them because they are “particularly sensitive to
popular opinion” and stand to lose both domestic and international support for military
operations.86 This suggests that states face a trade-off in interests between winning in war
through the superior application of force and winning in the court of public opinion, both
at home and abroad. While states have many resources to counter domestic public
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opinion (mainly nationalistic sentiment), this is not the case for foreign publics, neither
for occupied populations, nor for sympathetic regional or international publics. However,
if states see their best option as reconciling the two definitions of winning into a
consistent goal based on strategic constraint, then it can be argued that morality has a
social dimension that at times provides strategic advantage. My argument is that this is
exactly what occurred, and that the CIN is a social resource that bridges the two goals in
order to gain support of the local public as well as international publics that are
sympathetic to the local population.
Therefore, despite the conviction that exercising constraint in asymmetric warfare
presents powerful states with a disadvantage, states, when faced with strategic failure,
sometimes choose this path. While one is hard-pressed to make the argument that states
might knowingly act in ways inconsistent with their strategic advantage, if we assume a
rational actor, then it appears that what is normatively good has to some extent come to
coincide in such cases with what is strategically advantageous. Therefore, it is difficult
and possibly even counterproductive to insist on disentangling the “rational” and
normative” casual logics driving the move toward a more ethical strategy and doctrine.
This study aims to contribute to the small but growing body of scholarship that seeks to
understand how the two come together. Constructivism is particularly useful for this
purpose because it allows for the fact that states sometimes change their behavior because
their perceptions of their interests change. I argue that this is precisely the case, and that
the impact of the civilian immunity norm on state behavior and interests accounts for this
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shift. Since the mere presence of the norm is not determinative, the key task is showing
how this occurs and also identifying the conditions under which this norm matters, that is,
when the normative environment is seen as a key part of the strategic environment.
In the next section, I will explain how attempting to study the strategic aspects of
the normative environment bucks up against a larger theoretical debate in IR known as
the constructivist/rationalist divide. Arguing that this divide is counterproductive to the
topic under examination, I will then explain my adaptation of a model that includes
legitimacy as the concept that links norms with state behavior.87
Constructivism versus Rationalism Debate
The introduction of constructivism has divided international relations theory into
roughly two camps: Checkel states that “rationalists emphasize coercion, cost/benefit
calculations, and material incentives, whereas constructivists emphasize social learning,
socialization, and social norms.”88 March and Olsen provide a framework that captures
the basic distinction between the approaches and divides the behavioral domain by
assigning different logics to different modes of political action. These are known as the
logic of appropriateness versus the logic of consequences.89 While this opposition is
theoretically neater than an either/or proposition, it is also increasingly seen as
87
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counterproductive for the simple reason that states do not necessarily behave in an
either/or fashion. The military literature cited previously about the war of ideas and the
war on the ground provide evidence that the military, as the representative of state
interests in war, take for granted that conflict involves a struggle over perceptions as well
as physical force.
In explaining behavior, from a material rationalist perspective—realism being the
most prominent in security studies—the U.S. is least susceptible to pressure from the
international community because of its dominant power position, and thus need only
respond to its pre-given material interests. When power interests change, cooperation
with institutions change, thus rendering institutions epiphenomenal.90 From this
perspective, power considerations alone will account for the shift in strategy. Compliance
literature contains a set of explanations that are rational but liberal in focusing on costs
and benefits associated with opportunities to cooperate/transact with other states. This
will be discussed in more detail below, but this perspective offers little to account for
non-material costs which would help to explain the shift in strategy, or importantly, in the
relationship between the ideational and material aspects of war.
Constructivism butts up against some of the assumptions often taken for granted
in matters of war, which is the primacy of material factors. Rationalist explanations,
while important, are often inadequate to answering the question that interests me, which
is ultimately whether and how a more constraining normative context figures into
90
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strategy. From a constructivist perspective, the puzzle is inherently a social one that may
reach beyond behavior to an explanation of how identity and interests are shaped by
changing expectations (and how policy thus results in its particular form). Constructivist
theory varies in its emphasis on identity,91 speech acts,92 or rules,93 but regardless of its
deep theoretical underpinnings, it is closely associated with norms because, on a scale
from anarchy to community, it tends toward community, viewing international politics as
taking place in a social setting.94 While power and material incentives are present for
constructivists, this approach allows that “moral” considerations like humanitarianism are
as much a part of the social and political game as are the more tangibles.95 For domestic
audiences and allied publics, reflecting a “humanitarian” or moral identity works to
maintain support for the war effort. This is also true for persuading fence-sitting publics,
especially those seen as potential supporters of the opposition (whether local or
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transnational). Hardened or “irreconcilable” publics would be less persuadable and
therefore may not figure into the social game as crucial variables.
Constructivism, in attempting to explain social action as being based on shared
intersubjectivity, too often falls back on the assumption that the causal power of norms is
to be found internally, and as Hurd notes, “the internalization approach requires a strict
separation between strategic behavior and legitimacy which is not only empirically
unsustainable but also produces an unproductive ‘either/or’ framing of the relationship
between constructivism and rationalism.”96 According to Hurd,
the assumption of internalization is counterproductive in IR research for
three reasons: it predicts perfect compliance with norms, eliminates
strategic thinking by states, and erases any behavioral difference between
constructivism and rationalism. These problems attend both rationalism
and constructivism as the two have come to agree on a common division
of labor between explaining the making of interests and explaining
strategic action.97
The attempt to find commonalities between normative behavior and strategic
behavior is a slowly growing trend because, while the two approaches differ in their
ontological assumptions, they are not mutually exclusive.98 This occurs not only to
constructivists, who bear the onus as the newcomer, but also to rationalists who attempt
to make sense of the encroachment of constructivism on the discipline. Such
engagements have produced alternative analyses of the relationship between norms and
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strategic action, such as that articulated by Robert Keohane. Keohane, who identifies
himself as a rationalist, argues that while norms have both regulative and constitutive
effects, constitutive effects have little bearing on behavior:
Katzenstein, Krasner and I have argued that even for rationalist
neoutilitarian research programs, constitutive norms can be seen as
important – not because they generate a coherent world culture but
because they create common knowledge, which is essential for
coordination (Katzenstein et al. 1998: 682). Even if strong international
and transnational constitutive norms are lacking, knowledge of the norms
that various agents and groups hold is important in affecting the strategies
that players employ. According to a rationalist neoutilitarian perspective
such as my own, however, constitutive norms serve essentially as a source
of background knowledge, significant for strategy but not determinative of
actions by state or non-state actors.99
In the debate about strategic action versus normative behavior, Keohane’s
position supports the former. The real question is not whether strategy or norms prevails,
however, but whether norms have an effect not reducible to that which can be explained
by rational choice, strategic or not.
Legitimacy and Norms
As Ian Hurd usefully argues, states sometimes use norms instrumentally, and in
doing so, “straddle the academic divide between the [two] logics.” The reason for this
centers on legitimacy—invoking norms to justify one’s behavior is strategic action for the
sake of locating the self within a particular normative order.100 According to Clark,
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“legitimacy makes any kind of sense only within a social context.”101 He adds that
“socially, legitimacy functions to prescribe recognition of the relevant actors, and also to
prescribe appropriate forms of conduct.”102 Clarke adds that “at the point where
legitimacy and legitimation overlap is a political terrain—the meeting ground of
norms…[and] distributions of power. Legitimacy entails not just standards but practices
in the form of “actors’ strategies of legitimation.”103 An act of legitimation is both social
and strategic since it upholds the norm of seeking approval even as the actor seeks to
manipulate perceptions and even distort the agreed upon meanings of the norm.104 Hurd
gives the example of non-aggression by states: “so prevalent is the reflex to justify war
as defensive or as invited that it is difficult to find a case of admitted aggression in the
post-1945 world.”105 Legitimacy is the key concept linking states and norms since it
accounts for the social context in which states seek power and cooperation,106 even as I
argue, in war.
Legitimacy is thus the goal of a process rather than a norm in its own right.
Norms are used to achieve legitimacy. Further, in a globalizing world, legitimacy is
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located in the intersection between international society and what Clark calls the “world
society,” characterized by shifting social bases and multiple audiences. On this account,
human rights is a “world society claim” by which “state actors were able to pursue their
interests via human rights, only because there was a world society constituency extending
beyond international society and to which appeal could be made.”107 To the extent that
the legitimacy of human rights is weighted against sovereignty in the international order,
we would expect to see the human rights interpretation of the CIN carry greater strategic
appeal.
Thus, contra Keohane, who sees strategically motivated action as negating the
explanatory power of norms, I employ a social notion of legitimacy that derives from the
observation that social life is inherently strategic in the sense that it entails
communicating, arguing about moral claims, and justifying one’s identity and actions to
one’s community, even a global civil society. A legitimacy gap on this account would
then be indicated by an inability to project identity or image as consistent with one’s
position vis a vis the prevailing normative order. Ultimately this means that the actor’s
strategies of legitimation have failed. Further, it indicates that reputation or image is
being controlled according to alter’s definition instead of ego’s. The causal mechanism
for changed behavior lies in the legitimacy gap—the failure to achieve identity on one’s
own terms. This means that when an actor is unable to control that image through words,
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it must close the legitimacy gap through deeds, which necessarily entails a redefinition of
interests—in this case, what it means to “win” a war.
The recognition that norms matter in ways not amenable to the rationalistconstructivist divide is important to my efforts to carve out a space in the growing body
of literature on state behavior toward civilians in war. It explains why what is in reality a
fairly straightforward question has not been posed to this point. I believe this is because
the literature on civilians in war is divided between branches of rationalism and
constructivism, with the security studies literature emphasizing the strategic dimensions
of civilians in war on the one hand and a norms-based approach emphasizing culture and
identity on the other. These alternative explanations for state behavior toward civilians
will be reviewed in chapter three.
First, chapter two of this study will undertake an in-depth historical overview of
the civilian immunity norm to show the specific constitutive effects that issue from this
norm, specifically how the nexus of law, morality, and power have coalesced around and
even within the norm for centuries. This chapter will highlight recent literature discussing
the constitutive effects of the norm on the international order itself, specifically in terms
of its embodiment of the tension between sovereignty and human rights. This concept of
international order draws on Reus-Smit’s notion of the “moral purpose of the state,”
meaning that every international order has a purposive function defined by the moral
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reason for being of the state.108 This concept serves to link the GWOT to moral norms by
way of communicating a moral purpose in the GWOT conceived as a defense of the
international order. This will lay the groundwork for interpreting the instrumental use of
the norm both in terms of making sovereign power claims about military necessity and in
terms of making identity claims by aligning with the human rights aspects of the norm.
The attitudes of states toward civilian casualties say a great deal about the extent to which
they perceive a legitimacy gap caused by civilian mistreatment. Likewise, the degree to
which states attempt to justify more expansive definitions of military necessity points to
the diminished strategic importance of the civilian immunity norm. This chapter will also
provide the background to understand the historical centrality the civilian immunity norm
to Western military culture.
In Chapter 3, I will narrow the literature to two strands that compete more directly
with my own hypothesis: First, I will review the literature on doctrinal innovation in the
military, primarily because this is the strand of literature that seeks to explain the change
in strategy in social scientific terms. Reviewing this theoretical literature will demonstrate
that a gap exists in the explanations for why it is that the innovation was successful; and I
will suggest that a norms explanation helps to fill that gap. Second, I will review the
literature that specifically seeks to show why and under what conditions states do or do
not victimize civilians. This will again demonstrate that the rationalist/constructivist
108
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divide is apparent in the explanatory categories (rationalist/strategic; regime type;
identity; and military culture) and that each, taken alone, does not adequately allow me to
pursue that account of norms that interests me. My own model hits on but transforms the
meanings and relationships between the concepts above; that is, I treat them not as
independent factors but rather integral dimensions of the same phenomenon: democratic
states strategically alter military culture to render their actions more consistent with the
identity claims of the state when they believe a legitimacy gap hinders their ability to act
effectively. The strategic use of the civilian immunity norm fills the legitimacy gap by
rendering consistent the message between the war of ideas and the war on the ground.
The extent to which there is variance between the cases is examined as a function of the
legitimacy gap, which I do in chapters 4 and 5.
The Material as Background
In order to test for the effects of the civilian immunity norm, the normative
environment or what some consider the normative “background” of C.O.I.N. must be
brought to the foreground. This means that the material will not be absent but will rather
be shifted to the background. One of the primary missing links within the norms literature
as applied to the civilian immunity norm is how international norms are intertwined with
material factors. No studies thus far have linked changing perceptions of interests of the
U.S. as being tied to its identity, or concerns about “who we are” as a nation, yet the “war
of ideas” suggests that winning the physical war is being increasingly tied to positive
assessments of U.S. identity. A constructivist understanding of reputation recognizes the
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socially negotiated nature of identity—that a state can assert its identity endlessly but that
unless it is recognized as what it claims to be, it has strategically failed at controlling
perceptions. Legitimacy is the central concept that ties together reputation costs with
norm compliance because the civilian immunity norm is essential to the reputation of the
U.S. in the eyes of foreign publics—they identify more closely with civilians than they do
states.
The central material factor at work in my model is derived directly from the
military literature: the strategic necessity to deprive insurgents, terrorists, and guerrillas
of ideological and material support, especially in terms of increased recruitment of
insurgents.109 This is key because this loss of a monopoly on violence within the
international realm leads strategic decision-makers to see the changing nature of warfare
as a global insurgency rather than a localized one. This understanding led to an effort to
shift from a “case-by-case” strategy to a broad doctrine. Whereas localized insurgencies
have always relied on delegitimizing the incumbent government, David Kilcullen, one of
the architects of the counterinsurgency strategy, points out that the transnational character
of contemporary insurgency is such that several battles are being fought simultaneously
(global terrorists, local, and regional battles are all taking place at once, all with different
goals) and that multiple audiences, some far away from the battlefield, provide support.
Indonesia, for example, was known to have been the source of many foreign fighters at
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one point in Iraq.110 Multiple populations thus characterize and vastly complicate the
global insurgency, or what has also recently been termed the post-Maoist “insurgency
archipelago.”111 The implications are that while the local population directly experiences
the effects of the struggle for legitimacy between insurgents and the host nation, which
may include civilian casualties as well as ideological, security, and economic
developments, extended audiences will most likely judge the insurgents or terrorists
versus the government on their treatment of civilians.
The changing nature of war is a highly contested topic,112 the full examination of
which falls outside the scope of this study. My point is rather that if leaders perceive it as
such, it helps to explain a shift in interests, even a revised idea of what it means to “win”
a war. While it is true that guerrilla warfare is nothing new and neither is
counterinsurgency, the political and informational context changes,113 as do what are
considered effective and “appropriate” strategies regarding civilians. Mary Kaldor points
out that the emerging global civil society that makes possible the participation of
progressive actors such as human rights–oriented NGOs and advocacy groups also makes
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possible the rise of violent actors who wish to challenge humanitarian, liberal norms.114
Although states sometimes press against such norms when it constrains what they see as
their sovereign prerogatives, the fact that the liberal human rights regime helps to
delegitimize violent non-state actors means that democratic states, at the least, have an
abiding rational interest in maintaining the primacy of their own position as guarantors
within such an order.
Summary of the Argument
This study employs a constructivist approach, arguing that states will choose to
strengthen compliance with the CIN when they see the constraining normative
environment as a key part of the strategic environment. Legitimacy is argued to be the
causal mechanism driving interests and identities to align more closely with the human
rights-based aspects of the international order. My argument, based on a social
conception of power, hinges on the observation that state interests change over time and
that this is evident as sovereignty-based attitudes toward civilian casualties move toward
a more constraining, human rights-based outlook. I identify three conditions under which
this occurs: when the normative/discursive framework of protecting civilians is seen as
essential to delegitimizing the enemy; when the legitimacy of the initial invasion is in
question, and civilian casualties are seen as damaging to the international image by
increasing that gap; and when regaining a monopoly on force is seen as impossible to
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achieve through material force alone because civilian casualties increase support for the
insurgency. Together, these provide the conditions under which aligning with human
rights-centered norms eventually come to be seen as the only viable strategy in fighting
insurgencies.
Overall, this study adds to the literature on the strategic importance of civilians in
conflict by testing for the influence of norms in shaping strategy. This particular norm
has not yet been considered as a possible cause of strategic change. In this sense, I aim to
further the ideational turn in security by showing that norms can be used instrumentally
even within war without being reduced to “cheap talk.” I also aim to contribute to the
ongoing attempt to bridge constructivism with rationalism through employing a logic that
makes use of both approaches.
The schematic below visually demonstrates the causal logic of the model, which
is that the war of ideas appeals to human rights-associated principles and values while the
physical war appeals to sovereignty-based values. Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) creates
a legitimacy crisis due to the inability to prevail in a way that reconciles the desired
identity (defender) with the desired interests (conventional winning through superior
force). Civilian protection is a strategy of legitimation that renders words and deeds
consistent, and in the process necessitates redefining interests as “winning” by
delegitimizing the enemy.
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Figure 1. Physical War Versus the War of Ideas
PHYSICAL WAR:
SOVERIEGNTY

Power/Force

Legitimacy
Gap:

CIVCAS

WAR OF IDEAS:
HUMAN RIGHTS

Principles/Values

(Civilian Casualties)

Research Design
Case Selection
George and Bennett suggest that one can reasonably select a single case for indepth study when it is a deviant, least likely, most likely, or crucial case.115 Afghanistan
and Iraq in some ways straddle the line between two cases and a single case, but I will
treat them as two cases. Even when treated as two cases, each conflict is still a crucial
case because it involves the most powerful state in the system. The two cases are two
separate conflicts that overlap in terms of the organization, state, time frames, and
personnel involved. Further, the C.O.I.N. doctrine that represents change within the
military is the outcome under study in the Iraq war, but it is applied later and to a lesser
extent in the Afghanistan war. C.O.I.N. claims to be conceived as a guide for both
conflicts, but in reality, it was not adopted in Afghanistan during the same process. As
two cases, they also demonstrate variance in terms of the perceived legitimacy of the
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invasion of each, and Afghanistan is a joint effort between the U.S. and the international
community. This allows me to compare the relative urgency with which civilian
casualties were treated, and in addition, material differences between the two conflicts
become evident.
Both theaters were considered at the time to be two fronts in the larger war on
terror. In this sense, both cases involving the U.S. are both least likely and crucial.116
They are the least likely or hard cases because, from a rationalist perspective, the power
position of the US makes it least likely to be punished for norms violations by
international institutions such as the International Criminal Court. It is least likely to
suffer intervention by other states, or economic or other sanctions from the international
community for killing civilians, and its domestic support for war is not historically
dependent on civilian casualties, but rather is more sensitive to troop casualties.117 Thus
by choosing a constraining strategy it is behaving in ways not expected from a purely
rationalist perspective.
From a constructivist perspective, they are crucial cases because the United States
has the soft power to set cultural norms, including international norms. Thus, what the
U.S. interprets in terms of norms has effects for the entire normative international
context. Early debates about the civilian immunity norm suggested that it could be
weakened by seeming U.S. indifference to civilian casualties. Moreover, given the
116
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immense resources devoted to the war on terror, the U.S. sees the ability to establish the
terms of the post 9-11 international order as in its own interests. Constructing the
normative environment so as to delegitimize terrorism and the use of violence by nonstate actors through strengthening the norm in the public discourse is consistent with its
demonstrated interests. No other case has the ability to impact the normative environment
in this way.
Data
This study employs multiple data sources. I began with interviews, asking broad
exploratory questions about C.O.I.N. and the U.S. shift in strategy, as well as about U.S.
attitudes toward civilian casualties. I conducted approximately twenty-two interviews
with active and retired military members, some enlisted who served in either or both
conflicts, some junior officers, and some high level officers, as well as other civilians
with an informed analytical perspective and professional insight. Because of the
extremely sensitive nature of the information shared with me, it was mutually agreed that
all identifying information would be excluded, with only general rank (lower level, junior
officers, et cetera) to be used when necessary to clarify differences in perspective among
groups of interviewees. For example, lower level enlisted personnel have a different
vantage point on war than those involved in the making of doctrine. This is noted when
applicable, though ranks of individuals are not.
Other military perspectives were gleaned from the voluminous literature, which is
both secondary and primary. I searched out and viewed or read articles, interviews,
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lectures, memoirs, and transcripts of congressional testimony, as well as leaked memos
authored by key decision-makers. In order to triangulate the data, I examined and
interpreted official security documents of the U.S. Government, speeches, and secondary
analytical and historical sources. Wiki-leaks provided access and cues to leaked classified
intelligence reports that helped to directly gauge U.S. concerns about civilian casualties
during key battles such as Fallujah in Iraq. Another important data source were the
primary conference reports detailing a series of meetings held with military officials from
2000 until after the adoption of C.O.I.N. in 2008. These reports demonstrate the change
in attitudes that took place among high level military officials over time and included
military and human rights academics who would eventually partake in the writing of the
actual doctrine. The increased role of these human rights workers in the process of
C.O.I.N. revision over time is taken as evidence of the diffusion of civilian-centered
human rights norms into the military throughout the innovation process.
Finally, I examined the debate internal to the military during the year preceding
the writing of the new doctrine, as well as the field manual itself and the early version of
the field manual that was later discarded. A structured comparison allows me to
demonstrate variance in how civilians were viewed strategically in older models of
counterinsurgency versus the innovated model. I specifically looked for indicators as to
whether civilians were seen as objects or as subjects in the war. For example, were they
grouped linguistically with material objects such as property, or were they seen as
participants in the social/political order? Was moral identity deemed important for
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military actors? Were civilian casualties mentioned, and if so, how consistent was the
treatment of civilians in the old versus new models? Reading historical and journalistic
accounts of both wars allows me to place the developments in C.O.I.N. into context,
particularly when it comes to events that garnered bad press for the U.S., such as
atrocities and controversies about torture, detainment, and civilian casualties.
Method
The method used is process tracing and historical explanation. The process tracing
method is suitable for constructivism since, as Wendt suggests, “the core of descriptions
of causal mechanisms is “process-tracing, which in social science ultimately requires case
studies and historical scholarship.”118 The aim is to “identify the intervening causal
process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent variable (or
variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”119 Lupovici agrees that
constructivist research designs should use process tracing in order to show a relationship
between variables. Because constructivism is also concerned with how the normative
context matters, constructivists “need to study both the behavioural and the discursive
dimensions.” “Crucial junctures” must be identified “in order to ‘tell the two stories’, and
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to actually establish the regulative as well as the constitutive eﬀects norms have on
behaviour.”120
As recommended by George and Bennett, this study will employ a structured,
focused comparison, which means that both cases are narrowed to the same questions in
order to guide and standardize the data. The aim of each case study is to tell the story of
civilian casualties, whether and how such casualties came to be seen as problematic, and
whether and how this problem contributed to the civilian-centered institutional outcome.
The questions used to structure each case were as follows:
1. What was the baseline legitimacy level of each invasion based on
international sentiment?
2. Did the attitudes toward civilian casualties change over time? At what point
did civilian casualties come to be seen as problematic and why?
3. What were the crucial junctures in each conflict that led to the development of
new approaches, whether strategic or doctrinal? Were civilian casualties seen
as driving these changes? To what extent and how?
4. What kind of contact did military insiders have with the human rights
community? Did attitudes toward the human rights community change over
time? How is this expressed in the institutional outcome? (i.e. changes to
minimize civilian casualties?
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5. What explains the variance in the two cases in terms of when each adopted a
new approach and to what extent? For example, why was Iraq the first to
inspire new doctrinal thinking and why was population protection in
Afghanistan only considered later?
6. What institutional changes brought about as a result of civilian casualties cut
across both conflicts?
Because the institution (U.S. military) and the umbrella conflict (GWOT) are the
same for both wars, I divided the time periods for each conflict in such a way that overlap
was minimal. This allowed me to speak about human rights development from 20012012s within the military as a single continuous phenomenon. The Iraq chapter will
include the early years and Afghanistan the later years. Human rights is primarily
examined through the military’s interactions with a particular human rights group at
Harvard university, which is spread across the two cases. Moreover, the sequential steps
of human rights adoption structures the time periods, with Iraq containing the first three
phases: instrumental use, argumentation, and persuasion, and Afghanistan containing the
last two phases of habitualization and institutionalization.121
Since the CIN is not a visible variable, it must be proxied by attitudes toward
civilian casualties throughout the phases noted above. As Lupovici explains, “another
method for the study of norms is based on examining the actors’ arguments about
121
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normative behavior.”122 Modified behavior is indicated by the efforts to change doctrine
(actual doctrinal changes do not always coincide with more visible troop buildups, such
as the surge in Iraq). The crucial juncture in each conflict is identified as the time when
the military saw civilian casualties as driving a legitimacy crisis. Coverage of each
conflict ends upon doctrinal change toward civilian-protection; however, Afghanistan
continues beyond doctrinal change so that more permanent institutional changes can be
noted. The expected sequence of events is increased attention to civilian casualties,
perceptions of a legitimacy crisis, and then attempts to innovate doctrine to remedy the
situation.
Because mutual constitution of identity and interests are the primary focus,
Lupovic argues that discourse analysis is needed to show constitutive effects. Discourse
analysis may entail varied approaches, but this study employs critical discourse analysis,
an interpretive approach that aims at analyzing the construction of meaning through
language. It is critical insofar as it aims to explicate relationships of power. Since my
own argument draws on the discourse analysis of others, especially (as will be explained
in chapter two) on Kinsella's theory that the “civilian” is produced by locating subjects
within discourses of barbarism, I will apply Kinsella’s ideas to the case under study.
Doing so allows me to demonstrate the war on terror rhetoric as a norms-driven discourse
meant to produce identities in relation to international law and morality. Contextualizing
the discourse of terrorism as a continuation of the “barbarism versus civilization”
122
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discourse indicates the perceived need to delegitimize the enemy by invoking aspects of
the CIN that resonate with the international community.
Moreover, in this approach, identity becomes a relational concept inseparable
from power interests, making it compatible with a constructivist lens. This particular
notion of discourse is thus Foucaultvian in that it sees language as the focal point of
power and discourse.123 This interpretive approach examines the language employed to
legitimize political action, as well as attempts to construct a preferred identity to
legitimize interests. What I will look for in terms of discourse is if and how the historical
language of the CIN is invoked instrumentally, as part of the GWOT, to what extent the
same language claims are used to delegitimize the enemy, and then to what extent the
same language claims are later seen as having created a rhetorical trap.
The intervening process will comprise the bulk of my analysis, and evidence of
the presence of the civilian immunity norm will not thus be taken as evidence of the
influence of the civilian immunity norm, but rather concerns about how image is
connected to legitimacy in relation to the norm serves as the key indicator that the norm
is important causally. Legitimacy in this case is not derived from an objective
measurement imposed externally but rather a subjective concern for how civilian
casualties are being interpreted by multiple audiences at the same time, with an emphasis
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on the Arab/Muslim communities within the warzone and outside as well.124 How this is
communicated within the military as a concern is indicated by literal mentions of
legitimacy as well as expressions that suggest a concern for how behavior reflects on the
national and institutional image.
Furthermore, in order to show the movement from sovereignty interpretations of
CIN to human rights interpretations, I will look for the language of sovereignty in the
beginning, especially during the invasion and shortly thereafter. Table 1 shows that
sovereignty indicators of CIN are measured by an emphasis on the military necessity
principle as an enabling factor in killing civilians. Treating civilian deaths as the cost of
doing business, or as the inevitable outcome of military operations, or as the fault of the
enemy, is an indicator of a sovereignty orientation. Table 1 also shows that movement
toward a human rights interpretation is indicated by humanity principles (distinction,
precaution). Proportionality lies somewhere in between and can be used for either
enabling or constraining. Treating civilian casualties as “allowable’ collateral damage
indicates a tendency to privilege the proportionality principle of the CIN. The key here
would be the extent to which the military thought it necessary to emphasize their
constraint.
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The increasing human rights orientation will also be measured by the extent to
which the military as an organization follows the predictable steps toward norm diffusion
mentioned above. The expected relationship over time is that the proper lens for viewing
civilians moves away from sovereignty and toward human rights, which is indicated by
the constituent concepts within the norm.
Table 1. Civilian Immunity Norm: Principles and Underlying Meta-Norms

More Sovereignty

Less Sovereignty

Less Human Rights

More Human Rights

Military Necessity

Proportionality

Precaution

Distinction

Expected Findings Combining Process Tracing and Discourse Analysis
Early Invasion
Each case study will begin by placing the conflict into context within the larger
global war on terror and determining a baseline level of legitimacy. This will be based on
broad sentiments of the international community regarding the legitimacy of the invasion,
the degree of international support and involvement in the conflict, and where available,
attitudes of relevant audiences, especially those of Arab and Muslim audiences. When
perceptions of legitimacy are high, I expect to find a lower concern for civilian casualties
in terms of damage to social reputation, values, or “who we are,” in connection with the
treatment of civilians (while at the same time a high level of claiming an identity based
on human rights, democratic values, and a high regard for innocent life in comparison to
terrorists). In the face of criticism about casualties, however, I would expect to find
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attitudes of sovereign power expressed in terms of “military necessity” and legalistic
referents to the norm in connection with casualties; denial, displacement of blame, and
other dismissive statements rather than attempts to create identity alliances with human
rights in the face of criticism. Regarding the war of ideas, I would expect to find little
recognition that the war of ideas is contingent on actions in the physical war.
Rising Insurgency
The causal steps should reflect an early recognition of an insurgency and the need
to re-establish the monopoly of force. The level of concern for reputation costs incurred
by civilian casualties would remain low in the beginning and would grow after force is
escalated and the need for a clear choice about strategy begins to become apparent.
Sensitivity to the strategic of killing civilians will become more common, and arguments
will begin to surface about reducing casualties as a matter of winning both the war of
ideas and the war on the ground. This will be intensified at key points of global criticism
of the U.S. reputation as being tarnished and will take on urgency as the connection
between strategic failure and identity becomes evident to key innovators in the military.
As an indicator of a crucial juncture, I would expect to find an increasingly explicit
articulation of the need for legitimacy in counterinsurgency, and it would be increasingly
connected to the idea that killing civilians produces recruits for the enemy.
Adoption of C.O.I.N.
Upon adoption, I would expect to see a concern for operationalizing the ethical
standards involved in population protection. Appeals to the ethical warrior culture will be
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apparent—words like virtue, honor, ethical, moral high ground will become more
common in communications both to the public and to the soldiers. Institutionalization of
ethical treatment of civilians will be a goal, and the military will continue to seek out help
from human rights workers in order to figure out the details of what is required to
maintain a policy of civilian protection. I would also expect to find more coherent and
explicit articulations of why this ethical turn is the only possible one for the U.S. to
adopt. Connections will be made explicit between the war of ideas and the war on the
ground. A newfound appreciation for strategic communication and controlling the
narrative will emerge in the military, and a policy of accountability will emerge in
military culture.
Falsification
Lupovici explains that
the mere fact that there are actors who violate the norm does not
necessarily indicate that the norm does not exist….This is exactly why
Kratochwil and Ruggie argue that norms cannot be falsiﬁed and hence
cannot be regarded as ‘variables.’125
My hypothesis will be considered falsified in the absence of supporting evidence
as documented above. Counter-evidence would not include material incentives since that
is a background to the norm. However, material factors that overrule or crowd out
legitimacy concerns would be taken as counter to my hypothesis. Statements that
disregard the sequential order of events centered on legitimacy concerns would weaken
the hypothesis; for example, patterns of statements that suggest that population protection
125
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was preferred from the beginning but was only hampered by operational problems would
imply a high level of norm internalization that alone explained the shift in doctrine.
Statements that the U.S. reserves the right to revert to all necessary means would counter
the theory of the legitimacy gap. Statements that indicate that it mattered little, if at all,
how the U.S. was perceived by foreign audiences in terms of civilian casualties. If
coercive strategies were seriously considered but not chosen for purely instrumental
reasons, without regard for social damage to the U.S. reputation, this would be
considered evidence of a pure logic of consequences, or rationalism with no need for the
addition of norms.
The next chapter provides an historical account that demonstrates both the long
history of the norm as a social concern as well as the centrality of the CIN to the evolving
moral purpose of the state order.

CHAPTER TWO
HISTORY OF THE CIVILIAN IMMUNITY NORM
History provides the strongest proof of the importance of moral factors
and their often incredible effect: this is the noblest and most solid
nourishment that the mind of a general may draw from a study of the past.
--Carl Von Clausewitz
To introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation
would be an absurdity.
--Carl Von Clausewitz
As discussed in the previous chapter, the concepts of war and morality seem, on
the face of things, oxymoronic: war unleashes political power in its rawest form, which is
the use of force to coerce, subjugate, or even to destroy an opposing group; morality on
the other hand implies limits based on the recognition of some sort of duties or
obligations. The logic of force is potentially limitless, as famously stated by Clausewitz
in the above quote;1 yet as this chapter will demonstrate, Western ways of war have long
been embedded in a tradition of moral contemplation and rule-making.2 A short history
of those rules as they apply to the protection of civilians fulfills three purposes: first, to
provide a deeper understanding of the historical context of the CIN; second, to highlight
the constitutive role of the norm in the international order; finally, to demonstrate from
1
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the constitutive role of the norm in the international order; finally, to demonstrate from
where my qualitative measures derive by showing the norm’s development as the reason
for its embodiment of the tension between sovereignty and human rights. Let me begin
with a brief explication of why an historical overview matters in this case.
Since war, as the realm of politics most resembling anarchy, has been considered
the province of realism, the significance of morality (or ideational factors writ large) in
the face of material interests has been largely dismissed. This view of morality is itself
historical; that is, how morality has been understood to matter (or not) changes over time.
This fact disappears in structural realism, which takes an ahistorical view reflective of its
basic assumptions about states and the state system. This sort of structural explanation
presents insurmountable problems for discerning the effects of moral norms, yet its
emphasis on power is indispensable for explaining the use of force. Given the ideational
turn in the past couple of decades, which has inspired reinterpretations of the realist
canon, it has become increasingly evident that the idea that war occupies a realm separate
from the rest of the moral and political world is itself an historical development. Even
Clausewitz, the most influential military strategist and philosopher of war of the 19th
century believed that morality matters, though to be sure morality for him mattered in a
way that would hardly resonate with contemporary readers—as morale of the soldiers. In
that vein, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a history of the moral limits that came
to be known as the civilian immunity norm, as well as its contextual significance in
shaping the broader normative order.
Derived from just war principles, informed by state practice and military tradition,
and ensconced in international treaties and customary law, the civilian immunity norm is
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often heralded as the oldest, most entrenched of all international norms, preceding even
modern sovereignty and the Westphalian state system. The aim of the civilian immunity
norm is simple in that it attempts to limit the permissible harm done to groups of people
now known as civilians or noncombatants. It is considered the core moral norm of
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), also known as the Laws of Armed Combat
(LOAC).3 Simple on the face of things, the norm presents an enigma in that while it
generates a high level of consensus (which is at least partially implied in its definition), it
has also proven fragile, contingent, and in near constant danger of collapse in the face of
a changing international context.4 Terrorism, the strategy of warfare whereby non-state
actors hide among and purposefully target civilians, is only the latest in a long series of
challenges to the norm.
The paradoxical character of the civilian immunity norm means that narratives of
either progress or decline (or even of irrelevance) fail to capture its significance,5 not
only to the practice of war but to international law and international relations more
generally. As Helen Kinsella writes, “the laws of war,” and struggles to define the
principle of distinction between combatant and civilian, “offer substantial insight into the
conceptualization and institutionalization of relations among states over time.”6 These

3

David Kretzmer, "Civilian Immunity in War: Legal Aspects," in Civilian Immunity in War, ed. Igor
Primoratz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 87.
4

For a recent explication of this view as it relates to the Baltic Wars of the 1990s, see Kaldor, New and Old
Wars.
5

Another common view is that the norm made progress until the twentieth century when it was nearly
obliterated by World War 2. From that point on, some see progress—see Thomas, Ethics of Destruction.
Others see a steady decline—see Igor Primoratz, Civilian Immunity in War, 21-22. For a more nuanced
view, see Kaldor, Global Civil Society; Kaldor, New and Old Wars.
6

Kinsella, “Genealogy of the ‘Civilian,’” 15.

65

laws have been “both reflective of and constitutive of” particular sociopolitical orders.7
As such, many of the key tensions that characterize the contemporary international
context, such as the competing dictates of state sovereignty versus human rights, are
embodied in the norms protecting civilians.8 Moral strictures have thus functioned to both
enable and limit war’s violent potential, suggesting a more problematic relationship
between morality and power than is commonly acknowledged by conventional realism. 9
By highlighting the norm’s growing importance in relation to identity and interests in the
international order, and its enabling and constraining elements, this chapter will also
support my central premise that doctrinal innovation centered on minimizing civilian
casualties presents a puzzle. In addition to setting the historical stage for the cases under
study, the chapter will provide a concrete frame of reference for the ensuing theoretical
discussion of norms, how they function, and the methodological challenges that issue
from attempting to bridge empirical analysis with an expressly normative subject matter.
The sections that follow will be organized into three parts. First, to demonstrate a
pattern of increasing consensus about the importance of civilians in ethical theory, this
chapter will discuss the development of the idea of civilian immunity as an important
7
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component of the ethical concerns of just war doctrine. Second, it will address some of
the seeming contradictions within the norm itself. Third, it will provide an overview of
the development of the legal norm of noncombatant immunity, as codified through
treaties and conventions, which will link the strengthened consensus to increasing levels
of specificity and precision in legal terms, with special attention paid to major
developments in international politics that shaped the outcome of the conventions. In
doing so, this work will highlight key problematic aspects of the norm that prevent or
limit consensus and thus potentially weaken its practice.
Theoretical Origins and Development in Just War Theory
As mentioned above, the roots of the civilian immunity norm are located
primarily in just war theory, the systematic and influential body of thought concerned
with the justice of war, both in terms of when war may be waged (jus ad bellum) and how
it is fought (jus in bello). While Saint Augustine is typically credited with the birth of just
war doctrine, Brian Orend argues that its earliest contributions can be traced to GrecoRoman origins.10 Aristotle and Plato were both concerned with the just cause of war and
what could be rightly done with conquered populations. While the distinction between
combatant and civilian was both a theoretical and legal achievement of the
enlightenment, attempts to specify when and why soldiers should be subject to harm
provide the ethical foundation and impetus for eventually considering the additional
category of those who should be protected from harm altogether. Richard Shelly Hartigan
explains that the earliest precursors to the concept of the civilian were born of both moral
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imagination and practical necessities of life in the ancient Greek polis. The city-state
allowed the civis, or citizen, the stability and leisure necessary for intellectual reflection
but this arrangement also created a practical distinction:
The city, urban living, with shelter secure from the elements and food supplies
assured, meant civilization. It was the sine qua non of civilization. However, ancient man
was forced to pay a price for the luxury of that reflection afforded him by urban living.
He had to organize and institutionalize a portion of the city’s population for its defense.
Thus was born the soldier, and his alter ego, the civilian.11
To be sure, the emerging moral concept of the civilian had little effect on
widespread practices of slaughter and enslavement in Ancient Greece. Greek society was
extremely parochial, entailing little if any sense of shared humanity with enemy
populations, particularly with non-Greeks or Barbarians. It would not be until the citystate began to decline and the Roman Empire began to rise that Stoicism in the preChristian era would produce the seeds of a “feeling” that “some members of an enemy
population ought to be spared.”12 Other early Roman contributions to the jus in bello
(justice in war) include among others, Cicero, a proponent of moderation who asserted
that surrendering soldiers ought not be slaughtered, and Ambrose, mentor to Augustine,
who called for virtuous fighting.13
Out of this context arrives Saint Augustine of Hippo, a towering figure in just war
theory. Augustine is notable for framing the Greco-Roman ethical concerns within a
11
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Christian context, and here we can see that the use of force had to be justified against a
set of moral imperatives grounded in identity: how could Christians follow the pacifistic
teachings of Christ and at the same time wage war on behalf of their communities?
Augustine was much more concerned with the question of jus ad bellum, or when is a
war just and permissible. His answer was “to repulse an invading enemy, avenge a
wrong, and punish those guilty of breaching the peace.”14 His contribution to jus in bello
is less recognized, for while he advocates limitations on even just violence, this was
mere repetition of the type already commonly made for practical purposes—sparing
women and children in the hope that the other side might reciprocate in the future, or for
even more banal economic reasons: to preserve them for slavery.15 What Augustine did
contribute to jus in bello is that a Christian must have right intention, both in waging war
and in fighting it. In order to protect the city from encroaching barbarians, employing
force must be motivated by “the right intention [which is] love for, and desire to protect,
the endangered innocents,” and it must be carried out in somber, dispassionate fighting.16
So while moral condemnation against unnecessary slaughter was already in place,
Augustine added, “no slaughter at all with desire for glory or revenge.”17
Augustine’s theoretical contributions did not directly impact the precarious
position of what we now think of as civilians, mostly because his formulation of “just
cause” overrode any latent concern for innocents of the enemy population. On
14
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Augustine’s account, unjust societies were more than likely to be populated by unjust
souls. His model of war is therefore distinctively punitive not only toward rulers, but
toward the population. Though Augustine admitted the possibility that some innocents
may be killed, his practical inclination suggested that in any case, innocence is an interior
condition that cannot be readily identified by soldiers. Moreover, death and unjust
punishment in war were for him not the worst evils, because “in eternity they quite
escape punishment.”18 Regardless, as Hartigan points out, Augustine’s contribution to jus
in bello is “a groping and hesitant articulation of a guilt-innocence opposition” that leads
eventually to the familiar “innocent civilian” which would shape the norm for centuries,
and which is still used in popular political discourse today.
Though the following centuries of the Dark Ages were not known for great
intellectual achievement, they “did manage big progress on the jus in bello front.”19
Christian charity and mercy mixed with aristocratic chivalric codes of honor and fair play
provided the normative bases for many of these conventions.20 Through consultation with
Augustine’s writings and the Bible, the church further specified moral obligations toward
civilians. Influenced by battlefield practices, changing weaponry, and even violent
sporting practices of the times, such as jousting, papal edicts in the tenth century set forth
a fairly concrete set of rules which were later developed and consulted by many different
sources. The “Peace of God” and the “Truce of God”—as well as the 1139 Second
Lateran Council and Gratian’s 1148 Decretum resulted in, for the first time, women and
18
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children being singled out for immunity from attack based loosely on their noncombatant
status. Other types of harmful methods of fighting were prohibited as well, including the
destruction of food sources, using crossbows, and employing weapons dipped in poison.21
As Kinsella points out, the emphasis on military honor, chivalry and fair play, and
Christian values are important aspects of the Just War tradition since they will be central
to the development of the idea of “civilization” as a qualifier consulted to determine who
was deserving of protection and who was not.22 In terms of norm development, which is
generally indicated by increasing specificity, the events of this era indicate increasingly
specific behavioral obligations toward the protection of certain persons, and they build on
previous doctrine, indicating a strengthening normative consensus about the protection of
certain persons over many hundreds of years. On the other hand, many persons were
either excluded (particularly Non-Christians) or considered “unfortunate, unintended
victims.”23
Another important benchmark for the civilian immunity norm occurs in the
thirteenth century when St. Thomas Aquinas contributes the principle of proportionality,
which limits the force that can be morally justified to that which is proportionate to the
military advantage gained. He also provides the earliest articulation of the doctrine of
double-effect, which states that the good done by unintentionally killing civilians should
outweigh the harm, indicating a sense of precaution that must be taken to limit even
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“necessary” violence.24 At this point, two of the three limiting principles that make up
the civilian immunity norm have been conceptualized, even if primitively: distinction and
proportionality—with the third being precaution. Distinction carries the heaviest
normative weight in that is logically and morally prior to the other two limiting
principles.
It is noteworthy that insofar as the earliest preoccupations with the moral limits of
war focused on when war could be waged and by whom, the frame of reference was
nearly a complete reversal of what is today. That is, rather than assume the inevitability
and almost naturalization of war in anarchy, the pacifist position of the early Christian
church required answers to the question of why it was permissible to kill at all, and only
then who could justly be harmed. It was this line of thinking that eventually led to a
corollary logic: if some may be harmed without assigning moral culpability to their
killers, then it follows that others should be protected.
As mentioned above, as just war doctrine developed, it became the foundation for
the earliest forms of international law, and its concepts and categories eventually fueled
aspirations of an international society of states. The roots of society (based on social
interactions, in contrast to the realist idea of a “system”), were anchored in its attempts to
limit war, even as the Peace of Westphalia approached, and war became increasingly
recognized as a tool of statecraft. Paradoxically, the emphasis on state sovereignty was
accompanied by an increased emphasis on the individual and the role of reason. The
autonomous rational man in natural law accompanied the sovereign nation-state, which
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led to the next crucial turn in the development of the civilian immunity norm. This dual
autonomy of individual and state would eventually come to be seen as an opposition and
would be expressed in the development of international “humanity’s law.” Humanity’s
law is a term coined by Teitel, who observes the increasing emphasis in international law
on the interests of human beings as separate from or even in opposition to the interests of
states. 25
The Transition from Just War to International Law
As the ecclesiastical tradition gave way to the Peace of Westphalia and the rise of
the nation-state, Just War concepts became secularized and increasingly universalized by
way of natural law. Three men who figured prominently in this historical transition were
Francisco de Vitoria, an important Catholic theologian and political theorist of the
sixteenth century, Hugo Grotius, the seventeenth century “grandfather of international
law,” and Emmerich de Vattel, a Swiss jurist who lived more than a century later.26 It
was Vitoria who first invoked natural law and claimed that the “deliberate slaughter of
the innocent is never lawful in itself.”27 This distinction was for him based on the guilt of
the combatants who bore arms and the presumed innocence of those who did not, unless
proven otherwise. Categories of protected classes included “women, children, clerics,
religious, foreign travelers, guests of the country, ‘harmless agricultural folk, and also …
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the rest of the peaceable civilian population.’”28 Colm McKeogh argues that the practical
effects for civilians were progressive in a general sense, but that the argument was
incoherent because Vitoria attempted to fit natural law claims into an Augustinian
punitive war framework. Recall that Augustine assumed that the responsibility for the
wickedness perpetrated by the ruler was the basis for jus ad bellum and that the entire
population shared in this guilt. The problem for Vitoria is that it cannot be said that
soldiers of both sides are guilty if only one side has just cause, since guilt is what entitles
one side to punish the other.
McKeogh argues that the civilian immunity norm as we currently understand it
was only made possible because Grotius, in employing natural law, challenged the
millennium old model of punitive wars that was justified within the Augustinian tradition
as punishment for sin. Grotius paves the way for a state’s moral obligation toward the
enemy population by insisting on universalizable principles, not just categories, as the
basis for judgment. Jus ad bellum, or the cause for war, was universalized first, in the
sense that self- preservation, rather than the guilt or innocence of the collective enemy,
became the justification for fighting. This was necessary in part because the rise of the
nation-state meant that standing armies and frequent warfare stretched Augustine’s
punitive justification for war incredibly thin, and yet the requirements of sovereignty—as
an agreement rather than its later realist meaning as an eternal material fact—necessitated
the reconciliation of war with the moral framework meant to regulate state relations.
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The effect on jus in bello was that the actions of the person under consideration
must be invoked as reasons justifying his death.29 In shifting the moral locus of concern
away from the soldier’s internal state, Grotius far surpasses Augustine’s prohibition on
passionate or vengeful killing. According to Grotius, “the law of nature does not allow
inflicting reprisals, except on the actual person who committed the offense. Nor is it
enough that by a kind of fiction the enemy may be regarded as forming a single body.”30
Emmerich de Vattel adds to Grotius’ basic imperative nearly a century later: “The
sovereign is the real author of war, which is made in his name and at his command. The
troops, both officers and soldiers, and in general all the persons by whom the sovereign
carries on war, are only instruments in his hands. They execute his will and not their
own.”31 While instruments who fight may be killed without attributing guilt, civilians,
who retain personhood and cannot be considered instruments, may therefore not be
subject to harm: “as they do not resist the enemy by force or violence, they give the
enemy no right to use it towards them.”32 Consideration of just cause was, importantly,
effectively separated from justice in fighting, at least on theoretical grounds. The later
legal norm based on this distinction is considered by most analysts to be crucial to
protecting civilians since the state is seen as possessing its own will, superceding that of
combatants but separate from that of civilians. Overall, the Enlightenment revision of just
29
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war doctrine produced a version of civilian immunity that served to square the normative
and material conditions of the time, and as Kinsella points out, to invoke natural law as a
transition to the emerging Law of Nations.33
Theorizing about the justness of the causes of war ended for the most part with
Vattel, precisely because of the conditions of modern sovereignty:
But how shall this law be made to prevail in the quarrel of Nations and
sovereigns who live together in a state of nature? They recognize no
superior who shall decide between then and define the rights and
obligation of each.34
As Just War Theory declined, the secular turn produced the voluntary Law of
Nations and the “science” of international law wherein the justness of war was not at
issue so much as the conduct of war. This period of “law” was social rather than
positivist, that is, based on custom, which included practice as well as conventional
concepts and ways of reasoning. This period is hailed by some as the height of the
civilian immunity norm, wherein agreements between sovereign states were based on a
shared consensus and reciprocity. These customary understandings would greatly inform
the later codification of international law. The result was that the positive laws of war, in
assuming the inevitability of war between sovereigns, were more concerned with what is
than what should be. The positivist bent produced problems for grounding the norm,
however, in that natural law theorists attempted to shift its foundations from a moral
imperative to a material fact. As McKeogh points out, Vitoria and his successor Suarez
attempted to link the “powerful moral concepts of guilt and innocence to the material
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facts of combatancy and non-combatancy…yet they can link them only by
presumption.”35 The difficulties of establishing a solid grounding for distinguishing
between civilians and combatants, combined with many other customary ways of
rationalizing who can be harmed and who cannot, leads to a permissiveness that has
undermined the imperative to protect.
While the principles of the norm seem straightforward at first glance, the history
thus far shows that the norm, even as it gained coherence and a level of consensus among
nation-states, has historically allowed for the killing of large numbers of civilians. This is
not simply because states have failed to realize the norm’s ideals but also because the
norm itself is constituted by tensions between its enabling and constraining elements.
These tensions are an inherited feature of the norm that help to account for its continued
enigmatic character today.
The basic tension derives from just war theory itself. As a compromise between
realism and pacifism, the just war tradition tries to find a middle way between acceptance
of war and limiting its devastating effects. The constituent concepts of the civilian
immunity norm (distinction, proportionality, precaution, and military necessity) reflect
the interplay of power and morality, with the result that military necessity (as interpreted
in state practice) has historically limited attempts to increase the norm’s precision and
specificity. This becomes evident in the codification process, and provides insight into
why large number of civilians can be killed without necessarily violating the norm.

35

Colm McKeogh, Innocent Civilians: The Morality of Killing in War (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 94.

77

One of the tensions that accounts for this weakness in the norm is found in
double-effect reasoning, the proportionality principle applied to jus in bello that was first
articulated in medieval times by Aquinas. This compromise between morality and what is
deemed “military necessity” reflects the tension between sovereignty based on state
rights and natural law rights (eventually known as human rights) based on universal
notions of humanity. While developments in the civilian immunity norm depended on the
extension of rights to individual human beings to counter notions of collective guilt and
punishment, the reality of war is that it kills civilians. Since Just War, and then
international law based on its principles, seeks a middle way between realism’s
acceptance of war and pacifism’s rejection of violence, double-effect is the compromise
that makes war possible. In other words, were the pacifist stance—the total moral
prohibition on killing—followed, even if it were modified to allow for the killing of
soldiers but not for civilians, it is generally assumed that war would be impossible.
Double-effect is a moral loophole, so to speak, whereby foreseen but unintentional deaths
of civilians are permissible so long as they are “not productive of the military goal and
proportionate to the good sought.”36
Criticism abounds on this point. Just as Augustine saw innocence as an interior
state that would not be visible to soldiers, political theorists have raised the problematic
of attributing intention or its absence to states since the will of states is abstract, and can
often only be judged by acts or by agents.37 Moreover, the line between what is
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intentional versus what is unintentional but foreseen is unclear and often shifts at the
tactical and operational levels of military action. In a related vein, military necessity is
also a potentially limitless concept. Moreover, critics such as McKeogh charge that the
premises of double-effect violate the very basis for civilian immunity: the separation of
ad bellum and in bello on the one hand, and the distinction between instrument and
personhood on the other:
Civilians ought not be killed as a side effect of an action to save one’s own
combatants, for combatants may be treated as instruments, but civilians
remain persons; it is not the case that two combatant lives saved outweigh
one civilian life lost. Rather, the attack on the military target is only an
intermediate step, a means to the end of victory in the war. Its worth
cannot be assessed without reference to the ad bellum end for which the
war is waged by that party to the conflict.38
Furthermore, because the assessment of proportionality takes place event by
event, the “cumulative loss of civilian life can become disproportionate to the strategic
end of the war.”39 Regardless of its moral and theoretical limitations, double-effect and
proportionality remain crucial concepts in international law, both enabling the killing of
some civilians for the purposes of state, while limiting that killing, at least in theory. This
remains one of the most controversial, but arguably practically essential, elements of the
civilian immunity norm. Moreover, this moral tension represents well how power and
morality interact to both enable and constrain the killing of civilians in war. It also
suggests that empirical research focused on the norm’s regulative effects would benefit
from breaking the norm down into its constituent parts: does military necessity expand to
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become more permissive of killing civilians, for example? Do the parties to the conflict
emphasize the sovereign rights of states over the human rights of civilians, or vice versa?
Another explanation offered for the inherent fragility of the norm is the
indeterminacy of the principle of distinction itself. In her groundbreaking and highly
regarded work, Helen Kinsella argues that despite the accomplishments of Just War
theory, identifying who exactly counts as a civilian—and thus who should be subject to
harm and who should not—has shifted considerably throughout history. Rather than
taking this as evidence of the norm’s irrelevance, however, she insists that the effects of
the norm cannot be understood by measuring compliance alone, but also by its
constitutive effects. Tracing the codification process through the major preparatory
conferences, debates, and drafts of diplomatic treaties that mark the norm’s milestones,
Kinsella finds that the transition of the norm from a social to a legal (positivist) status can
only be properly understood in light of the social identities, historical discourses, and
power relations that shaped it.
By comparing conflicts that occurred directly before or after major milestones in
the norm’s development, Kinsella was able to explain variance in the norm’s effects that
could not be measured by numbers alone. She hypothesizes, and convincingly
demonstrates, that because the distinction between civilian and combatant was an
historical process, specifying who is a civilian relies on shifting, often inconsistent
criteria based on gender, civilization, and innocence.40 Gender, for example, is often used
in a way considered to be synonymous with “civilian” (women and children being the
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most common definition). Differences in the definition of “innocence,” however, can
support or negate the use of gender and even age as a marker of “civilian.” For example,
innocence has been applied according to a continuum of loyalty during the U.S. Civil
War, and women who were considered disloyal were killed alongside men and even
children. The concept was applied differently in the same time frame, involving some of
the same military personnel, in the case of the Indian Sand Massacre. Here, innocence, as
applied to Indians, was defined as ignorance or harmlessness, but innocence was
overridden by distinctions of “civilization.” Who counted as a civilian deserving of
protection was much narrower, and the killing more permissive, because the war was
seen as being waged “on behalf of civilization.”
It may be tempting to view the weakness in the civilian immunity norm as an
unacknowledged byproduct of the age of colonization but irrelevant to the development
of the norm per se. Kinsella pushes beyond the mere fact of shifting standards, however,
and ties the development of the principle of distinction to the interests and identities of
the emerging European empires and the European order of states. On her account,
“civilization” was the identity attribute understood to be shared by European states.
Earlier notions of chivalric codes of military honor loosely structured the (voluntary)
Laws of Nations between these states, but such laws were not seen as applicable to the
wars of colonization. For Kinsella, the importance of the transition from an ecclesiastical
to a secular order is that “Vitoria substituted the right of conquest held by Christian states
for that held by civilized states.”41 Civilization takes its meaning from its binary
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opposition—barbarism, and wars of colonization were seen as being launched on behalf
of civilization. However, barbarism has also historically been constructed as a descriptor
of wars that do not honor the civilian/soldier distinction—that is, they are “barbarous”
wars.42
Although the barbarian is presumed to demarcate a clear opposite or
absolute limit of civilization, the barbarian is, in fact, immanent to
civilization. The barbarian is said to wage war unconstrained and
undisciplined, this is among the characteristics of barbarism. And yet,
against the barbarian, civilized entities may wage a war unconstrained and
undisciplined. Consider the effects of this upon the entire distinction of
barbarian and civilized believed to arise from the putative self-discipline,
restraint, and moderation of civilized entities. Does this distinction
disappear? Or, was it simply never there? Answers to either underscore
that the barbarian remains the constitutive outside, presupposed and
prefigured by civilization.43
The concept of civilization served not only to allow for what most would now
consider violations of the civilian immunity norm, but “the shaping of the laws
themselves” were a means by which “civilized nations and civilized men defined and
defended their interests and identities.”44 Consider how Grotius links the civilized
identity of the emerging society of European states to their conduct in war:
There is a common law among nations, which is valid alike for war and in
war . . . . Throughout the Christian world I observed a lack of restraint in
relation to war, such as even barbarous races should be ashamed of: I
observed that men rush to arms for slight causes, or no cause at all, and
that when arms have once been taken up there is no longer any respect for
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law, divine or human; it is as if, in accordance with a general decree,
frenzy had openly been let loose for the committing of all crime.45
In other words, the construction of the laws of war were an important site of the
construction of the international order built on the recognition of sovereignty between
states on the one hand and the hierarchy between states and their empires on the other:
The tensions and ambiguities of discourses of civilization both set the
limits of law (civilization vs. barbarism) and occasion the exercise of the
law (from barbarism to civilization). Only individuals and nations that are
defined as civilized are invested with the power to distinguish between
combatants and civilians….Barbarians, by definition, lack the capacity to
discriminate or to judge and, therefore, are unable to exercise this
sovereign power. Consequently, as the Marten’s clause illustrates so well,
the empire constructs the laws of war, especially the principle of
distinction, and the barbarians are held to be (always already) in violation,
regardless of actual practice.46
This points to the constitutive effects of norms: norms are essential touchpoints in
the building of social identities and interests and as such form the basis for a particular
order. Thus norms serve as both cause and effect at various times. This is what
constructivists term “mutual constitution,” which is better imagined as a process than as a
linear occurrence. A non-linear causality need not be considered post-positivist, however.
As Kendall Stiles and Wayne Sandholtz write, international norms change, and that
change is characterized by broad cyclical patterns, meaning a norm serves as both cause
and effect at different points in its development. Such shifting is attributable to political
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and legal disputes that mediate between the tensions inherent in normative theory,
international law, and political practice.47
What becomes evident through the codification phase of the civilian immunity
norm is that as the international order transforms to incorporate formerly colonized
peoples, the debate about the norm also becomes a site for the struggle of interests and
identities. In this section, I will sketch out the major legal milestones for the norm,
beginning with the U.S. Civil War and ending with the 1977 Additional Protocols.
Legal Codification of the Norm
General Orders 100 (The Lieber Code)
The parallel discourses of natural law and civilization permeated the European
and then the American political landscape and were intimately tied to the colonial project.
John Locke’s Second Treatise, to offer one important example, rationalized the
dispossession of the Indians from their land based on such reasoning.48 The effect of
such reasoning on the civilian immunity norm was that even as the legal code attempted
to specify material facts upon which to identify protected civilians, tensions and
contradictions created double standards and gray areas that fell back on military honor
and chivalry to discern. This is evident in General Orders 100, written by Francis Lieber
and issued by the American government in 1863.
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Meant to address the escalating violence of the Civil War, General Orders 100
(Lieber Code) marked the transition from war being seen as “between professionals
without a great deal of involvement of the civilian population” to increasingly affecting
civilians.49 The document was the first comprehensive attempt at codifying previous
customary laws of war and was implemented as U.S. domestic law for the last two years
of the Civil War. This development serves as a test case for Kinsella’s hypothesis. In
comparing two wars conducted at the same time by many of the same military personnel,
guided by the same legal codes, Kinsella shows that the treatment of civilians in
Sherman’s March was much more discriminate than the treatment of Indians in the Sand
Creek Massacre.”50 While the Civil War was brutal against some civilians, it was not
indiscriminate. Mark Grimsley argues that distinctions were made according to
socioeconomic status, with the logic being that elites were targeted because they would
likely support the opposition and resist the Union.51 Thus, “innocence” was based on
degrees of loyalty toward the Union. Indians, on the other hand, were deemed
uncivilized in a way that suspended them somewhere between the category of children
and savage, fueling a tension between policies of “assimilation and extermination,”
which resulted in every man being named a potential target. Gender norms—the
protection of women--were applied more equally across the two conflicts.52
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The Lieber Code demonstrates the extreme confusion in specifying who counts as
a civilian because although it attempted to institute a definition of civilian according to
material criteria: those not in uniform that had little to with that distinction. As Kinsella
argues, the visual marker of combatant does not neatly correspond to realities on the
ground, especially in a civil conflict, and so the “indeterminacy of the principle of
distinction affects compliance with the principle.”53 The Lieber Code’s importance for
the codification of the norm is its systematic reflection on the principle of distinction, and
its reliance on custom as a source of criteria.54
After the Lieber Code, the civilian immunity norm continued to rely on
agreements between “civilized” states. This meant in practice that the legal aspects of the
norm remained vague and that its practical implementation relied on the expectation that
the moral honor of military personnel would dictate distinctions about civilians. The
nascent legal norm, however, while even at low levels of specificity and precision, began
to take on increasing importance as a part of the normative political order between states.
The rise of a legal class meant that it also served as a test of transformational progress for
nations seeking recognition as sovereign states—Japan at the turn of the century, for
example, was watched by legal scholars to determine whether its conduct in war qualified
it for “passage…from the oriental to the European class,” and marked those who were
capable of self -rule and recognition of sovereignty.55
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The Hague Conventions and the Fourth Geneva Convention
The Lieber Code, though vague and ideological, attempted to “strike a balance
between the demands of military necessity and the principles of humanity.” The
document survived and formed the “undisputed basis for the so-called Law of the
Hague,” the first formal international treaty on the laws of war. 56 The legal sources of the
civilian immunity norm are thus traceable to a long series of conventions, customs, and
supporting agreements. The earliest meetings leading up to the First Hague Peace
Conference reflected concerns about increasingly lethal weaponry and its effects on the
means and methods of warfare. The Brussels Declaration of 1874 was one of the results
of such concerns, and it mostly served to protect members of the military from “an
unlimited power as to the choice of injuring an enemy,” but this was directed primarily at
protecting members of the military.57 There are a few exceptions: its concern with
artillery bombardment of undefended places refers indirectly to protection of
noncombatants.58 The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 revised the unratified rules
of the Brussels Declaration, but still mostly took for granted that limiting the means and
methods of warfare would indirectly limit civilian deaths. It was soon after, in World War
I and the Spanish Civil War that the development and implementation of aerial
bombardment would exploit the gaps in international law. It was not expressly forbidden
to indiscriminately attack a defended area, for example.59
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The next Hague convention produced the Hague Rules of Air Warfare in 1923,
though it was never ratified. This marks the recognition of the new vulnerability of
noncombatants to developing weapons technology, and it also exposed the limited
compatibility of noncombatant immunity with military necessity. Were noncombatant
immunity observed, aerial warfare would not at this point be permitted and would render
the technology ineffective. The Rules of Air Warfare shifted the debate to proportionality
and the identification of proper military objectives and targeting. The purpose of such
bombardment was taken into consideration, and intention, first introduced by Augustine,
became a litmus test for the norm: the Rules specified that aerial bombardment not be
undertaken for the “purpose of terrorizing the civilian population or damaging private
property not of a military character, or of injuring noncombatants.”60
This did not hold, however, as World War II is almost universally recognized as
the lowest point in the lifespan of the civilian immunity norm. Some believed that the
distinction between combatant and noncombatant had been forever destroyed, as
technology made distinguishing between targeting objectives more difficult, and
intentional target area bombing and saturation bombing became more frequent and
widespread. Finally, the first use of the atomic bomb, a weapon designed to be
indiscriminate, appeared to mark the end of the principle of distinction. During World
War 2, military necessity followed the ideology of total war in which the entire nation is
mobilized for the war effort. The population was thus seen as a more efficient target for
reducing the military capability of the enemy. As Ward Thomas notes, the problem was
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not that the norm did not exist; rather it was that the early days of international law had
produced a “multiplicity of laws” that had “a relatively modest impact on expectations,
preparations, and decisions in war.”61
The enormous gaps between the Laws of the Hague and current state practice cast
into doubt the ability of international law to uphold the very principle of distinction, let
alone the regulations needed to sustain it. This is why the Fourth Geneva Convention
(formally entitled Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Times of War of 1949) was in name the first attempt to specifically codify the treatment
of civilians, but in reality its scope was limited to the protection of civilians in the
custody of a foreign military. As Gardam explains, “any provision in the draft of the
convention designed to protect the civilian population from the dangers of military
operations was carefully removed.62 This was done out of fear that the conventions, in
reaching far beyond state practice to limit conduct during hostilities, would not be
ratified. Kinsella adds that sovereignty was the overriding concern between states, and
that “delegates to 1949 preparatory conferences deemed the sovereignty of states, which
is inextricably bound to the emergence and the codification of the laws of war, too sacred
to be subjected to international regulation.”63 Instead, the general statement of principle
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found in the Martens Clause, formulated in the Hague Conference of 1899, provided the
guidelines for the legal norm until the Additional Protocols. It states that
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the high
contracting parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in
Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under
the protection and empire of the principles of international law as they
result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws
of humanity, and the requirements of public conscience.64
Interestingly, however, while the Geneva Conventions were hesitant to restrict
state behavior toward civilians, it did for the first time introduce the protection of
noncombatants in non-international armed conflict, providing the seeds for the later
Additional Protocols.65 The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1977
attempted to remedy the timidity of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 by codifying the
main precepts of just war principles and secular customs into actual battlefield rules.66
This development was profoundly shaped by post World War 2 challenges to the colonial
world order, when colonized peoples became represented in the forum of the newly
formed United Nations. The U.N., formed in response to the atrocities and enormous
scale of destruction wrought by the World Wars, quickly became the forum for the
former third world to push a human rights agenda, particularly the right to selfdetermination.67 It was not until the preparation for the 1977 Additional Protocols that the
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movements arising in the former third world insisted that they be recognized as equal
belligerents. As Kinsella points out, for the first time the “‘barbarians’ dictated the laws
of war.”68
The 1977 Additional Protocols
Gardam concurs that the overarching political context for the 1977 Additional
Protocols was the ongoing liberation movements (and the resistance to that struggle by
incumbents). Even as the U.N. effectively outlawed war, “for some of these States an
integral component of their political agenda was the right of such peoples to use force to
achieve their goal of self-determination [which] caused considerable disquiet in the
international community.”69 Some of these movements revived the medieval Just War
paradigm that claimed that a just cause superceded limits on the means and methods of
warfare. Gardam and others at the time saw this as a threat to civilian immunity not
because of the potential for equal belligerent status of internal war combatants but
because the guerrilla warfare strategies used in such wars threatened to undermine the
very distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello that made compliance possible.
That is, it threatened to support the claims to killing of civilians in the pursuit of a just
cause.70
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Other developments in international politics at the time reflect this same basic
struggle. After the 1972 Munich attack on Israeli civilians, international terrorism became
almost synonymous with attacking civilians. Drawing on the ongoing debates about the
Additional Protocols, terrorism became not only a descriptor of a strategy or tactic, nor
even an evaluative judgment, but it became an identity for an entire liberation movement
(most notably at this time, the Palestine Liberation Movement). Moreover, as state
terrorism was employed against various resistance movements in Latin America, the near
conflation of terror with killing civilians became politically charged and complicated the
codification of the Additional Protocols. The emergence of the anti-terrorism norm
became closely related to the civilian immunity norm. Parhad explains
The relatively powerful states, including most of the Western states, saw
the creation of a strong anti-terrorism norm as an opportunity to reinforce
some level of order in the anarchical society of international politics, by
de-legitimizing a certain category of violence that was most often a
“weapon of the weak.” Meanwhile, many of the weaker states saw normbuilding efforts as an opportunity to bring attention to more insidious and
pervasive forms of violence and oppression in the international system.71
The right to self- determination movement challenged the very notion of who
properly represented civilization. The rebels in the French Algerian War, for example,
challenged the Western identification with civilization by debating and interpreting the
laws of war.72 Western states such as the United States who self-identified as a civilized
state were faced with a difficult choice. On the one hand, leaders resisted legitimizing
guerrillas as belligerents with rights in international wars because to do so would
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challenge the exclusive claims to sovereignty and the monopoly on legitimate force that
sovereignty entails. Furthermore, those states who anticipated involvement in struggles
against Guerrillas objected to the military constraints of the additional Protocols,
including states who found themselves the site of secessionist struggles.73 On the other,
they wanted to delegitimize the methods used by guerrillas and terrorists by ratifying the
legal norm.
The result is that the United States rejected Protocol I which mentions guerrilla
fighters as combatants in international wars and accepted Protocol 2, which addresses
internal wars. Reagan’s 1987remarks to the Senate make clear his objections:
‘It is unfortunate that Protocol 1 must be rejected,' the President wrote.
But, he added, ‘we must not, and need not, give recognition and protection
to terrorist groups as a price for progress in humanitarian law.'74
Reagan goes on to say that the United States will continue to abide by the
principles of noncombatant immunity independently of the dictates of international law.
As of the current writing, Protocol I has not been ratified by United States, Israel, Iran,
Pakistan, and Turkey. Most of the contributions of Protocol I have been considered
customary law since then, however, and the general tenets regarding civilians are widely
accepted. The contributions of the Additional Protocols are many and include most
importantly the definition of civilian. Article 48 of Additional Protocol I defines the
principle of distinction:
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In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian
objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their
operations only against military objectives.75
The three principles of protection (distinction, precaution, and proportionality)
became enshrined in the Additional Protocols, with distinction given the most weight
(article 48 of API ). Furthermore, it states in article 51:
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general
protection against danger from military operations. To give effect this
protection the following rules, which are additional to other applicable
rules of international law, shall be observed in all circumstances.
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall
not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary
purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are
prohibited.76
The challenge of international law has been to maintain the determinacy of
distinction based on a person’s noncombatant status. Kinsella rightly points out that
basing civilian status on the direct participation in hostilities does not solve the issue of
determining who is and who is not a combatant. Since non-international warfare has
become the norm since World War 2, the reality that guerrilla fighters do not distinguish
themselves by openly carrying arms still holds. This makes the burden of distinction
more difficult in practice, but also more conceptually difficult to maintain since guerillas
and insurgent rely on the cover and support provided by civilians in order to be effective.
In terms of military strategy in coping with insurgency, the reality is that
counterinsurgency has tended to be far less discriminate than in recent interstate wars.
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To sum, despite the long history and high level of acceptance of the norm at the
abstract level, attempts to codify and apply the norm have always been contentious,
contingent, and utterly political insofar as the norm shapes and is shaped in turn by the
prevailing political order. As such, the norm has been central to the Western war-making
tradition, but the U.S. experience with counterinsurgency, its importance to U.S. identity
and interests has not always translated into compliance, particularly in these types of
wars. Thus, this historical overview supports my basic premise that at a crucial juncture,
the doctrinal shift invoked by the U.S. military need not have been in the direction of
constraining violence toward civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan. When faced with a failure
in strategy, the new strategy chosen by the U.S. could have theoretically enabled or
constrained the scope of violence employed in fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Furthermore, this chapter provides the basis for identifying constitutive effects in
the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan through the employment of a long history of CIN
language and legitimating discourses, in particular its reliance on the discourses of
“civilization versus barbarism” as well as the “innocence” of civilians. Read in this light,
it makes sense that the legitimacy struggle present between the U.S. and non-state actors
would lean so heavily on the language of the CIN.

CHAPTER THREE
DOCTRINAL INNOVATION AND CIVILIANS
I argued in the first chapter of this study that the doctrinal shift toward CIN
compliance that occurred in Iraq and later in Afghanistan is remarkable because no clear
historical pattern suggests a shift toward compliance in the face of strategic failure. The
content of the new doctrine marks a radical break with previous doctrine in that it forged
a new consensus about not only how to fight a war but about what the appropriate goal of
war should be— the protection of the population rather than the destruction of enemy
forces,1 the latter of which has been a core assumption in U.S. military doctrine since at
least 1944.2 This chapter will examine alternative (though not necessarily opposing)
explanations. Since my question is embedded within the larger concern of how change in
doctrine occurs, in the pages that follow, I will first briefly review how previous literature
has explained doctrinal innovation more generally. Then, since not only the mechanisms
of change but the particular choice of civilian protection is under examination, I will
continue with a discussion of the recent theories of state behavior toward civilian in war,
regardless of war type. I finish with locating the norms-based approach articulated in
chapter one within the existing literature on civilians in war.
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Summary of Argument
To this point, I have argued that a constructivist approach is useful in explaining
how what is right comes to be seen as what is useful. In the language of norms, the
strength of the civilian immunity norm is both a negative and positive resource: it shapes
doctrine through regulative effects by constraining the range of strategic choices seen as
appropriate and actionable; at a more fundamental level, it shapes doctrine through its
constitutive role in producing an ethical, rules-based international order, providing a
source of legitimacy to define “who we are” in relation to the enemy in the “war on
terror,” as well as in the insurgencies on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.3 In the
second chapter, I provided an historical overview to show gradual development of the
civilian/combatant distinction and its constitutive role in the normative international
political order.4 This argument has been specified already, so it will only briefly be
supplemented with a further explanation of human rights diffusion theory.5
Military Doctrine
Military doctrine is the link between grand strategy and the use of force to meet
political goals. Military doctrine provides a formal and “explicit articulation of the means
3

The logic of appropriateness versus consequences was conceptualized by March and Olsen, "Institutional
Dynamics." For a critique of the limits on this binary, and an argument that states straddle these two logics
in practice, particularly when it comes to the use of force, see Hurd, "Legitimacy and Strategic Behavior.”
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et al., Commentary on the Additional Protocols. Moreover, “terrorism” was neither an identity nor was it
linked solely to the killing of innocent civilians until after the Munich attacks on Israeli Olympians in the
early 1970s. See Parhad, "Illegitimate Violence.” On the evolution of terrorism as a tactic see Bruce
Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).
5

See especially Thomas Risse-Kappen and Kathryn Sikkink, “Introduction," in Power of Human Rights.
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by which armed forces are to secure national security objectives.”6 Effective military
doctrine achieves what Posen terms “political-military integration” or the fittedness of
military means to political ends. When “political objectives and military doctrine are
poorly reconciled,” states incur costs, lose wars, and at the extreme end, “jeopardize their
survival.”7 Doctrine thus reflects the organization’s attempts to accurately grasp and
convey the current state of warfare.8 In doing so, doctrine provides militaries with “goals,
tasks, cognitive tools and guidance to prepare for and execute military operations suitable
to the environment in which it operates.”9 In other words, doctrine lays out a broad
vision of the best available strategies for succeeding within that context.10
Clark argues that since doctrinal change must make it through a political and
bureaucratic process, when innovation does succeed, it expresses a change in the
prevailing consensus within the organization and in the civilian leadership as to how the
security environment has changed and how wars are best fought in light of that change.
My study contributes to this literature by explaining how the normative environment
contributes to changing perceptions of the security environment that resulted in new
doctrine in the two conflicts under study.
6
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Existing debates about military doctrinal innovation follow the two major schools
of thought represented by Posen and Rosen and have centered on whether internal
(organizational) or external factors (civilian intervention) are responsible for its
occurrence. Posen emphasizes the role of decision-makers inside the military who assess
the changing security environment, while Rosen believes that if innovation is to occur, it
must be imposed by the civilian administration as it responds to a shifting balance of
power.11 Recent scholarship has attempted to bridge the two schools by theorizing that
bureaucratic politics is responsible for the success of military innovation. 12
Interestingly, however, all agree that while the need for change is urgent in the
face of strategic failure, it nevertheless rarely succeeds. Battlefield conditions alone do
not determine wide reaching change or innovation in doctrine. Instead, battlefield
information must be interpreted and doctrine must then be ushered through a process of
change. The U.S. in Vietnam, for example, never fully embraced counterinsurgency,
despite the presence of the insurgency in South Vietnam and despite the efforts of
General Creighton Abrams to push for the change.13 Even when doctrinal change
succeeds, the logic of the strategic response is not predetermined but may follow any of a
number of paths. The U.S. counterinsurgency in the Philippines, for example, mixed civil
reforms with civilian victimization. 14
11
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Since 1944, doctrine has been periodically changed, but the constant assumption
has been that the way to win wars and achieve security is “through the destruction of
enemy forces.” This core assumption allowed new strategies to develop but prevented
others. For example, the Active Defense doctrine, which held that the first battle was the
most important determinant of strategic success,15 was adopted in the early 1970s even
as Creighton Abrams’ attempts to innovate doctrine in Vietnam were not.16
According to Clark, the primary obstacle to doctrinal innovation is the difficulty
of achieving double-loop learning within the bureaucracy of the military. Double-loop
learning is a term coined by Argyris and Schein to refer to organizational learning that
questions the deep assumptions and goals of the organization in order to solve
problems.17 This is difficult to achieve and rare because members of organizations tend to
have vested interests in maintaining current assumptions, and members (and perhaps
human beings broadly) tend to engage in “defensive reasoning” when assumptions are
questioned. This is in contradistinction to single loop learning which tries to solve

counterinsurgency in the Philippine war, 1899-1902 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1989), 167. See also Downes, "Draining the Sea;” Kathryn McNabb Cochran and Alexander B. Downes,
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Meeting, 2010.
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problems with different means but without ever questioning the appropriateness of the
goals. Double-loop learning is pictured below:
Figure 2. Double Loop Learning 18

A doctrinal entrepreneur must have the authority, access, and autonomy within
the organization to set into motion the double loop learning process, creating a
community of like-minded innovators who “update conceptual understandings regarding
what, how, or where military force is to be applied.”19 This process entails identifying the
problems with previous doctrine, especially its faulty assumptions, and developing
solutions based on new assumptions better oriented to the current security environment.
Success requires overcoming resistors who are attached to or who have a vested
bureaucratic interest in maintaining the old doctrine, gaining the support of the civilian
administration and then using that strengthened position to implement the new doctrine
within the organization, thus achieving the double loop learning process.
18
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According to Clark, who compares General Abrams’ failed attempt to innovate
doctrine toward counterinsurgency in Vietnam with General Petraeus’ successful attempt
in Iraq, outcomes are a function of the attributes of the bureaucratic position of each
entrepreneur at each phase of the innovation process:
In the face of strategic defeat, the attempt to innovate begins with members of an
armed service. Within the organization, these individuals must convince their colleagues
to revisit long held assumptions. They must then ‘exit’ the organization and present the
need for doctrinal change to civilian authorities and convince them to intervene in
support of their proposed innovations. With civilian intervention, innovators ‘re-enter’
the organization with the additional resources and authority necessary to attempt a change
in operational behavior.20
While Clark’s study shows strong support for the argument that authority,
autonomy, and access are required in order to usher innovation through the bureaucracy,
he concludes that this was not the case for the idea that back-channel access to the
presidential administration determines support: both Abrams and Petraeus enjoyed
access, but only Petraeus succeeded. As the above schematic demonstrates, overcoming
defensive reasoning is the main obstacle to overturning assumptions and beginning to see
goals as inappropriate. A bureaucratic position that allows access to key decision-makers
is necessary but not sufficient to overcoming defensive reasoning. I suggest that the
international normative environment, while not the only difference accountable for the
two outcomes, is nevertheless an important one since it was in response to Vietnam that

20

Ibid., 2-3.
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the CIN was strengthened. While the experience of counterinsurgency in Vietnam did not
translate into doctrinal innovation, the vulnerabilities of civilians caught in the cross-fire
in Vietnam had a lasting effect on international norms. The images of civilian suffering
broadcast by journalists stood in stark relief to the hearts and minds rhetoric.21
International reaction to the large scale suffering of Vietnamese civilians during the
conflict22 helped legal aspects of the civilian immunity norm gain significant traction in
the 1970s, and Michael Walzer’s book, Just and Unjust Wars, sparked a renewed interest
within both the international academy and among the American public about moral
behavior in war.23 This means doctrinal entrepreneurs in Vietnam, as compared to
entrepreneurs in the Global War on Terror, were lacking a key resource in selling the idea
of population protection as a security issue.
Theories of State Behavior Toward Civilians
In order to lay the groundwork for arguing why a norms-based approach is
necessary if we are to understand how the constraining normative environment shapes
doctrine, it is necessary to first address the recent but quickly growing literature seeking
to explain both when and why states do and do not target civilians in war. The theories
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are grouped according to approach and include regime type, identity, military culture, and
strategic-rational theories.24
Regime Type: Democracy as Determinant
Probably the most intuitive and popularly accepted argument about state behavior
toward civilians is that democracies are more restrained in their treatment of civilians
than are authoritarian regimes. Regime type arguments encompass two contradictory
theses about how the attributes of a state affect its treatment of foreign civilians in war.
The two relevant characteristics of democracies include the values of the populace and
the institutional mechanisms of accountability that pressure state leaders.
The theory that democracies are less likely to victimize civilians is an outgrowth
of democratic peace theory.25 Because democracies are rooted in the liberal
philosophical concepts of human dignity and individual freedom, their political cultures
and institutional arrangements are based on the rule of law. The logic holds that domestic
respect for the law would extend to international law and would thus counter the
temptation to invoke the idea of collective guilt, that is conflating combatants, who pose a
threat and can be legally killed, with civilians, who do not. The assumption is that these
Kantian ideals and moral absolutes are reflected in the values of the democratic
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populace,26 and that public opinion would electorally punish leaders who violate
international norms so close in spirit to domestic norms. Such constraints, it is theorized,
would not inhere in autocratic regimes.
Some support for this thesis has been found in public opinion polls, for example
when Mueller found that democratic public opinion generally does not support the direct
victimizing of civilians.27 Engelhardt’s 1992 study also finds that “nondemocratic
regimes are able to rely on brutalization tactics more readily than democracies.”28
Davenport and Armstrong link the level of democracy to the level of repression in
internal wars and find that strong democracies (but not weak) do not repress in internal
wars.29 This holds with mass killings in guerrilla wars also: Valentino, Huth, and BalchLindsay find that highly democratic states are 27% less likely than highly authoritarian
states to engage in intentional killings of this type. This relationship is stronger when the
regime’s existence is threatened by the insurgency, and when the insurgency enjoys a
high level of support among the population.30 Watts adds that even in conventional
warfare, “in cases short of total war, democracies have emphasized greater restraint than
non-democracies in the use of air warfare in order to limit the killing of noncombatants,
26
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even when doing so is perceived as a costly limitation.” Watts attributes this to domestic
norms expressed in domestic politics, which is driven by public opinion.31
The democratic public opinion thesis does not necessarily hold in cases of
indirect strategies of civilian victimization. Mueller, in measuring public opinion about
U.S. behavior toward civilian victimization after the Gulf War, remarks that “the public's
remarkable indifference to the massive death toll essentially caused by its government's
sanctions policy in the decade since the war suggests that any avowed concern for the
lives of foreign civilians is at best an expression of unreflective smugness and at worst
one of arrant hypocrisy.”32 Moreover, Valentino et al’s findings about democratic
behavior regarding mass killings in a guerrilla war leaves open the possibility that highly
democratic regimes are less likely to generate their own guerrilla resistance movements
strong enough to threaten the regime, nor are such movements likely to enjoy a high level
of popular support. Models based on the relationship between democracies and
insurgencies does not fit well with the object of this study because a highly democratic
intervening force may respond to different incentives than the domestic regime fighting
for its life; the effects of the domestic political culture may not be as relevant in such
cases.
Some go further and insist that the logic of democratic institutions works against
expected democratic values in the sense that politicians who are dependent on elections
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to keep their positions feel more pressure to win wars. Reiter and Stam find that “when
the people willingly offer consent for war, even wars of empire or genocide, then
democratic governments have obliged.”33 Moreover, as Watts notes, democracies, more
than autocracies, are averse to the casualties of its own soldiers and are thus likely to
choose methods that shift the risk toward civilian populations, such as air power.34
Further, some argue that democratic leaders are more likely to do “whatever it takes” to
win so that they do not risk the next election for losing the war.35 In interstate warfare,
Downes finds that, statistically, democracies are more likely to engage in mass killings,
particularly in wars of attrition that they are desperate to win.36 Contra Valentino’s
findings, the survival factor is not necessary to reach a threshold of desperation, however.
For Downes, the fact that democratic leaders feel pressure to reduce costs and save the
lives of their own soldiers is enough to spark mass killing. Interestingly, Downes includes
guerrilla warfare as a subtype of attrition in interstate war, which may account for the
differences between his and Valentino’s findings.
Given that regime theory produces inconclusive results and relies on contradictory
assumptions, it is not clear that regime type determines state behavior toward civilians.
33
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As Bell points out, history demonstrates a mixed record of using civilian victimization
strategies, and democratic publics are a fickle bunch, sometimes demonstrating a “rally
round the flag effect,” and at other times showing a willingness to trade the lives of
others when they perceive their own security to be at stake.37 However, there is clearly a
strong identification of democracies with values that support civilian immunity. I will
argue that this identification can be better understood from a norms perspective rather
than as a too-broad “regime type” variable.
Identity-Based Approaches to State Behavior toward Civilians
Identity theories of civilian victimization are based on the observation that
civilians are more likely to be targeted—or if the logic is extended, more civilian
casualties are likely to be tolerated—when the population is viewed as “barbaric” or
different in a way that inspires hostility or animosity. The relevant categories of
difference are generally cultural, ethnic, racial, and religious and are taken as the key
predictors for rationalizing exceptions to moral codes prohibiting the targeting of
innocents. John Dower, for example, explains the atrocities of World War 2 involving
Japan as the result of racist demonization of the enemy’s collective identity. 38 As we
have seen in the previous chapter, the identity categories of “civilization versus
barbarism” have been central to the development of the civilian immunity norm itself,
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often mediating the fuzzy and problematic category of who counts and is thus deserving
of protection as an “innocent civilian.” As Kinsella and others have asserted, the idea that
only the “civilized” are entitled to civilian immunity runs deep in the history of the norm,
with the result that identities outside of the European cultural tradition were more likely
to be dehumanized and denied protection, particularly in colonial conflicts.39
The identity thesis is even more strongly associated with the surge in ethnic and
intrastate conflict in new, weak, or failing states after the Cold War.40 Kaufmann argues,
for example, that cultural difference is associated with particularly intense violence
against civilians in civil wars.41 While dehumanizing the enemy in order to rationalize
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violence is common, as Downes points out, dehumanizing or “demonizing” the enemy
occurs with much greater frequency than does civilian victimization.42 Moreover,
asserting the presence of significant cultural difference, as an objective causal
phenomenon, becomes difficult to sustain in civil conflict as well because cultural
distance is not as great when people have lived together for long periods of time. In both
Rwanda and Bosnia, for example, before the outbreak of conflict and mass killings, some
groups had intermarried, worked and lived together, and mixed freely for long periods.
Even in cases where difference is more pronounced, Bell rightly points out that identitybased theory is “both over-predictive and under-predictive, since conflicts between
different identity groups sometimes fail to employ civilian victimization, whereas similar
identity groups sometimes turn to civilian victimization.”43 Downes and others concur
that the mere fact of difference in identity does not predict state behavior toward
civilians, since victimizing civilians occurs both when difference is present and when it is
absent.44
Because of its basis in affective motivations, theories of identity based on
difference predict increasingly brutal treatment of civilians as a conflict progresses.45
This logic does not hold when held up to the latest quantitative studies; rather, civilian
victimization is more likely to be a means of last resort in international conflicts, and the
release, February 1, 2009, quoted in Human Rights Watch Report,
http://www.hrw.org/node/83964/section/6.
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first resort in cases where the one belligerent aims to annex the land, either to expand
their territory or to eliminate a potential fifth column. 46 Downes finds that the
“barbarism” explanation is more likely an intervening variable—that is, when the intent
to victimize civilians is present, invoking barbarism is likely as a means of rationalizing
or legitimizing the treatment. Moreover, he adds that feelings of animosity toward a
population is something more likely to be experienced by “soldiers on the battlefield
more than those responsible for the strategic direction of the war and is this probably a
better explanation for the battlefield atrocities than for policies of civilian
victimization.”47
Finally, identity theories based on either interstate or intrastate conflict tend to
assume dyads such as state versus state or incumbent versus insurgent—both distinct,
opposing (enemy) relationships between groups fighting for control of the battlefield.
Like the regime model, this model does not fit well with the spectrum of transnational or
internationalized conflicts comprised of internal foes as well as external intervening
forces. This is important not because these wars are necessarily “new,” but because our
old categories and ways of understanding them do not adequately account for the
complex political nature of the interactions among actors with different goals—some of
whom may have only an indirect stake in governance but who may have other goals. 48
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A more fundamental critique of the concept of “identity as difference” suggests
that identity is often wrongly understood as the objective presence or absence of
difference,49 as civilizational,50 or even as the affective collective consciousness of
groups with long-standing traditions.51 While the effects of identity and culture are that
they appear natural and objective among groups and between groups, identities are
relational and fluid—the significance changes according to political and social context.52
Fluidity is not a critique in itself, only an indicator that identity is social and part of the
political struggle (reference Wendt’s theory of ego and alter in chapter one). A norms
approach complements an identity approach by seeking to make that context more
prominent. While identity has multiple dimensions, identity as a politicized concept only
makes sense in the context of how identity is being interpreted and what is perceived to
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be at stake.53 Lifting identity out of its social function and political context strips it of
meaning; examining identity thus demands an approach suited to social and political
analysis, which includes an accounting of strategy which affects and is affected by
culture. First, a discussion of how military culture has been treated as an independent
variable to explain civilian victimization follows.
Military Culture as an Explanation for State Behavior toward Civilians
Military culture theory centers on the “organizational constraints that influence
when militaries do—and do not—victimize civilians in civil war.”54 Proponents argue
that “the organizational culture of states’ militaries explains the propensity of states to
escalate the use of force against civilians in wartime.”55 On this account, decisions about
how to treat civilians are not completely separable from the “attitudes and behaviors of
actors [who] are heavily conditioned by the norms, interests and culture of the
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organization that acts on behalf of the state.”56 Observing the military is useful to explain
state behavior toward civilians in war because, as Bell argues, the military is the agent
most directly responsible for the treatment of civilians in war.57 Further, as Downes
points out, the military is “in the business of using force to defeat the nation’s enemies,
[and] organizational culture prescribes how and with what means the service should fight
in wartime.”58
Military culture is closely related to military doctrine in that “the organizational
norms, beliefs and customs underlying military behavior—forms the foundation of
strategies militaries employ to achieve their ends.” However, from this angle doctrine is
not conceptually distinct from culture but is rather taken as an expression of culture. The
military culture perspective takes the view that how civilians fit into strategy is a product
of culture since organizational culture shapes the goals of the military by “shaping [its]
members’ understandings and expectations about the world”59 (Bell 10). What follows is
an explanation of the theoretical underpinnings of military culture and then a review of
how previous literature has used military culture as an explanation for state behavior
toward civilians.
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Organizational Culture
Theories of military culture draw heavily on organizational culture theory, which
overlaps to some extent with constructivist theories. Organizational culture can be
thought of as an offshoot of broader organizational theory, which stresses both structural
and cultural factors in explaining organizational behavior.60 Organizations, as purposedriven, decision-making hierarchies, are “influenced by both formal governance
structures and informal norms of behavior—culture—that help determine the social
orientation of the actors within them”61 Organizational culture encompasses both “a set of
evaluative standards (such as norms or values) and a set of cognitive standards (such as
rules and models) that define what social actors exist in a system, how they operate, and
how they relate to one other.”62
The concept of “culture” draws on broader sociological theories of culture,
particularly social constructivism, the core insight of which is that social interaction
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produces baseline agreement on how to interpret relevant aspects of reality. 63 This social
context forms the basis for the social identity of the group, constituted and expressed
through the internal “taken-for-granted values, underlying assumptions, expectations,
collective memories, and definitions” of the organization. 64 Shared culture allows the
organization to “respond to the [external] environment and [to] organize internally to
accomplish its goals).”65 Culture underlies decision-making by managing the scope of
possible alternatives and stabilizing organizational preferences through the process of
member socialization, guiding them in “the correct way to perceive, think, and feel”
about challenges and problems.66
Military culture, commonly understood as “the military’s personality, way of
thinking, or values” is the specific application of the concept of organizational culture to
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the military.67 These ways of thinking take the form of deep assumptions that inform
norms and are directly observable in artifacts.68 This is possible because cultural
attributes of the military become “institutionalized within the bureaucracy through a
number of ways, including education and training, career promotion, doctrine and war
plans, budgetary priorities, procurement programs, and force structures.” 69
Review: How Military Culture Impacts Civilian Victimization
The impact of military culture on civilian victimization is a fairly recent and
limited area of inquiry, and the scholarship tends to examine the organizational culture of
military services to determine the extent to which that culture prescribes strategy that
either calls for, allows, or is averse to either putting civilians in the cross-hairs, or even
tolerating large numbers of foreseen but unintentional civilian casualties. Such strategies
include those that are “punitive, indiscriminate, or focused on breaking civilian morale”
even in the face of prohibitive norms.70
Jeffrey Legro’s work in the mid 1990s is an influential example of such work. In
comparing the cultures of the German and British military services during World War II,
Legro shows that pre-existing organizational culture was decisive in setting preferences
for the use of “unthinkable” means of warfare and also for the timing and variance of
employing prohibited methods of fighting. The prohibited strategies of escalation that
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Legro examined include the use of submarines to bomb civilian ships, the strategic
bombardment of civilian targets, and the use of chemical weapons.71 Legro acknowledges
that international norms matter insofar as certain forms of warfare are considered
“illegitimate,” but on his account the internal attributes of military culture are decisive as
to whether or not such means will be employed. Legro’s study contributes to broader IR
debates by concluding that, contrary to what either balance of power theories or
international norms would predict, the organizational culture of the military was
responsible for shaping the preferences of both the state and the military when it came to
strategy.72 This is because
Informal beliefs interact with formal bureaucratic structure to shape the
identity and cognition of groups [which matters because] the various
military services favored some modes of warfare over others, valuated the
strategic environment and enemy activity, and developed plans and
capabilities to meet anticipated threats according to their various cultural
predispositions.73
According to Legro, the norms of military cultures may either support or compete
with international humanitarian norms, and their willingness to violate international
norms (or their propensity to comply with such norms) is dependent on internal ways of
thinking rather than external (or international) norms. However, this view does not
account for the fact that international norms against killing civilians were at their weakest
71
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point in World War 2, and it is unclear whether this is an effect of military culture, a
cause, or completely unrelated. Some attribute the willingness to victimize civilians
during that time to cross-cultural ideas about “total war,” wherein civilians were seen as
indistinguishable from the “nation.”74 Others attribute civilian victimization to the
crudeness of targeting technology, though this is a backward looking narrative that
ignores the purposeful targeting of civilians. Ward Thomas examines the U.S. military’s
willingness to employ strategic bombardment during World War 2, but he compares this
strategy to conflicts occurring later in the century, and finds that militaries gradually
internalized post WW2 international ethics against such means and methods of warfare.75
This study highlights the fact that culture changes as a complex result of political,
technological, and normative changes, so that while militaries may exhibit organizational
cultures set apart from the larger societies in which they operate, military culture does not
exist in a vacuum.
As Clausewitzian wisdom reminds us, the function of the military is as a tool of
policy and not for the use of force as an end in itself. And in a constitutionally limited
state, it is also constrained by the broader external environment, both internationally, to
some extent, and domestically to a greater degree. Kier shows, for example, that military
organizational culture and domestic political constraints shape military doctrine, which
determines the tactics militaries use to fight during war.76 Similarly, Ward Thomas’ study
74
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concludes that the strength and stability of international norms impacts the preferences
and attitudes of the military. A more recent study by Colin Kahl argues that the U.S.
military culture has changed a great deal in its attitudes toward civilian victimization
since Vietnam,77 when it came under heavy criticism for its hearts and minds slogans
juxtaposed to the media images of screaming, napalmed women and children.
What sets Kahl’s cultural argument apart, however, is that he measures culture
through the institutionalization of processes meant to uphold international norms by
holding individual members of the military accountable through punishment mechanisms.
Kahl notes that military judge advocates (JAGs) became increasingly important in
upholding cultural respect for the Laws of War in the Iraq War, in addition to the
“expansion of the law of war training program, and the integration of judge advocates
into weapons procurement.”78 Dickenson also documents the presence of “judge advocate
corps as ‘compliance agents’ within the military under the DoD Law of War program
[which] led to greater U.S. military law of war compliance during the Iraq War.”79 Bell
adds that such cultural changes can occur even in the absence of a highly professionalized
military: “a military culture of civilian respect (MCCR) can explain state military
behavior toward civilians better than competing theories of civilian victimization,” made
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possible by “high-level military leadership interest, pervasive norm training programs,
and norm enforcement structures.” 80
Both Kahl and Dickensen document changes in Iraq, but it is not clear from their
studies if crucial junctures within the conflict contributed to change. Kahl, for example,
explains that it is the unwillingness of the U.S. to any longer employ strategies that target
civilian morale that account for the precautions increasingly put into place. My study can
add nuance to this by showing a more direct relationship between the civilian casualties
that did occur, the attitudes about them within the military, and how the social context is
read as a strategic matter. Changes to military culture can be treated as an outcome, in
other words.
Downes critiques the military culture approach for different reasons: because it
fails to take into account the inherently strategic nature of military actors and the external
pressures they face when fighting wars. Downes points out that if external factors, such
as desperation to win on the battlefield, explain noncompliance with civilian immunity
norms, then norms internal to military culture will give way under the right conditions.
To demonstrate this, Downes examines the same case studies as Legro from World War 2
but finds that military culture is indecisive in the face of objective strategic pressures.
Thus, he cautions against assuming that the “norm of noncombatant immunity has
become an integral part of the culture of the contemporary American military, implying
80
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that in future wars the United States will refrain from intentional killing of noncombatants, and will work hard to minimize inadvertent civilian damage as well.”81
So while the military culture approach emphasizes unique identities and
preferences that in turn independently shape the organization’s behavior, apart from and
often against the influence of the external environment, Downes provides an important
corrective to an overly cultural approach, which is that the most salient external
environment for the military is the strategic environment.82 This approach is
representative of a new strand in civilian studies and brings to the fore that the strategic
environment does not operate in a parallel realm, separate from civilians, but rather
civilians are often included in the strategic calculus.
Strategic-Rationalist Theories: Why Civilians Are Sometimes Targeted
The past decade has produced intense interest in the strategic aspects of civilians
in war, particularly about the strategic value of civilians as military targets. This stream
of scholarship is termed “strategic rationalist” theory by Bell (2012) because it
“emphasize[s] the strategic incentives of targeting civilians. According to this school,
actors target civilians because of the calculation that targeting civilians produces benefits
and inflicts harm upon the enemy to allow them to achieve their goals.”83 Strategic
81
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rationalist theories share a deep affinity with realism in the assumption that state
decision-making takes place in an amoral context. On this account, the utility of force is
assumed, and victory is defined in a purely traditional military sense—by defeating
opposing forces. The role of the civilian in both interstate and intrastate conflicts is found
in their support of the enemy forces, which is why the “innocence” of civilians is a fragile
concept.
In interstate conflict, states have been shown to intentionally victimize civilians
when they are “desperate to win,” which is generally associated with fighting wars of
attrition, guerrilla wars, and also when they desire to annex territory and wish to clear out
the population.84 When applied to counterinsurgency, two logics prevail in this
scholarship: one borrows from the Maoist handbook of Guerrilla warfare which imagines
insurgents as fish swimming in a sea of civilian support, both ideological and material.85
States will seek to counter insurgent strategies by “draining the sea,” or killing, forcibly
removing, or otherwise victimizing civilians so as to deprive insurgents of cover and
support.86 Another strand sees civilian support as an object, since civilians are conduits
of valuable intelligence as well as potential supporters of the insurgency. This theory
predicts that incumbents will employ calculated, measured violence against certain
civilians, especially fence-sitters, in order to “deter defection.” As Bell points out, “actors
84

Downes, Targeting Civilians in War; Downes, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures.”

85

Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, 2nd ed. (Urbana, IL: University of
Illinois Press, 2000).
86

Cochran McNabb and Downes, "It’s a Crime”; Cochran McNabb and Downes, "Targeting Civilians to
Win?”; Downes, "Introduction: Modern Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Comparative Perspective;”
Downes, "Draining the Sea;” Valentino, "Draining the Sea;” Valentino, Final Solutions; Valentino, Huth,
and Croco, "Covenants without the Sword.”

123

in civil conflict employ violence as a factor of the level of civilian control and the amount
of information that is able to be gained from civilians through that control.”87 Strategic
rationalist theories do not predict that states always target civilians, but that they employ
a cost-benefit calculus and seek to lower the costs of war when they are desperate to
win,88 or when civilian support to an insurgency significantly increases the threat level
(to an incumbent).89
The strategic-rationalist approach highlights an enigma, which is that 1.) anticivilian strategies continue to be used despite the fact that the civilian immunity norm is
one of the strongest of all international norms, enjoying support from nearly all states and
most civilian populations, and 2.) anti-civilian strategies continue to be used in
counterinsurgency strategies despite the fact that the strategy can backfire by “stiffening
the resolve” in the population.90 Bell argues that this latest scholarship, while increasing
our understanding about the utility of force against civilians at the macro-level, suffers
from two weaknesses when applied to individual cases in which civilian victimization
does not occur: “not all political actors respond to strategic contexts in the same manner,
and strategic-rationalist theories ignore the internal characteristics of the entity that
actually conducts and executes the violence: the state military itself.”91 Furthermore, in
87
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this line of inquiry, the absence of civilian victimization is seen as simply the absence of
a strategic or at least rational incentive to victimize. By prior assumption, this approach
excludes the possibility of strategic incentives associated with constraint and instead
simply assumes the irrelevance of constraining norms, even when choices are possible
and strategy could go either way.
Moreover, while both interstate war and civil war have garnered much attention,
little attention has been paid to the dynamics of civilian victimization in transnational
conflicts that contain elements of both intrastate and international conflict and include a
variety of non-state actors, including both foreign and domestic insurgents. This is
particularly the case when one important actor is an intervening force and another a
transnational terrorist. In such cases, the relational dynamics multiply well beyond the
familiar dyads of incumbent and insurgent (intrastate) or belligerent and noncombatant
(interstate) to include remote and local audiences. The closest examples would include
past conflicts in which population protection strategies were employed, such as Britain in
the Malaya conflict or France in Algiers. Notably, both of the intervening forces in these
conflicts were former colonizers and had to grapple with complex issues of legitimacy in
the eyes of both the domestic populations and the international community.
Given the partial but important perspectives of the identity, regime, culture, and
strategic theories of conflict, this study suggests that including a constructivist, normsbased approach would further our attempts to understand the changes in orientation
toward civilian victimization, particularly in cases where states are faced with a strategic
choice and choose to comply rather than to violate civilian immunity. Theories of
civilian victimization are incomplete without analyzing the role that the normative
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environment plays in influencing how states, especially intervening powers, come to see
the protection of civilians as a strategic goal rather than as a strategic obstacle to be
overcome.
Norms-Based Constructivism: An Alternative Framework
The review of the literature has produced two gaps in knowledge, first about how
doctrinal entrepreneurs are able to overcome defensive reasoning in the innovation
process such that assumptions about the effective use of force can be effectively
challenged and then overturned. Second, it is unclear why the content of
counterinsurgency doctrine would emphasize high degrees of population protection,
when prior experience evidences a predilection toward coercive methods. My argument is
that the constraining normative environment supplies the missing link through the
strengthened civilian immunity norm. Moral norms matter—in this case the norm
limiting the use of force against noncombatants--because they are a resource in the
struggle for power. I begin by explaining how the constructivist approach is appropriate
to explaining how and why this is so.
Constructivism and the Power of Norms
I have argued in the first chapter that mainstream constructivist IR, which is the
type I invoke in this study, emphasizes that the identities and interests of actors are
mutually constituted through the rules and norms that comprise the social and political
context. Norms affect behavior; that is, they exhibit regulative effects, but they also
exhibit constitutive effects as was shown in chapter two. This means that the interests of
actors are closely tied to their identity within the international order, of which norms are a
part. Norms that are important, especially those of with a moral dimension, exhibit
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constitutive effects on identity and interests. Identity in this sense is not an objective set
of characteristics derived from domestic culture, but is rather the outcome of a process of
negotiation that occurs as actors define themselves in relation to other actors, and in
relation to the social order itself. Since identity itself is closely tied to interests, norms
have strategic value. This means states have an interest in defining norms to suit their
power goals, but they also have an interest in aligning their identities with existing,
powerful norms. Take, for example, how aspiring states made use of the norm of selfdetermination of peoples, which creates political claims to legitimate self-rule based on
an “imagined community” called a “people.”92
This perspective differs from structural realists like Mearsheimer, who sees 93
strategic behavior almost exclusively in material terms. On his account, norms have no
independent effect since, as he puts it, the powerful make rules such that the international
order of rules and norms merely “reflects the distribution of power in the world.”94
Constructivism does not deny the importance of material factors, but it differs in the
extent to which it accepts the assumption that actors are driven almost exclusively by
material incentives, particularly in some mythical anarchical state of nature in which
rules do not exist. While the early realist position against constructivism was based on
what Donnelly calls a “philosophical rejection” rather than an empirical case against it,
rationalist critiques since then have become more thoughtful and nuanced. Keohane, for
92

Benedict R. O'G Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (London; New York: Verso, 2006).
93

Mearsheimer as quoted in Jack Donnelly, “Realism and International Relations,” Themes in International
Relations (Cambridge, England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 148.
94

Mearsheimer as quoted in ibid.

127

example, considers that norms exist, but sees their causal value as limited, especially for
constitutive norms, which form the background for strategic action. In order for norms to
be effective, he explains, they require an agent, a norm entrepreneur, who engages in
strategic action, employing the norm for some political purpose.95 Constructivists agree,
but they do not see strategic and normative behavior as necessarily opposed; power and
norms are not mutually exclusive. Constructivists, historians, political sociologists, and
English School adherents all agree that norms both constrain and enable behavior.96
Donnelly, a preeminent human rights scholar, argues that “rules and norms are important
precisely because they allow states to achieve effects that they otherwise would not be
able to.”97
“War is a norms oriented activity,” according to Martha Finnemore, and norms
can be permissive or not, weak or strong, but even so, and as even Morgenthau admits,
moral norms set the outer limits of what it possible to imagine as behavioral alternatives.
As the history of the civilian immunity norm has shown, the content of the norm is a
product of inheritance but also fo the discourse and politics of the times. All of this is not
to say that the presence of a law, for example, determines state compliance. Indeed, this
is why norms change, according to Sandholz and Stiles. Norms are cyclical, and “norm
change frequently occurs when (1) when norms are in tension with one another and (2)
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when the “fit” between norms and concrete experience is disputed.98 The norm’s saliency
increases when disagreements ensue, positions are put forth, arguments are made, and
new understandings are reached. Rulings may issue forth in formalized systems, which
increases the strength and specificity of the norm, or behavioral expectations may
become customary; either way prior expectations alter and give way to new
expectations.99
The model of Sandholz and Stiles also identifies metanorms, the two major
constitutive norms of international society that inform more specific norms: these are
sovereignty and liberal norms, namely human rights. 100 According to Sandholz and
Stiles, international order overall is moving more in the direction of liberal, human rights
-based norms and away from sovereignty based norms.101 I concur, though as the
previous chapter shows, the civilian immunity norm embodies the tension between
sovereignty and humanity, which later became “human rights.” International law
demonstrates this shifting metanorm as well, since the civilian immunity norm, which
falls under IHL rather than IHRL, is increasingly interpreted from a human rights
perspective. In popular terms as well, the invocation to protect civilians has become
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almost indistinguishable from the idea of human rights.102 Thus the popular moral force
of the norm has become more restrictive than the law requires, while at the same time, the
meaning of “civilian” has extended to include repression within domestic societies in
news accounts and in reporting by transnational advocacy networks such as HRW. The
significance is that state obligations to uphold human rights are criticized on the same
grounds whether or not they have a governing relationship with the population or not.
The “Responsibility to Protect” norm, though legally distinct and meant to compel
humanitarian intervention, has come to occupy the same linguistic and moral space as
civilian immunity.
“The Civilian” has thus largely become a symbol for the human rights of all
people to be immune from the harm that flows from states and non-state groups who use
force. Killing civilians or otherwise violating their rights is now a major criterion for a
lack of legitimacy for states and in some ways the popular litmus test for the legitimate
use of force: it is the ticket to membership in the international order, at least for weaker
states--the rule of both Saddam Hussein and Momar Qaddafi were delegitimized on just
this basis. Insurgent groups in the Congo are now targeted by peacekeeping forces based
on whether or not they kill civilians. And terrorist groups are identified as completely
illegitimate precisely because they kill civilians, rather than because states reserve a
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monopoly on violence for themselves.103 Thus the power of the civilian immunity norm
lies in its close identification with human rights. And like any source of power, the norm
serves as a resource in the political struggle between groups through its ability to
legitimize (or not) the political goals of the group. This study hypothesizes that the CIN
matters when states see it as a resource by which to delegitimize its “terrorist” enemies.
The Power of Human Rights to Change State Behavior
Some of the most important early work on the power of human rights and how
states relate to the norm is found in the volume edited by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink in
1999.104 Though this volume is meant to explain the impact of human rights norms on
domestic regimes, it reveals much about the influence of human rights to even large
powerful states who already identify with human rights but whose sovereignty-leaning,
even hegemonic foreign policies may be in tension, and even if they are out of reach of
prosecution.105 This occurs through similar pressures that domestic regimes experience
when violating human rights, which is attributable to “the diffusion of international
norms in the human rights area.” (5). Though while Risse and Sikkink, writing in 1999,
attribute the diffusion of human rights norms directly to transnational networks and their
effects on public opinion, I begin with the assumption that those norms associated with
human rights enjoy strong support. This is especially the case with the civilian immunity
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norm, since nearly all states claim to support it and public opinion favors it across the
globe. In an era of globalized communications and media, it is fair to assume that
violence against civilians produces significant criticism.
My argument is not that the criticism itself resulted in a doctrinal shift toward
civilian immunity in Iraq and then in Afghanistan, but rather that states like the U.S. can
be expected to use strong human rights norms as part of their legitimizing strategic
narrative when employing force, and that the result is increased pressure to comply.
Though the model does not exactly fit with my subject area (a state at war), Risse and
Sikkink explain that “the process of human rights change always begins with some
instrumentally or strategically motivated adaptation by national governments to growing
domestic and transnational pressure.”106 This would be similar for states employing force
in the name of human rights, particularly states who intervene using such justifications.
When norms are strong, I would expect to see an identification with human rights since
“human rights norms have a special status because they both prescribe rules for
appropriate behavior, and help define identities of liberal states.”107 The invocation of
human rights norms as a matter of identity would be likely in the preconflict and war
rhetoric of the civilian administration, which is easily identifiable in national security
statements and public statements and speeches. Conversely, when a norm is not strong,
one would expect to see other justifications for force, particularly those that emphasize
sovereignty (such as I would expect to be the case in Vietnam, before human rights was
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as strong and before the civilian immunity norm was codified). Once that narrative is
employed, however, it invites scrutiny, which transnational groups and, increasingly,
ordinary people with internet access and cellphones are able to participate in. The
invocation of a norm already professed creates a situation in which a choice must be
made as to how to respond. Any narrative of moral identification might provoke one of
the three logics as states react to pressures from norm violations: 1. Adaptation and
strategic bargaining; 2. moral consciousness-raising, argumentation, and persuasion; 3.
Processes of institutionalization and habitualization.108 With states who are already
liberal and strongly identify with human rights, I would expect to see a recognition of the
pressure, but that the pressure military will react in ways that emphasize sovereignty until
strategic failure forces a choice.
My central theoretical argument is thus based on human rights diffusion theory—
when states invoke human rights norms for instrumental purposes (to uphold the antiterror norm), pressure to comply is increased, not for fear of punishment in this case but
for purposes of legitimacy and standing in the international community 109 However, in
keeping with doctrinal innovation theory, my argument is that the community of doctrinal
entrepreneurs within the military began to see the increasing civilian casualties as a
growing political problem, but that it was not until faced with strategic failure and a
choice about using more force or less that strengthening the civilian immunity norm
became seen as a strategic resource rather than as a constraint on strategy. My hypothesis
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holds that the CIN becomes a more important resource when regaining a monopoly on
force through force is not seen as an option.
The norm becomes a strategic resource in three ways: first, the norm, as an
important pre-existing part of the military’s culture, is used as a resource to socialize its
members and to overcome resistance and attachments to attitudes about the use of force
and troop protection over civilian protection. Second, the norm’s consistency with prior
ideas about counterinsurgency provided a strong resource for attaining the support of the
civilian administration, who had already made identity claims about the legitimacy of the
use of force based on human rights norms. Further, the regulative effects of the strong
civilian immunity norm made increased use of force against civilians untenable. Third,
the civilian immunity norm bridges the state’s identity claims with its use of force and
thus serves a source of legitimation. This is true for the local population,110 but it also
addresses the standing of the U.S. in the international community, broadly defined as its
moral standing and reliability in upholding norms constraining the use of force. As ReusSmit writes in 2004, at precisely a moment when the U.S. had gained social capital from
the 9/11 attacks, Bush’s foreign policy became “muscular,” sparking “unease” and
“widespread resentment,” and he has “crudely chipped away at America’s liberal identity
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in international relations.111 My hypothesis is that the legitimacy of the initial invasion in
each case helps to account for variance in the concern for reputational damage due to
civilian casualties and thus the uneven doctrinal response.
My overarching theory is that the military, as an agent of the state, engaged in a
redefinition of interests in a manner consistent with constructivist logic: through a mutual
constitution of identities and interests such that protecting civilians comes to be seen less
as a constraint on strategy and more as a central tenet of strategy. By embracing a
widely accepted norm that is associated with the broader human rights agenda, the U.S.
(re)aligns its identity with the values of the international community while at the same
time delegitimizing the identities of those who seek power through the targeting of
civilians.112 In doing so, it reinforces the anti-terror norm and denies the legitimate use of
force to the “other.” Thus this particular norm matters because of its role in structuring
the normative environment that regulates membership in the international community,113
which is strategically important in furthering the foreign policy goals of a “war of ideas”
that legitimizes and guides the desired political outcome of the wars on the ground. Seen
in this light, the civilian immunity norm highlights the growing strategic importance of
moral norms—as a factor in the security environment rather than as an artificially
imposed moral constraint on strategic behavior.
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In the language of norms, the strength of the civilian immunity norm acts as both
a negative and positive resource: it shapes doctrine through its regulative effects by
constraining the range of strategic choices seen as appropriate and actionable; and at a
more fundamental level, it shapes doctrine through the consequences of its constitutive
role in producing an ethical, rules-based international order, providing a source of
legitimacy to define “who we are” in relation to the enemy in the war on terror, as well as
in the wars on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. In doing so, it helps doctrine to link
the use of the military with national security and foreign policy objectives. In the simplest
terms, the military doctrinal shift drew on strength of the morally constraining
environment by appealing to it instead of fighting against it.

CHAPTER FOUR
IRAQ
In this case study, consistent with my causal model, I will demonstrate how the
instrumental use of civilian-centered human rights norms shapes the civilian-centered
counterinsurgency doctrine. The chapter begins with a discussion of baseline attitudes
about civilian and immunity in the year 2001, as interactions between the military and
human rights groups began in earnest. The relationship is traced out through the steps
normally seen in human rights diffusion: instrumental use, argumentation, and
persuasion. The next section demonstrates how Bush employs the language of just war
and human rights instrumentally while at the same time planning a War of Ideas meant to
support the War in Iraq. Next, I will show how civilian casualties early in the Iraq War
led to a crucial juncture whereby civilians were seen as strategic rather than as simply
collateral objects. I go on to show how even the perception of violating civilian immunity
became seen as a strategic liability when the U.S. experienced a crisis of legitimacy
through the degradation of the American image. This narrowed the scope of alternatives,
which eventually led to redefining the “problem” in the war in Iraq, including the
acceptance of a loss of the monopoly on force. Once this occurs, the influence of the
norm can be seen in the efforts to reshape and clarify counterinsurgency doctrine more in
keeping with civilian immunity.
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2001: Baseline Attitudes about Civilian Immunity
This story begins in the period leading up to the war in Iraq, when the Global War
on Terror (GWOT) had just begun, but before the military’s views on civilian casualties
had been impacted to a great extent by either the Iraq or the Afghanistan experience. As
argued in a previous chapter, civilian immunity has been an increasingly salient aspect of
the normative international political order, and some members of the military had already
started to recognize that civilian casualties were a political liability (though not yet a
military one). In response to U.S. involvement in conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and then
Afghanistan and Iraq, the military and a group of human rights scholars from Harvard
began building professional relationships in 2000 with a series of conferences and
workshops entitled, the Project on the Means of Intervention. The program was
organized by the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, under the auspices of the Human
Rights and National Security program. The goal of the early conferences was to
encourage dialogue among academics, human rights experts, NGOs, members of the
media, and high level military personnel. 1
The 2001 workshop provides a good baseline snapshot of the attitudes of U.S.
military personnel about issues pertaining to civilian casualties, media, and military
practices. In order to begin to find “common ground,” panels were held, conference
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papers presented, and keynote speakers of the highest level were brought in—in this
instance General Wesley Clark, commander of the mission in Kosovo. The director of the
Carr Center at that time was Sarah Sewall, who would emerge as one of the key human
rights experts to contribute to the revision process of the C.O.I.N. manual in 2006. Sewall
was present throughout this process and forged professional ties with Conrad Crane, one
of the primary authors of C.O.I.N., who would also participate, as did, eventually, David
Petraeus, John Nagl, and others who comprised much of the inner circle of what would
become known as the counterinsurgency “community of innovators.”
The attitudes expressed in this early conference roughly approximate what I
described in chapter two as the two major tendencies within the civilian immunity norm:
sovereignty and human rights, itself a reflection of the two competing currents in the
international order. Sovereignty in this sense refers to the interpretation of civilian
immunity as a negative constraint on the sovereign war-making function of the state, and
the human rights interpretation emphasizes the positive, rights-protecting responsibility
of the liberal state toward civilians.2 The problem that necessitated the creation of
dialogue between the human rights community and the military was the difference in
perceptions, expectations, and assessments about civilian casualties among the different
parties. Military personnel expressed some frustration with negative press coverage, and
emphasized the previous decade’s impressive achievements in minimizing civilian
casualties. They presented concern for civilian casualties as an historical, evolutionary
2
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process far removed from the enormous casualties of World War 2. In contrast, nonmilitary participants expressed continuing criticism about the way force was used; human
rights workers were concerned about the “risk aversion” of U.S. personnel, pointing out
that both Serbian and Kosovar civilians suffered a great deal as a result of the strategic
choice of relentless air strikes, for example.
The conference began with an exploration of the most basic questions, including
what the relationship was between international humanitarian law and war. The answer
given by one military official provides a good summary of prevailing attitudes of the
time, which saw military effectiveness and civilian casualties in direct opposition. As the
quote below also shows, the priority of force protection was, at this point, assumed by
those speaking from a military perspective, confirming a deeply ingrained, organizational
cultural perspective about risk aversion:
As a starting point, it is fundamentally correct to say military operations
and humanitarian concerns are at odds. Military operations are about
destruction, and are often chaotic and confused. Humanitarian concerns
are about minimizing this destruction. But this doesn’t tell us much. The
real question is to what extent can military operations be carried out with
minimum casualties without damaging effectiveness and accepting
significantly higher casualties of friendly forces.3
The starting assumptions about the role of ethics in the two communities were
fairly far apart. Military participants’ thinking about civilian immunity at this time
reflected a primarily technical outlook, and the scope of discussion was largely limited to
choice of weaponry, targeting practices, and collateral damage modeling. Human rights
3
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experts, however, saw humanitarian norms endangered by the reluctance to commit
ground troops, which sparked a debate as to whether the trend in increased reliance on air
power was good or bad for civilians.
They also worriedly pointed out the expansive potential of “military necessity,”
the civilian immunity norm’s ambiguous limiting principle. One such example brought
up in discussions was the bombing of the television station in Belgrade, which human
rights experts saw as illegal since it aimed to sever the link between the people and the
government. Consistent with the Weinberger-Powell doctrine of the time, however, some
participants held more expansive, sovereignty-oriented views of military necessity,
arguing that “media outlets provide effective mobilizing tools for the perpetration of
violence and thus are legitimate targets.”4 Similar debates occurred about the bombing of
electrical grids, which produce great civilian suffering but which was defended by some
military participants as necessary to “provide military advantage by injecting friction into
the system and temporarily disabling the enemy.”5 This difference in perspective also
manifested in discussions about whether the concept of military necessity can be
coherently applied to coercive strategies.6
Overall, many were conflicted about the role of international humanitarian law
against a legitimizing backdrop of humanitarian intervention. (It should be noted that
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though the GWOT had just begun, counterinsurgency in these discussions was not yet on
the radar. The public discourse about civilian casualties, the use of force, and civilian
immunity had not yet extended its reach to include issues of ground wars.) Still others
brought up the difference between legal and moral standards for military behavior and
suggested that “while international humanitarian law certainly places constraints upon the
use of force, many thought that popular conceptions of “morality” had a far more
powerful impact.”7 The report shows evidence of a nascent debate about whether more
restrictive moral expectations put the U.S. at a disadvantage. (This debate would arise in
relation to Iraq only later). One comment suggested a quite suspicious view of the norm
of civilian immunity as a possible a weapon to constrain U.S. power: “New international
humanitarian law is emerging, and if allowed to progress, law will become the most
potent weapon deployed against the United States.” Some noted the seeming irrelevance
of the norm in practice since “the distinction between civilian and non-civilian has
become blurred due to the nature of modern warfare and the environments in which
modern wars are fought,” especially urban environments.8
Some military participants countered that a slew of lawyers were already involved
in targeting decisions and that consideration for IHL (or LOAC, the preferred military
usage) had become internalized into military decision-making.9 The debate was widened
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when one participant remarked that “it is a mistake for military planners to view
humanitarian concerns as impediments to success in war. Wars are fought for political
reasons, and ignoring humanitarian concerns runs the risk of winning the battle and
losing the war.” The beginnings of the recognition of the need for legitimacy in
humanitarian intervention surfaced because “the domestic public and international
community, justifiably or not, holds Western militaries to a higher standard when they
intervene for ostensibly humanitarian reasons.” Some acknowledged the more cautious
targeting practices that might require, but “it was suggested that the U.S. could “afford”
such caution only in limited circumstances. Still another “queried whether it would be
either militarily prudent or politically necessary to apply these constraints to the war on
terrorism.”10 Common ground was found, however, as military officials and human
rights experts agreed that the U.S. public needed to be encouraged to have more realistic
expectations about the humanitarian implications for the use of force.
To sum, analysis of the earliest conference report available (held in November
2001) shows the beginnings of a debate informed by concerns about legitimacy,
especially the link between the reasons for using force to the moral issues about how
force is applied. Some “asserted that many participants sought to distinguish between
morally acceptable and legally justifiable actions, suggesting that there are tensions
between them.” This conference also shows a baseline understanding of an oppositional
relationship between humanitarian concerns about civilian casualties and military
10
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effectiveness. The comments and concerns of military personnel demonstrate a certain
level of internalization of the civilian immunity norm, though this attitude is inconsistent
across participants and narrow in scope in the sense that it applies mostly to airpower.
Interestingly, we see the first hints that some would assume a lesser degree of political
pressure to incur risk to protect civilians in the GWOT than humanitarian intervention
required. Both groups wanted to better manage public expectations about the
humanitarian consequences of employing force, however, though none at this point saw
foreign publics as a concern; rather, the American public was the audience to which they
were referring. Finally, military personnel and human rights experts both expressed an
interest in “the NGO world saying ‘this is what we’d like to see,’ and the military saying
‘this is the best we can do,’ and trying to narrow this gap.”11 These initial interactions
mark a period of “strategic bargaining” in the sense that it is seen as necessary to talk to
the human rights community, but for many the attitude appears skeptical, mostly to
defend the military’s actions.
Origins of the Legitimacy Gap: the Instrumental Use of Civilian-Centered Norms
If war is forced upon us, we will fight in a just cause and by just means —
sparing, in every way we can, the innocent. And if war is forced upon us,
we will fight with the full force and might of the United States military —
and we will prevail.12
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While those participating in the human rights policy conferences recognized the
competition between the two very different goals of human rights and military action, the
tensions between “just means” and “full force” was apparently lost on the George W.
Bush administration. From the beginning of the GWOT, President George W. Bush
engaged in a strategy of legitimation for his war policies by invoking moral concepts
deriving from Just War. His rhetoric invokes the jus ad bellum to justify the use of force
in Iraq, and he employs the language of just means (jus in bello) in order to legitimize the
U.S. identity as one that can be trusted to act ethically with that power, which works
simultaneously to deny legitimacy to its enemies, both state and non-state.
The War of Ideas and its Reliance on Just War Concepts
The War of Ideas is a real component in the GWOT broadly and in the Wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan more narrowly, yet because words are used to sell action, this is
often overlooked as mere rhetoric. The point of the War of Ideas is to deny support for
extremist ideological movements hostile to the United States. In the National Security
Strategy of 2002 (NSS 2002),13 Bush spells out the War of Ideas for the first time, and he
explicitly states that the legitimacy factor is a central concern:
We will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international
terrorism. This includes using the full influence of the United States, and
working closely with allies and friends, to make clear that all acts of
terrorism are illegitimate so that terrorism will be viewed in the same light
as slavery, piracy, or genocide.14
13
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Besides starving terrorism of legitimacy, the War of Ideas would also include the
following three goals:


Denying “fertile ground” for extremist Islamist ideology by
promoting Muslim moderates.



Addressing “underlying conditions” with the help of the
international community
Use public diplomacy to counter extremist rule and to promote
identification with American ideological concepts such as
freedom.15



The efforts to delegitimize terrorism were, of course, well under way by the time
this document was published. Bush employed a familiar tool which is itself the
supporting language of civilian immunity and just war, but which has also historically
been used to violate the spirit of distinction between combatant and noncombatant:
civilization versus barbarism/savagery: “this is civilization’s fight;” “the civilized world
is with us;” and "we wage a war to save civilization itself."16
That terrorism poses a universal threat to “civilization” was not terribly
controversial in the U.S. or elsewhere in the wake of 9/11. As Mendelsohn argues, “Al
Qaeda poses a challenge to the sovereignty of specific states but it also challenges the
international society as a whole. This way, the challenge that Al Qaeda represents is
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putting the survival of the system under risk.”17 Kinsella adds that “what marks President
Bush and his administration as the right defenders of ‘civilization is their claims to
protect ‘civilians.’”18 Most agree that to kill civilians for political purposes is wrong and
should be condemned. Naming terrorists as the “enemy of civilization” labels them not as
emergent actors who threaten the state monopoly of violence but as illegitimate in their
very identity. While their actions necessitate war, “who they are” precludes conferring
any legitimacy on their political claims or grievances precisely because “targeting
innocent civilians for murder is always and everywhere wrong;”19 To be a “terrorist”
means to be defined by the use of unjust means (killing civilians), which renders
impossible just cause and puts terrorists beyond the pale as actors—irreconcilable with,
and so incapable of inclusion within, any moral international order.
The analysis above is supported by the congressional testimony of Douglas
Feith,20 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the time, who was also in charge of the
initial civilian reconstruction effort during the Iraq War. Feith helped to shape the Bush
stance toward the Geneva Conventions, and he explains that Donald Rumsfeld
summoned him and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers to
17
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provide a memo about the Geneva Conventions with “talking points” for a National
Security Council meeting in February 2002, during the period the Bush Doctrine was still
being formulated. Though the issue was at this time centered on torture and POW status,
Feith explains that the “memo represented the thinking of the top civilian and military
leadership of the Defense Department,”21 whose stance was that the U.S. “had a
compelling interest in showing respect for Geneva.” It was considered important because
“Geneva is crucial for our own armed forces” in order to be treated as the law prescribes
in case of capture, and it was “an essential component of military culture.” Moreover,
Feith adds, it is “’morally important, crucial to US morale’ and it is also ‘practically
important, for it makes US forces the gold standard in the world, facilitating our winning
cooperation from other countries.’”22 Finally, Feith adds, the Geneva Conventions—and
here he specifically refers to the core content of the civilian immunity norm—are crucial
in the war on terror:
[our] position is dictated by the logic of our stand against terrorism. I argued:


The essence of the Convention is the distinction between soldiers
and civilians (i.e., between combatants and non-combatants).



Terrorists are reprehensible precisely because they negate that
distinction by purposefully targeting civilians.23

The war on terror became controversial as the universalism of the “human rights
interests” of civilization morphed into the sovereignty-based power interests of the
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United States, despite the belief that values and interests had fused. This was evident
when Bush employed the language of just war and terrorism for the purposes of
legitimizing the use of force against other states: in this case, Iraq. As part of his broader
foreign policy program known as the Bush Doctrine, the rhetoric Bush crafted at this
early point was directed toward mobilizing the domestic audience by “branding” the war
in Iraq as a secondary but crucial front in the GWOT. As others have pointed out,
however, the nature of global media today makes it nearly impossible to target only one
audience since “the media invites domestic and international responses, publicizing the
debate.”24
The NSS 2002 aims to ensure an order whereby all nations would “protect basic
human rights”25 by furthering the sovereign power interests of the U.S.: “The U.S.
national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that
reflects the union of our values and our national interests.”26 This document, while
building on the brief surplus of legitimacy afforded the U.S. in fighting Al Qaeda, made
instrumental use of Just War concepts (civilian immunity , human rights, and democracy
more broadly) to legitimate the expansion of its own power across the globe. Most
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famously, Bush turned the Just War concept of preemption into prevention,27 a move
which served to undermine the stability of the international normative order and reaffirm
European publics’ initial assessment of Bush as “mak[ing] decisions based entirely on
U.S. interests.”28 As Hurd argues, his instrumental use and distortion of this norm was
damaging on many fronts:
The American challenge to the customary law on preemption threatens to
delegitimize both the existing norms and the social basis of US power,
while also attempting to legitimize American interests and new
understandings of the norms. It therefore shows the productive and
destructive aspects of the power of legitimation in world politics.
Legitimation is the link between states and the normative structures of
international society.29
Defining rogue states as illegitimate based on their anti-human rights, “terrorist”
ideology, they too are denied any just cause because their identity precludes the
possibility: “we make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor
or provide aid to them.”30 In attempting to blur the line between the identities of state and
non-state actor by conflating illegitimate violence against foreign civilians (terrorism)
with illegitimate violence within a state (human rights violations), Bush serves to
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strengthen the normative power of both human rights and civilian immunity, and more
specifically, reinforces a civilian-centered human rights ethic.
By employing international society’s morally constraining norms in an identity
contest with both terrorists and rogue states, however, Bush reinforces expectations that
the United States be held to a higher standard in war, undermining the legitimacy of the
traditional bias states have maintained toward an expansive, sovereignty-based definition
of military necessity. Couching the build-up to the Iraq War in the rhetoric of Just War
and undermining its long historical struggle to separate jus ad bellum from jus in bello (as
explained in chapter 2) by fusing unjust cause with unjust means, Bush’s garbled
communication strategies enact three unintended consequences: 1.) he creates moral
confusion about who the enemy is and what type of treatment they are entitled to. This is
true of the U.S. public and many of the soldiers at the lower levels, as confirmed by my
interviews.31 2.) he invites judgment of his own war according to those same criteria, and
3.) he undermines both the physical wars and the wars of ideas by placing them at odds.
By instrumentally using norms meant to limit war-making power for the purposes
of expansion of power, Bush drew unprecedented attention to the contradictions between
the American values of rule of law, democracy, and the protection of human rights and
American aspirations for global hegemony. As Ikenberry explains, people feared that
Bush had abandoned the post WW2 social compact that allowed U.S. power to exist
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relatively unchallenged by the rest of the world because it rested on how actual, ordinary
people, that is, civilians, experienced American power.32 The precarious balance
previously employed by the U.S. through strategic restraint had rested on the
“institutionalization of hegemonic strategy, [which] serves the interest of the United
States by making its power more legitimate, expansive, and durable. The price is that
some restraints are indeed placed on the exercise of power.”33 As Ikenberry suggests, in
rejecting the restraints on its own power, the U.S. emphasized its “imperial face” over its
“liberal face,” which intensified insecurity and inflamed public opinion in many states
across the world.34 Anti-Americanism, which the War of Ideas was meant to remedy,
instead was fanned in the build-up to the invasion of Iraq.
This worsened as two of the three legs of the stool constructed by the
administration to justify its invasion disintegrated (Saddam Hussein’s alleged cooperation
with terrorists and his program of WMDs). This left only one leg, humanitarian
intervention, which meant that the legitimacy of U.S. military action in Iraq rested
precariously on the promise that the good of removing the previous regime would
outweigh the violation of Iraq’s state sovereignty, not to mention the destruction and
misery wreaked on its people. As damage to the U.S. reputation began to accrue in the
32
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larger international community,35 a legitimacy gap began to expand between the values
and identity promoted in the War of Ideas and the material reality of the physical wars.
With a unilaterally conceived and implemented foreign policy goal lacking international
support, particularly amongst foreign publics,36 the stated goal in Iraq became the
creation of a stable, democratic state that respects human rights and that would become
an ally in the war on terror.37 Hearkening back to the previous social compact of strategic
restraint, the material goals of the war were now firmly embedded within normative
claims about making life better for ordinary people through freedom, prosperity, and
human dignity.
The criteria by which to judge U.S. power and thus U.S. identity was promoted
by the U.S. itself through its attempt to establish its place within international society as a
global hegemon that was fierce to its enemies but protective of its friends. In using the
rhetoric of restraint and principle but appealing to the desire for destruction and revenge,
Bush set an emotionally powerful tone for the nation, including some in the military. As
my interviews with military personnel have revealed, Iraqi civilians came to be seen as
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the enemy by many in the early days of the war. As a result, the latent tensions regarding
the moral dimensions of the civilian immunity norm that existed pre-Iraq, between the
humanitarian justification for force versus the suffering it causes for innocent civilians,
would be amplified ten-fold.
What the U.S. civilian leadership did not yet understand, but what some in the
U.S. military would learn fairly quickly, is that the narrative (the actual story that
interprets and guides the ideas and perceptions of people about events) and the
legitimacy it confers or destroys, was not an ancillary rhetorical issue; rather, the War of
Ideas impacted directly on the material success or failure of a war waged on behalf of
democratic values and human rights, by a powerful Western democracy, against nonstate actors in a state it was responsible for “breaking.”38 What was just as important was
that, as in any war, the enemy was watching, listening, and behaving in a strategic
manner as well. Moreover, the enemies were multiple, and Al Qaeda, who had been
working out its own narrative of morality and legality about killing civilians, provided an
alternative narrative about the justness of killing civilians, aiming at the Achilles heel of
American legitimacy: its limited ability to see the gap between its own words and its
deeds. At the same time Bush was formulating his use of norms, al Qaeda’s official
spokesman, Suleiman Abu Ghaith, posted the following on al Qaeda’s web site in June
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2002. Using the same language of WMDs that Bush was using, he wrote a justification
for killing Americans based on American behavior toward Muslim civilians:
Due to the American bombings and siege of Iraq, more than 1,200,000
Muslims were killed in the past decade…The Americans have still not
tasted from our hands what we have tasted from theirs. The [number of]
killed in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are but a tiny part of
the exchange for those killed in Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, the Philippines,
Bosnia, Kashmir, Chechnya, and Afghanistan. We have not reached parity
with them. We have the right to kill four million Americans – two million
of them children – and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple
hundreds of thousands. Furthermore, it is our right to fight them with
chemical and biological weapons, so as to afflict them with the fatal
maladies that have afflicted the Muslims because of [Americans’]
chemical and biological weapons. America knows only the language of
force. America is kept at bay by blood alone.39
Iraq: Post Invasion 2003-4
The U.S. enjoyed its brief, shining moment in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of
the invasion, which was militarily successful by most accounts in the sense that it
achieved its goal of defeating and removing the previous regime. Cheers for the
liberators soon gave way to chaos, however, as it became apparent that there was a lack
of any real post-invasion plan or even capability for state-building. Thomas Ricks
documents the “fiasco” of those years when many ordinary Iraqis turned from optimism
to suspicion: a failure to police the unruly mobs who destroyed Iraqi cultural heritage; a
lack of civilian capacity to assist the military in building infrastructure and institutions;
de-Baathification and the dissolution of the Iraqi military by L. Paul Bremer produced
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angry, unemployed, and well -armed Sunnis who began resisting what they correctly
predicted would be a Shia-majority dominated government.40
What is less acknowledged by most accounts of the invasion and early postinvasion period is that the lack of planning included an absence of clear, unified
expectations and training on how to treat civilians. While the air strikes in the “shock and
awe” campaign employed precise weaponry and careful collateral damage planning, they
also used cluster munitions in residential areas.41 Civilian immunity considerations were
institutionalized in air strike targeting procedures, but how ground troops behaved toward
civilians fell to the ethical leadership exhibited (or not) by individual leaders. Though
some units were expected to (and did) exercise ethical judgment in distinguishing
between combatant and civilian, others describe a free-for- all environment in which, as
one soldier put it, the rules of engagement were to “kill anything that moves.”42 Others
described the mood as vengeful and dark after 9/11, and all agreed that force protection
was an absolute, unquestioned priority: “better to send a bullet than a soldier” was
mentioned as a common slogan of the time.
Despite the words of President Bush, who characterized the invasion as "one of
the swiftest and most humane military campaigns in history,"43 the reality of the war on
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the ground was experienced differently by many of those in uniform and the civilians
with whom they interacted. Bush, in an address to the nation (which was of course
transmitted throughout the world by global media), said “the people you liberate will
witness the honorable and decent spirit of the American military. In this conflict,
America faces an enemy who has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality.”
After condemning Saddam Hussein on the grounds of his violations of human rights,
Bush adds, “I want Americans and all the world to know that coalition forces will make
every effort to spare innocent civilians from harm.”44 In the meantime, the military was
not, as General Tommy Franks put it, “in the business of doing body counts,”45 but an
initial damage assessment by Human Rights Watch estimated that the invasion killed
thousands.46
In the face of the grave material disaster forming on the ground, the lack of basic
needs being met and the massive disruption to an already severely damaged society and
economy, the War of Ideas faded into the background. Neither the State Department nor
the DoD thought much about what would be required to implement it or even how it
would relate to the war on the ground. While the military had always engaged in
psychological operations, the goal of manipulating perceptions was negative: to support
the use of destructive force and defeating the enemy. The last U.S. experience with a war
44
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of ideas meant to promote positive U.S. values, identity, and power occurred during the
Cold War, when the state department ran a fairly vibrant public diplomacy effort. As was
the case with many of the other traditionally civilian responsibilities, this capability did
not exist early in the war. Perhaps more importantly, it was only gradually becoming
apparent that what happened on the battlefields and in the neighborhoods of Iraq had any
bearing on the larger ideological war of perceptions relating to the GWOT. As President
Bush had explained, the War of ideas was meant to address and remedy the fertile ground
for terrorism and anti-American feeling, yet those very enabling conditions were taking
root in Iraq.
In the meantime, the Project for the Means of Intervention continued to hold
conferences and meetings continued between a core of approximately 60 “veteran
participants” along with a diverse crowd described as consisting of “intergenerational,
international, senior to junior; analytic and operational, [and] “unusual” suspects.” Some
could be considered “norms entrepreneurs,” and others were not. As events in Iraq heated
up, the meetings became “informal, off-the-record, and intensive.” The causes of civilian
suffering and how to reduce it was the main topic of discussion, and assumptions and
perspectives of human rights experts and the military were far off. Issues were raised
about the utility and difficulty of keeping track of civilian casualties, along with
discussions about what was and was not within the control of the U.S. government. It was
noted that while the location, capabilities, and intentions of the adversary were not in
control of the U.S., the “rules of engagement (ROE), quality of intelligence, and strategy”
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were. No consensus, or even emphasis at this time suggested that both sides had decided
that civilian suffering was itself a strategic consideration, though it was assumed that the
issue was a matter that impacted the “Western ‘center of gravity’ in the sense of affecting
“local political and military allies, coalition partners, domestic political support, and
international legitimacy.”47
By 2003, the outcomes of the conferences showed an acknowledgement of the
salience of civilian casualties, and despite the tensions between a military that tended
toward the presumption that progress toward civilian suffering was already as good as it
gets, the results of the conference highlighted the need to


‘increase communication among military, political leadership,
human rights groups, and broader public’ about CD issues



Develop greater understanding of how conduct of U.S. military
operations and other factors affect civilians during war



Help make U.S. use of force as consistent as possible with
humanitarian principles



Make U.S. use of force more effective48

Back inside the military, it became clear to many that an insurgency was brewing
from the beginning, but that fact did not compel a unified doctrinal response.49 Rather, in
the absence of a clear doctrine to address such a contingency, early attempts at building
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infrastructure, providing basic services, and working to restore order and stability took
place within the context of a disintegrating relationship between soldiers and civilians.
Anti-occupation sentiment grew in key areas, and as soldiers experienced the terror tactic
of road-side IEDs, suspicion and tension built between the populace and the military.
Checkpoint incidences of killing civilians increased, and soldiers kept their physical
distance from the people, which exacerbated an already shaky foundation undermined by
poor communication, cultural distance, and the sense of soldiers as outsiders. The initial
euphoria about U.S. liberation that was touted (and by most accounts generally believed)
by the administration, was soon clearly being experienced as occupation by many
Iraqis.50 Promises of prosperity and freedom instead gave way to destitution, insecurity,
and growing chaos.
U.S. forces were trained for conventional war, in which destroying the enemy is
the goal, and civilians in many cases became indistinguishable from insurgents, both in
their physical appearance, but also, some interviewees suggest, in the minds of some of
the soldiers. One remarked: “we began to look at them as the enemy.” Lacking in training
and preparation for such a development, many confirmed a widespread mood of avenging
9/11. Other interviewees suggested that most events involving civilian casualties and
abuse were never brought to light by the media: “there are lots of things you’ve never
heard about on the news.” This is likely due to the practice of controlling the media by
50
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embedding reporters; one interviewee mentioned a specific incident in which a soldier
went on a rampage against civilians in the Iraqi town of Hit after losing several of his
buddies to an IED attack. According to this account, the soldier was prosecuted, but this
was not a big media hit, at least in the U.S. Two events that did attract global media
attention, however, were seen by most of the interviewees as tarnishing the reputation of
the military in a significant way,51 contributing to the spread of an already growing
insurgency, and represented a tipping point in the early stages of the war. These two
events both centered on perceptions of the unethical treatment of Iraqi civilians by
American soldiers: the scandal at Abu Ghraib and the first battle of Fallujah in April of
2004.
The scandal at Abu Ghraib resulted from the brutal, degrading, sometimes deadly
treatment of detainees that was captured in film clips, photographs, journals, stories, and
official reports by the ICRC and Human Rights Watch.
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The investigation began within

the military, but traditional media brought it to life—a special on 6o Minutes and then an
article by the famed journalist Seymour Hersh of the New Yorker.53 Photographs were
leaked and disseminated across the globe via the internet, and the world was shocked by
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the depraved, sadistic images of torture and sexual degradation against the prisoners.54
Further, it was mentioned that the released photos were relatively tame compared to the
still unreleased photos of rape, torture, beatings, intimidation, and death. Hersh notes that
military officials described American soldiers ‘severely beating an Iraqi prisoner nearly
to death, having sex with a female Iraqi prisoner, and ‘acting inappropriately with a dead
body.’ The officials said there also was a videotape, apparently shot by U.S. personnel,
showing Iraqi guards raping young boys.”55
Military officers describe this exposure as devastating to the war cause, but
interestingly, several sources note that the Iraqi reaction was not the main concern, since
this was not surprising to many of them—this was a surprise to those outside of Iraq.
Despite the public stance of the civilian administration that this was the result of a few
bad apples, one interviewee said that the abusive attitudes in Abu Ghraib reflected a
wider attitude toward civilians. He described his own reaction to the outing of Abu
Ghraib as consistent with the general reaction of those around him: “Well, we’d been
caught is what I thought when I first heard” he said. When asked if it was the global
public or the Iraqi public he was concerned about, he indicated it was the perceptions of
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the American audience they most feared: “we were afraid they’d find out we were acting
like animals.”56
The response of public officials at the time indicated grave concern that the
damage to the U.S. image undermines the war in a way that transcends domestic support.
TIME magazine published the following:
Senator Joe Biden, ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee
and a supporter of the decision to invade Iraq, characterized the
revelations of abuse as the single most significant blow to U.S. prestige in
the Arab world over the past decade. Anthony Cordesman, the widely
respected defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies was equally forthright: "Those Americans who mistreated the
prisoners may not have realized it, but they acted in the direct interests of
al-Qaeda, the insurgents, and the enemies of the U.S.," he said. The reason
is that they came at a point when U.S. standing in the Arab world was
already at an all-time low. Says Cordesman, "These negative images
validate all other negative images and interact with them." In other words,
they function as a multiplier by providing photographic "proof" of the
demonic picture of the U.S. painted by anti-American propagandists.57
As if Abu Ghraib were not bad enough, in the same month the U.S. became
embroiled in the single most damaging battle of the war thus far: Fallujah. Fallujah is a
city in Iraq that was initially friendly to U.S. forces. It eventually became a hotbed of
insurgency, however, fueled by anti-occupation resentment. An overwhelmingly Sunni
city, its residents suffered high unemployment from the de-Baathification policies
undertaken by the Coalition Provision Authority (CPA).58
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A series of incidents occurred that sparked mistrust and anger between the
soldiers and citizens. First, only a month into the invasion, 700 troops entered the city and
took over a local school as part of their base. Residents resented the closure of the school,
and within five days, protests around the school grew more ominous, with evidence of
rock-throwing by citizens, some children, and claims by soldiers that they were taking
fire. While other reports confirm sporadic violence against soldiers over time, Human
Rights Watch did not find credible evidence to support that soldiers were under fire on
the day in question. The event culminated with soldiers climbing to the roof and opening
fire on the crowds, resulting in about seventeen civilian deaths.59
As unrest and resistance grew over the next year, troops pulled out of the city,
and, in keeping with Bush’s policy goal to hand over control to local forces, Iraqi security
forces attempted to keep control. The situation grew more volatile as insurgents
massacred police, and as they gained mass support of the city’s residents. Moreover, the
lack of control in the city allowed it to become inundated with foreign fighters, most
notably Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).60 The event that sparked major combat operations was
when four American Blackwater contractors accidentally took a wrong turn into the city
and were killed by insurgents. Images of a cheering crowd who then mutilated the
corpses and hung them from a bridge enraged Americans, including President Bush and
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CPA head, L. Paul Bremer.61 Troops were hurriedly called in, before there was really
time to “shape” the terrain or empty the city of civilians, and the goal of searching out
and killing insurgents resulted in an estimated 700-2000 Iraqi deaths (some claim 700
civilians), and from 38-100 U.S. soldiers. The city was destroyed, and many of the people
displaced. Several of my interviewees confirmed a “shoot anything that moves” mentality
and noted that Fallujah is known for what was a common practice in the early days of
Iraq, which was to count all males of a certain age as insurgents. None of the soldiers I
spoke with were in the battle and instead relied on the internal accounts and stories
spread amongst soldiers. Such a characterization has become almost conventional within
the military because even some of the newer soldiers have been taught that Fallujah was
the antithesis of what good counterinsurgency should be. It is also known at this time that
white phosphorous was used to drive insurgents from houses, and an amateur American
filmmaker who entered Fallujah right after the battle interviewed residents, (and later
soldiers), who showed him hateful graffiti left by soldiers on the furniture of a resident: “I
hate Iraq and all Iraqis.”62
What is remarkable about the preceding events is not necessarily the brutality of
war, but the spirit of openness and self-reflection about such incidents that is increasingly
evident in the military today. The military literature is filled with monographs seeking to
make sense of such events in the interest of organizational learning. Major Sherry Oehler,
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for example, who writes on the unintended consequences of killing civilians, confirms
my own assertion that the instrumental use of international norms matters for what
happens on the ground: she notes that “the Bush administration’s policy on denying
“unlawful combatants” privileges as prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions
enabled troops freedom of maneuver to accomplish these missions, however, the policy
contributed to the ambiguity on the ground with regard to the treatment of civilians.”63
Bush at the time of Fallujah demonstrated little recognition of this, as evidenced by the
fact that his public comments leading up to Fallujah continued to justify force by
instrumentally employing the norms-language of democracy, civilian immunity, and
human rights: “they want to kill innocent life to try to get us to quit,” he said. Bush
promised that “U.S. troops will use whatever force is needed to quell uprisings in
Fallujah…and “we will deal with those who want to stop the march to freedom.”64
Bush’s determination to make an example of Fallujah for killing American
“civilians” and his stated willingness to use all available means suggest that he was no
longer concerned with the image of the U.S. military or state as being in line with civilian
immunity. His attempts to signal resolve are indicative of a sovereignty-oriented reading
of the CIN wherein military necessity enables more civilian casualties. I suggest that this
is a tipping point in the war whereby it became very clear that killing civilians entailed
damage to the U.S. social reputation, and that the importance of the War of Ideas was

63

Oehler, "Unintended Consequences," 12.

64

"Bush Vows to Win in Fallujah," Washington Times, April 2004.

166

first connected to success in the physical war. This is so because, despite the tough talk
about force, the political pressure created by the carnage was immense, and it was
decisive in stopping the battle despite material definitions of “winning.”65
Some of the interviewees present in Iraq during the Fallujah period named
Fallujah as a tipping point: “We looked around, and we’d killed all these people, but now
what? What were we doing?” This was not lost on many Iraqis. One Iraqi man spoke to
the American press weeks after Fallujah, and
he recalls that his growing uneasiness with the US occupation turned into
something steelier a few weeks ago, when he saw the first images of
civilian casualties carried from Fallujah on the Arab satellite channels Al
Jazeera and Al Arabiya. ‘They showed us what they really are.’66
The military denied that there were many casualties or that ROE were broken, but
according to an intelligence report leaked to Wikileaks, it was immediately recognized
that the perception of civilian casualties had damaged the legitimacy of the American
mission by creating “political pressure” and building on anger already present from Abu
Ghraib.67
A very influential series of articles published in Military Review, the Army’s
internal journal, in 2005 demonstrate that the thinking of the leadership was in keeping
with both the general sentiment expressed by my interviewees and that of the intelligence
report. Metz writes
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U. S. forces unilaterally halted combat operations after a few days due to a
lack of support from the interim Iraqi Government and international
pressures amid unsubstantiated enemy reports of collateral damage and
excessive force. Marines won virtually every combat engagement
throughout the battle and did so within the established rules of
engagement. The missing element was an overall integrated information
component to gain widespread support of significant influencers and to
prepare key populations for the realities of the battle plan. Without such
advance support, the finest combat plan executed by competent and brave
Soldiers and Marines proved limited in effectiveness. The insurgent forces
established links with regional and global media outlets that had agendas
of their own. The failure to mass effects in the global information sphere
proved decisive on the battleground in Fallujah.68
Metz, who works in information operations, highlights that perceptions are
directly relevant to the larger war on terror, which now had direct links to the battlefields
of Iraq. He cites Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was writing to al- Zarqawi about the War of
Ideas from the perspective of Al Qaeda and now AQI as well, and that this was based on
civilian casualties: “. . . I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this
battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a
race for the hearts and minds of our Umma.”69 Metz adds that it is specifically the
perception “that combat operations are indiscriminate, disproportionate, and in violation
of the rules of war” that caused the failure of the April 2004 incursion into Fallujah.70 It
became quite clear after Fallujah that communication was seen as not simply words but
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as strategic interaction, and that winning the War of Ideas was now seen as directly
connected to winning the ground war.
Furthermore, the military began to realize what Bush did not: that the U.S. was
light years behind the enemy in acknowledging this basic fact: “[Our] units are facing an
adaptive, relentless, and technologically savvy foe who recognizes that the global
information network is his most effective tool for attacking what he perceives to be the
center of gravity- public opinion, both domestic and international.”71 By early 2006,
Bush’s own former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations,
Joseph Collins, published an open letter in the Armed Forces Journal warning Bush that
‘[i] f our strategic communications on Iraq don't improve, the strategy for victory will fail
and disastrous consequences will follow.’"72
Transitioning Counterinsurgency: Ideas within the Military
By 2004, post Fallujah, the insurgency was spreading, and now the multifaceted character of it was becoming clear. The Shiite cleric Muqtada alSadr’s faction had also revolted after L. Paul Bremer shut down his
region’s television station and arrested one of his men. 73 The battle was
not nearly as damaging as Fallujah because the civilians separated
themselves from the fighter and literally stood aside. As David Kilcullen
explains in the Small War Journal Blog, however, refraining from killing
civilians while going after the enemy is not the end of the road because
they still have to choose sides: “in that instance [in Sadr City], and a
couple of others, the local Shia population actually stood to one side and
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waited for us to secure them, but once they saw we weren't planning to
stay permanently they were too exposed to support us.”74
According to a Shiite cleric at the time, Fallujah had for a brief time united Iraq—
against the United States. “What happened in Fallujah made every Iraqi think it could
happen in their own town, and that united us.”75 The battle in Fallujah however, in
destroying much of the city, had displaced both insurgents and civilians, which
destabilized other areas in the North and contributed to later sectarian tensions.76
With Iraq further destabilizing and beginning to fragment, it became clear to
many in the military that the character of the conflict required a change in approach.
While information operations were about controlling the narrative and thus perceptions,
John Nagl, co-author of the final C.O.I.N. manual (FM3-24) attributes the need for a
change to the Information revolution’s effects not only on the image of the U.S., but on
the “nature of warfare, especially insurgency.”77 The debate within the military about
counterinsurgency began to view the actual place of the civilian and ethical treatment
toward them as a strategic matter. Despite popular conceptions, the foundations for the
C.O.I.N. manual were being laid months before General Petraeus took over the
Combined Arms Center and began the famous re-writing of the field manual.
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As I continue with my case, a caveat is in order: at the highest levels of the
military, I have not heard my thesis confirmed in public speech, though most lower and
mid-level military participants in my study78 confirmed the idea that civilian casualties
early in the Iraq conflict were a significant reason for the later change in doctrine toward
population protection, and many elaborated that the doctrine was needed to get soldiers to
“change their attitudes toward the Iraqi people and quit seeing them as the enemy.” “We
had to learn that they’re not all terrorists, that they have a culture of their own, and that
hurting them hurt the mission.” Nagl’s characterization draws a direct line between
civilian casualties and material effects on the battlefield, however, when he wrote in the
Small Wars Journal Blog that
the key to success in a counterinsurgency environment is not to create
more insurgents than you capture or kill. A stray tank round that kills a
family could create dozens of insurgents for a generation. Thus, it is
essential to use force as carefully and with as much discrimination as is
possible.79
Nagl also described the need for a change in doctrine as arising because
counterinsurgency was previously a special forces task. They needed to “reenergize the
force” as a whole. The “big army, conventional war-fighting army needed to be reminded
that fighting counterinsurgency” was their job, and the temporary manual that had been
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hastily put together in October 2004 was about to expire.80 What has been left unsaid by
military leadership is that the history of special forces and CIA running
counterinsurgency operations (in Latin America for example) were secretive and far
removed from both the spirit and letter of LOAC. The CIA “murder manual,” for
example, was described as a training manual for the Nicaraguan guerrillas in “how to
kidnap, assassinate, blackmail, and dupe civilians.”81
Counterinsurgency Debate: More Carrots, Less Sticks
The doctrinal change that eventually occurred addresses the deficit in military
culture toward civilians, and the debate leading up to the new manual in 2005 seemed to
recognize this deficit. What the debate in 2005 achieved was to help clarify the logic of
counterinsurgency in accordance with the changing political/strategic environment.
Ironically, while the public and legal discourse in the U.S. had exploded with questions
as to whether or not the civilian immunity norm was obsolete or should be discarded in
the face of irregular warfare, military insiders were carefully interrogating assumptions
about the use of force, exploring and explicating new goals, and starting to identify what
needed to change in order to reach those goals. The community of innovators that shaped
the debate engaged in a redefinition of some of the key counterinsurgency concepts in a
way that took into account the need to remedy the existing legitimacy gap with the moral
content of civilian immunity and by doing so, attempt to bridge the war of ideas with the
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war on the ground. The body of published works taken as a whole attempted to change
ideas about how to fight by matching them with revised interests and American identity,
creating a conceptual link between the ethical treatment of civilians and national security
imperatives and foreign policy goals.
In response to perceptions of failure associated with failing to live up to civiliancentered human rights norms, the debate found in the 2005 (post-Fallujah but prePetraeus period) issues of Military Review82 are indications that human rights demands
are having an effect: adaptation, moral consciousness-raising, argumentation, and
persuasion are all present. Processes of institutionalization and habitualization would not
be expected to come until later, after the adoption of C.O.I.N., which this chapter will not
cover.83
The first counterinsurgency manual put out in October, 2004 was a hurried
attempt to draw lessons learned from past counterinsurgencies.84 The manual shows that
prior ideas about how to manage insurgencies emphasize the tactical and operational
levels, but not the strategic level, which is the vital difference between it and the later
FM3-24. Meant for “division-level leaders and below,” it was not meant to challenge the
prevailing assumptions in the military about the utility of force and the way it should be
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employed. Furthermore, it reflected Rumsfeld’s priority that responsibility for the
aftermath of the Iraq War was to be shifted onto Iraq,85 the host nation (HN): “a basic
premise of counterinsurgency is that the ultimate responsibility rests with the HN.” And,
“one of the key recurring lessons is that the United States cannot win other countries’
wars for them, but can certainly help legitimate foreign governments overcome attempts
to overthrow them.” Lessons from past counterinsurgency experience were thus
interpreted in a manner meant to uphold current strategic assumptions, and despite the
change in circumstances, the manual reflected an understanding of the U.S. as having a
supporting role in the counterinsurgency (as it did in Latin America) rather than as a
primary actor: “the use of combat forces is a presidential decision and serves only as a
temporary or provisional solution until HN forces are able to stabilize the situation and
provide security for the populace.86 However, since the war was one of choice by the
U.S., and ostensibly for the purposes of humanitarian intervention, the situation in Iraq
hardly matched the traditional model of insurgency as resulting from the internal organic
uprising of elites with grievances. Instead, it was the result of an invasion and postinvasion policies, including the dismantling of its prior institutions.
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Though the first manual contained the basic elements of C.O.I.N. in terms of
population protection as a goal,87 and it emphasized that officers should “prevent
indiscriminate use of force,” this is overshadowed by force protection. The manual notes
that human rights are a likely grievances and something to be taken into consideration,
but it sees them as competing with the use of force and kinetic operations:
“Counterinsurgency operations must balance elimination of grievances (that is, reform to
include elimination of human rights abuses) and security force action that eliminates the
insurgents.”88 The manual also emphasizes the media effects of collateral damage and the
psychological effects on the populace as damaging to the mission: “Do not hurt the
people, but kill the insurgents. Where US forces violate this dictum, US policies may
fail.”89 However, consistent with remarks by one of my interviewees that “civilians were
treated as objects, not human beings,” civilians are mentioned in the same subheading as
“Resource Control:” “Combat operations are developed to neutralize the insurgent and,
together with population and resources control measures, establish an environment
within which political, social, and economic progress is possible.”90 An entire section
discussed coercive practices toward civilians, which included the extreme measure of
forceable relocation of populations if deemed necessary.91
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In contrast to the inconsistent focus of the prior counterinsurgency manual, which
emphasizes that combat operations are in tension with population protection, the series of
articles published in Military Review during 200592 emphasize the importance of limiting
force and protecting the civilian, both for ethical and strategic reasons. In doing so, it lays
the intellectual groundwork for shifting the “center of gravity” from the insurgent to the
civilian.
The articles in the year preceding C.O.I.N. emphasize the synthesis of moral
identity, moral behavior, and strategic goals in the war in Iraq. There is an emphasis on
developing Information Operations capabilities, but also on how information operations
require challenging the assumption that force produces victory: “U.S. forces find, engage,
capture, and kill terrorists, but this traditional approach to counterinsurgency does not
adequately counter the insurgents’ information environment strategy.”93 There was a
growing recognition that all negative experiences and images of the U.S. hurt the
mission, but that changes are not simply about controlling the story through counterstories, but about changing the hearts and minds of soldiers as well. In acknowledging the
damage done by Abu Ghraib, the author emphasizes the changes that must occur as a
result: “The stark images from Abu Ghraib prison fade from the news only until the next
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U.S. soldier must answer formal charges for what happened there. The Army is ensuring
what happened will not happen again.”94
Competing perspectives appear on occasion, for example, one that argues for the
primacy of force protection. The author defends force protection as a strategic necessity
because of the casualty sensitivity of the American public: “the enemy also learned that
America’s vulnerable center of gravity is dead American soldiers.”95 The overwhelming
tenor of the publication at this time though is of change, not one of maintaining the status
quo. Part of this change is a concerted effort to explain the importance of ideas and the
physical war as being connected and of drawing distinctions between terrorists and
insurgents versus the U.S. military through their actions: “The United States must also
understand that when its forces react negatively and kick down doors in night raids, they
are helping the enemy improve his own information environment. Their actions will
annoy and alienate citizens who might no longer cooperate or who might begin actively
supporting the insurgents.”96
Others seek to bring the context of the current war back into its original
humanitarian framework: “If the military is to conduct the Global War on Terrorism in an
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effects-based campaign, then all military operations must become part of that plan.
Consider, for instance, the secondary effects of a humanitarian relief operation. As part of
the Global War on Terrorism, such an operation well executed serves the campaign
plan.”97 Even suicide attacks are explained, not as Arab or Muslim cultural defects—
which was common in the U.S. at the time, but as strategic aims of insurgencies,
including al Qaeda, which increased with anti-occupation resentments. The author argues
that closer engagement with the people could defuse the underlying conditions that give
rise to such strategies.98
A British officer, in a frank and rather controversial article, observed the effects
of U.S. military culture and made an explicit criticism: “It was apparent that many
considered that the only effective, and morally acceptable, C.O.I.N. strategy was to kill or
capture all terrorists and insurgents; they saw military destruction of the enemy as a
strategic goal in its own right.”99 Others attempted to show what went wrong in past
operations to demonstrate the strategic utility of ethical behavior and to counter the
tendency to rely on excessive force and permissive ROE. Brian Mcallister Linn drew
lessons from the Philippines counterinsurgency about the “necessity of having officers of
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character, initiative, and humanity in counterinsurgency operations.“100 Another author
discussed how important maintaining or repairing perceptions of moral character were in
British counterinsurgencies and yet another in the French Algerian War. Montgomery
McFate, an anthropologist working for the DoD, argued that as soon as coalition forces
toppled Saddam Hussein, they became de facto players in the Iraqi social system.”101 She
encouraged cultural knowledge, both in terms of understanding Arab culture and on
reflecting on the military’s own strategic character and how that affects outcomes: “the
American solution to the conflict [in Vietnam] was the use of overwhelming force in the
form of strategic bombing and the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, neither of which
resulted in victory.102
C.O.I.N. Revision
By the time David Petraeus was installed as the head of the Combined Arms
Center in November 2005, the raw mass of intellectual ideas that formed the foundation
of C.O.I.N. had been circulating throughout the organization. Petraeus almost
immediately announced that there would be a revision, and the process sped forward,
making extensive use of some of the articles already published in Military Review. He
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employed John Nagl as editor and Conrad Crane, the military historian, as primary
author.
The Human Rights Conferences at the Carr Center had, in the meantime, been
ongoing, and the mood had shifted within the meetings as well. The November 2005
meeting was attended by Petraeus, Crane, Susan Rice, and about 85 others. Participants
looked back at historical counterinsurgencies, seeking to learn lessons, and most agreed
that giving up on the idea of force used in a conventional way was a necessity. When
discussing how some states employed brutal methods against populations even within
counterinsurgencies, most agreed that this was no longer possible for “Western nations
prosecuting counterinsurgency campaigns as they would be viewed as collective
punishments that deny fundamental human rights to innocent populations.”103 Indeed,
“conference participants were generally critical of what they called ‘terrorism to fight
terrorism’ employed by the French in Algeria.”104 Not only were they critical in ethical
terms, but they spoke of past brutality as counterproductive: “in Vietnam, too,
indiscriminate force was counterproductive and undermined overall political
objectives.”105
The general feeling at this time was that political considerations required an
ethical stance and that this had to trump military considerations, and not vice versa.
103

Sarah Sewall, "Counterinsurgnecy in Iraq: Implications of Irregular Warfare for the U.S. Government,"
(John F. Kennedy School of Government: Harvard University, 2005), 3.
104

Ibid., 4.

105

Ibid.

180

While some questioned the possibility that an insurgency could be eliminated without
dirty tactics, another claimed that such assertions being “floated around: were
“garbage.”106 As a consensus emerged about the limited utility of force in such situations,
the discussion turned to more technical aspects of putting counterinsurgency into
practice: how institutions were to be built, what was needed from the U.S. government,
and what difficulties lay ahead.
The relationships built between the human rights community and the military was
consummated with the C.O.I.N. revision conference in February 2006, when Crane and
Petraeus included the Human Rights Policy group as part of the 150 total academics,
journalists, CIA and State Department members that were invited to provide criticism and
feedback. Tyler Mozelle, of the Carr Center, says in an interview, “this work was a
major milestone in American history and throughout the world of military policy because
we were able to broaden the aperture of thinking about US national security to include a
more humane approach to thinking about war, civilian casualties, and the ethical
dimensions of US foreign policy.”107
The C.O.I.N. manual (FM3-24) was published a year later in December 2006, and
it was downloaded more than a million times. Sarah Sewall, of the Carr Center, wrote the
introduction for the University of Chicago Press version published shortly thereafter, and
she calls it “radical” in the way it challenges the “American way of war.” Sewall notes
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that the manual’s purpose transcends the immediate need to find a workable strategy and
claims that its direction “raises some fundamental questions about the legitimacy,
purposes, and limits of U.S. power.”108
The manual is directed toward practitioners, but its engagement in a redefinition
of interests and identity is clear: protecting the population is the new center of gravity,
and given the strength of the moral, human rights dimensions of civilian immunity, and
their instrumental connection to the justification of the war, this was the only possible
choice that allowed the U.S. to salvage its identity, other than walking away from the
fight. The War of Ideas and the war on the ground needed to be consistent; indeed,
Petraeus describes the shift in Iraq as a “surge of ideas.”109 Concerned about whether the
soldiers would embrace the ethical stance deemed necessary, he urged them to accept one
of the key tenets of the manual, which is to “live our values.”110 He states:
Realize that we are in a struggle for legitimacy that will be won or lost in
the perception of the Iraqi people. Every action taken by the enemy and
our forces has implications in the public arena. Develop and sustain a
narrative that works, and continually drive the themes home through all
forms of media….Live our values. Do not hesitate to kill or capture the
enemy, but stay true to the values we hold dear. Living our values
distinguishes us from our enemies.111
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In sum, I find strong support for my central hypothesis that civilian-centered
norms helped to shape the civilian-centric population protection doctrine known as
C.O.I.N.. Attitudes toward civilian casualties show movement ranging from early
sovereignty-based attitudes about military necessity and proportionality (collateral
damage as inevitable), even overtly abusive attitudes, toward an increasing emphasis on
distinction over time; this movement is relative to the political pressure resulting from the
civilian casualties that drew press attention. The result was a period of self-reflection in
which the U.S. foreign policy goal of instituting a democratic state friendly to the U.S.
and unfriendly to terrorist ideology was seen to be endangered. As it became clear that a
new doctrine was needed, members of the military and human rights experts, in
interaction, decided that this doctrinal change needed to be based on the moral or at least
ethical actions of the U.S. military regarding the treatment of civilians. My interviews
confirm this, with one recently trained cadet stating that they are now taught to be
extremely careful of civilian casualties because “we are the human instrument of U.S.
foreign policy, and everything we do reflects on the whole nation.” Compare this to some
of the stories told to me by enlistees—that he was never told what the Geneva
Conventions were, or that civilians were looked at as enemies. Emma Sky, adviser to
Petraeus and Odierno in Iraq, remarked that "the biggest mindset change was for the U.S.
to look at Iraqis as not the enemy, but to look at the Iraqis as people who needed
protecting.”112
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Further, it was recognition of the strength and salience of the norms protecting
civilians that drove concern for the presence of media rather than the other way around;
this is clear from the lack of concern about abuses before they hit the media. Media is an
empty vessel, but the strategic narrative that is woven from available norms can either
legitimize or delegitimize the actions of actors. Since the legitimacy gap was eventually
seen to fuel the insurgency, both global and local, the legitimacy gap created a crucial
juncture which required at some point either changing the U.S.‘s purported values—in
this case abandoning or at least downplaying identification with human rights and civilian
immunity, or changing behavior and thus the definition of what it means to “win.” My
argument is that the military took on the political burden handed it by Bush, and
attempted to change its behavior.
Furthermore, documenting the increasing interaction between human rights
organizations and the U.S. military reveals the diffusion of human rights norms,
beginning with the instrumental use of the CIN, to argumentation about civilian
casualties, to efforts to persuade members of the strategic value of abiding by a more
human rights-orientation toward civilians. Finally, I find support for the three conditions
under which this transformation in strategy occurs: the questionable legitimacy of the
initial invasion, the need to delegitimize terror, and the recognition of a loss of a
monopoly of force.
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2001: Baseline Attitudes about Civilian Immunity
This story begins in the period leading up to the war in Iraq, when the Global War
on Terror (GWOT) had just begun, but before the military’s views on civilian casualties
had been impacted to a great extent by either the Iraq or the Afghanistan experience. As
argued in a previous chapter, civilian immunity has been an increasingly salient aspect of
the normative international political order, and some members of the military had already
started to recognize that civilian casualties were a political liability (though not yet a
military one). In response to U.S. involvement in conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and then
Afghanistan and Iraq, the military and a group of human rights scholars from Harvard
began building professional relationships in 2000 with a series of conferences and
workshops entitled, the Project on the Means of Intervention. The program was
organized by the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, under the auspices of the Human
Rights and National Security program. The goal of the early conferences was to
encourage dialogue among academics, human rights experts, NGOs, members of the
media, and high level military personnel. 1
The 2001 workshop provides a good baseline snapshot of the attitudes of U.S.
military personnel about issues pertaining to civilian casualties, media, and military
practices. In order to begin to find “common ground,” panels were held, conference
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papers presented, and keynote speakers of the highest level were brought in—in this
instance General Wesley Clark, commander of the mission in Kosovo. The director of the
Carr Center at that time was Sarah Sewall, who would emerge as one of the key human
rights experts to contribute to the revision process of the C.O.I.N. manual in 2006. Sewall
was present throughout this process and forged professional ties with Conrad Crane, one
of the primary authors of C.O.I.N., who would also participate, as did, eventually, David
Petraeus, John Nagl, and others who comprised much of the inner circle of what would
become known as the counterinsurgency “community of innovators.”
The attitudes expressed in this early conference roughly approximate what I
described in chapter two as the two major tendencies within the civilian immunity norm:
sovereignty and human rights, itself a reflection of the two competing currents in the
international order. Sovereignty in this sense refers to the interpretation of civilian
immunity as a negative constraint on the sovereign war-making function of the state, and
the human rights interpretation emphasizes the positive, rights-protecting responsibility
of the liberal state toward civilians.2 The problem that necessitated the creation of
dialogue between the human rights community and the military was the difference in
perceptions, expectations, and assessments about civilian casualties among the different
parties. Military personnel expressed some frustration with negative press coverage, and
emphasized the previous decade’s impressive achievements in minimizing civilian
casualties. They presented concern for civilian casualties as an historical, evolutionary
2
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process far removed from the enormous casualties of World War 2. In contrast, nonmilitary participants expressed continuing criticism about the way force was used; human
rights workers were concerned about the “risk aversion” of U.S. personnel, pointing out
that both Serbian and Kosovar civilians suffered a great deal as a result of the strategic
choice of relentless air strikes, for example.
The conference began with an exploration of the most basic questions, including
what the relationship was between international humanitarian law and war. The answer
given by one military official provides a good summary of prevailing attitudes of the
time, which saw military effectiveness and civilian casualties in direct opposition. As the
quote below also shows, the priority of force protection was, at this point, assumed by
those speaking from a military perspective, confirming a deeply ingrained, organizational
cultural perspective about risk aversion:
As a starting point, it is fundamentally correct to say military operations
and humanitarian concerns are at odds. Military operations are about
destruction, and are often chaotic and confused. Humanitarian concerns
are about minimizing this destruction. But this doesn’t tell us much. The
real question is to what extent can military operations be carried out with
minimum casualties without damaging effectiveness and accepting
significantly higher casualties of friendly forces.3
The starting assumptions about the role of ethics in the two communities were
fairly far apart. Military participants’ thinking about civilian immunity at this time
reflected a primarily technical outlook, and the scope of discussion was largely limited to
choice of weaponry, targeting practices, and collateral damage modeling. Human rights
3
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experts, however, saw humanitarian norms endangered by the reluctance to commit
ground troops, which sparked a debate as to whether the trend in increased reliance on air
power was good or bad for civilians.
They also worriedly pointed out the expansive potential of “military necessity,”
the civilian immunity norm’s ambiguous limiting principle. One such example brought
up in discussions was the bombing of the television station in Belgrade, which human
rights experts saw as illegal since it aimed to sever the link between the people and the
government. Consistent with the Weinberger-Powell doctrine of the time, however, some
participants held more expansive, sovereignty-oriented views of military necessity,
arguing that “media outlets provide effective mobilizing tools for the perpetration of
violence and thus are legitimate targets.”4 Similar debates occurred about the bombing of
electrical grids, which produce great civilian suffering but which was defended by some
military participants as necessary to “provide military advantage by injecting friction into
the system and temporarily disabling the enemy.”5 This difference in perspective also
manifested in discussions about whether the concept of military necessity can be
coherently applied to coercive strategies.6
Overall, many were conflicted about the role of international humanitarian law
against a legitimizing backdrop of humanitarian intervention. (It should be noted that
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though the GWOT had just begun, counterinsurgency in these discussions was not yet on
the radar. The public discourse about civilian casualties, the use of force, and civilian
immunity had not yet extended its reach to include issues of ground wars.) Still others
brought up the difference between legal and moral standards for military behavior and
suggested that “while international humanitarian law certainly places constraints upon the
use of force, many thought that popular conceptions of “morality” had a far more
powerful impact.”7 The report shows evidence of a nascent debate about whether more
restrictive moral expectations put the U.S. at a disadvantage. (This debate would arise in
relation to Iraq only later). One comment suggested a quite suspicious view of the norm
of civilian immunity as a possible a weapon to constrain U.S. power: “New international
humanitarian law is emerging, and if allowed to progress, law will become the most
potent weapon deployed against the United States.” Some noted the seeming irrelevance
of the norm in practice since “the distinction between civilian and non-civilian has
become blurred due to the nature of modern warfare and the environments in which
modern wars are fought,” especially urban environments.8
Some military participants countered that a slew of lawyers were already involved
in targeting decisions and that consideration for IHL (or LOAC, the preferred military
usage) had become internalized into military decision-making.9 The debate was widened
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when one participant remarked that “it is a mistake for military planners to view
humanitarian concerns as impediments to success in war. Wars are fought for political
reasons, and ignoring humanitarian concerns runs the risk of winning the battle and
losing the war.” The beginnings of the recognition of the need for legitimacy in
humanitarian intervention surfaced because “the domestic public and international
community, justifiably or not, holds Western militaries to a higher standard when they
intervene for ostensibly humanitarian reasons.” Some acknowledged the more cautious
targeting practices that might require, but “it was suggested that the U.S. could “afford”
such caution only in limited circumstances. Still another “queried whether it would be
either militarily prudent or politically necessary to apply these constraints to the war on
terrorism.”10 Common ground was found, however, as military officials and human
rights experts agreed that the U.S. public needed to be encouraged to have more realistic
expectations about the humanitarian implications for the use of force.
To sum, analysis of the earliest conference report available (held in November
2001) shows the beginnings of a debate informed by concerns about legitimacy,
especially the link between the reasons for using force to the moral issues about how
force is applied. Some “asserted that many participants sought to distinguish between
morally acceptable and legally justifiable actions, suggesting that there are tensions
between them.” This conference also shows a baseline understanding of an oppositional
relationship between humanitarian concerns about civilian casualties and military
10
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effectiveness. The comments and concerns of military personnel demonstrate a certain
level of internalization of the civilian immunity norm, though this attitude is inconsistent
across participants and narrow in scope in the sense that it applies mostly to airpower.
Interestingly, we see the first hints that some would assume a lesser degree of political
pressure to incur risk to protect civilians in the GWOT than humanitarian intervention
required. Both groups wanted to better manage public expectations about the
humanitarian consequences of employing force, however, though none at this point saw
foreign publics as a concern; rather, the American public was the audience to which they
were referring. Finally, military personnel and human rights experts both expressed an
interest in “the NGO world saying ‘this is what we’d like to see,’ and the military saying
‘this is the best we can do,’ and trying to narrow this gap.”11 These initial interactions
mark a period of “strategic bargaining” in the sense that it is seen as necessary to talk to
the human rights community, but for many the attitude appears skeptical, mostly to
defend the military’s actions.
Origins of the Legitimacy Gap: the Instrumental Use of Civilian-Centered Norms
If war is forced upon us, we will fight in a just cause and by just means —
sparing, in every way we can, the innocent. And if war is forced upon us,
we will fight with the full force and might of the United States military —
and we will prevail.12
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While those participating in the human rights policy conferences recognized the
competition between the two very different goals of human rights and military action, the
tensions between “just means” and “full force” was apparently lost on the George W.
Bush administration. From the beginning of the GWOT, President George W. Bush
engaged in a strategy of legitimation for his war policies by invoking moral concepts
deriving from Just War. His rhetoric invokes the jus ad bellum to justify the use of force
in Iraq, and he employs the language of just means (jus in bello) in order to legitimize the
U.S. identity as one that can be trusted to act ethically with that power, which works
simultaneously to deny legitimacy to its enemies, both state and non-state.
The War of Ideas and its Reliance on Just War Concepts
The War of Ideas is a real component in the GWOT broadly and in the Wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan more narrowly, yet because words are used to sell action, this is
often overlooked as mere rhetoric. The point of the War of Ideas is to deny support for
extremist ideological movements hostile to the United States. In the National Security
Strategy of 2002 (NSS 2002),13 Bush spells out the War of Ideas for the first time, and he
explicitly states that the legitimacy factor is a central concern:
We will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international
terrorism. This includes using the full influence of the United States, and
working closely with allies and friends, to make clear that all acts of
terrorism are illegitimate so that terrorism will be viewed in the same light
as slavery, piracy, or genocide.14
13
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Besides starving terrorism of legitimacy, the War of Ideas would also include the
following three goals:


Denying “fertile ground” for extremist Islamist ideology by
promoting Muslim moderates.



Addressing “underlying conditions” with the help of the
international community
Use public diplomacy to counter extremist rule and to promote
identification with American ideological concepts such as
freedom.15



The efforts to delegitimize terrorism were, of course, well under way by the time
this document was published. Bush employed a familiar tool which is itself the
supporting language of civilian immunity and just war, but which has also historically
been used to violate the spirit of distinction between combatant and noncombatant:
civilization versus barbarism/savagery: “this is civilization’s fight;” “the civilized world
is with us;” and "we wage a war to save civilization itself."16
That terrorism poses a universal threat to “civilization” was not terribly
controversial in the U.S. or elsewhere in the wake of 9/11. As Mendelsohn argues, “Al
Qaeda poses a challenge to the sovereignty of specific states but it also challenges the
international society as a whole. This way, the challenge that Al Qaeda represents is
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putting the survival of the system under risk.”17 Kinsella adds that “what marks President
Bush and his administration as the right defenders of ‘civilization is their claims to
protect ‘civilians.’”18 Most agree that to kill civilians for political purposes is wrong and
should be condemned. Naming terrorists as the “enemy of civilization” labels them not as
emergent actors who threaten the state monopoly of violence but as illegitimate in their
very identity. While their actions necessitate war, “who they are” precludes conferring
any legitimacy on their political claims or grievances precisely because “targeting
innocent civilians for murder is always and everywhere wrong;”19 To be a “terrorist”
means to be defined by the use of unjust means (killing civilians), which renders
impossible just cause and puts terrorists beyond the pale as actors—irreconcilable with,
and so incapable of inclusion within, any moral international order.
The analysis above is supported by the congressional testimony of Douglas
Feith,20 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the time, who was also in charge of the
initial civilian reconstruction effort during the Iraq War. Feith helped to shape the Bush
stance toward the Geneva Conventions, and he explains that Donald Rumsfeld
summoned him and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers to
17
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provide a memo about the Geneva Conventions with “talking points” for a National
Security Council meeting in February 2002, during the period the Bush Doctrine was still
being formulated. Though the issue was at this time centered on torture and POW status,
Feith explains that the “memo represented the thinking of the top civilian and military
leadership of the Defense Department,”21 whose stance was that the U.S. “had a
compelling interest in showing respect for Geneva.” It was considered important because
“Geneva is crucial for our own armed forces” in order to be treated as the law prescribes
in case of capture, and it was “an essential component of military culture.” Moreover,
Feith adds, it is “’morally important, crucial to US morale’ and it is also ‘practically
important, for it makes US forces the gold standard in the world, facilitating our winning
cooperation from other countries.’”22 Finally, Feith adds, the Geneva Conventions—and
here he specifically refers to the core content of the civilian immunity norm—are crucial
in the war on terror:
[our] position is dictated by the logic of our stand against terrorism. I argued:


The essence of the Convention is the distinction between soldiers
and civilians (i.e., between combatants and non-combatants).



Terrorists are reprehensible precisely because they negate that
distinction by purposefully targeting civilians.23

The war on terror became controversial as the universalism of the “human rights
interests” of civilization morphed into the sovereignty-based power interests of the
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United States, despite the belief that values and interests had fused. This was evident
when Bush employed the language of just war and terrorism for the purposes of
legitimizing the use of force against other states: in this case, Iraq. As part of his broader
foreign policy program known as the Bush Doctrine, the rhetoric Bush crafted at this
early point was directed toward mobilizing the domestic audience by “branding” the war
in Iraq as a secondary but crucial front in the GWOT. As others have pointed out,
however, the nature of global media today makes it nearly impossible to target only one
audience since “the media invites domestic and international responses, publicizing the
debate.”24
The NSS 2002 aims to ensure an order whereby all nations would “protect basic
human rights”25 by furthering the sovereign power interests of the U.S.: “The U.S.
national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that
reflects the union of our values and our national interests.”26 This document, while
building on the brief surplus of legitimacy afforded the U.S. in fighting Al Qaeda, made
instrumental use of Just War concepts (civilian immunity , human rights, and democracy
more broadly) to legitimate the expansion of its own power across the globe. Most
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famously, Bush turned the Just War concept of preemption into prevention,27 a move
which served to undermine the stability of the international normative order and reaffirm
European publics’ initial assessment of Bush as “mak[ing] decisions based entirely on
U.S. interests.”28 As Hurd argues, his instrumental use and distortion of this norm was
damaging on many fronts:
The American challenge to the customary law on preemption threatens to
delegitimize both the existing norms and the social basis of US power,
while also attempting to legitimize American interests and new
understandings of the norms. It therefore shows the productive and
destructive aspects of the power of legitimation in world politics.
Legitimation is the link between states and the normative structures of
international society.29
Defining rogue states as illegitimate based on their anti-human rights, “terrorist”
ideology, they too are denied any just cause because their identity precludes the
possibility: “we make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor
or provide aid to them.”30 In attempting to blur the line between the identities of state and
non-state actor by conflating illegitimate violence against foreign civilians (terrorism)
with illegitimate violence within a state (human rights violations), Bush serves to
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strengthen the normative power of both human rights and civilian immunity, and more
specifically, reinforces a civilian-centered human rights ethic.
By employing international society’s morally constraining norms in an identity
contest with both terrorists and rogue states, however, Bush reinforces expectations that
the United States be held to a higher standard in war, undermining the legitimacy of the
traditional bias states have maintained toward an expansive, sovereignty-based definition
of military necessity. Couching the build-up to the Iraq War in the rhetoric of Just War
and undermining its long historical struggle to separate jus ad bellum from jus in bello (as
explained in chapter 2) by fusing unjust cause with unjust means, Bush’s garbled
communication strategies enact three unintended consequences: 1.) he creates moral
confusion about who the enemy is and what type of treatment they are entitled to. This is
true of the U.S. public and many of the soldiers at the lower levels, as confirmed by my
interviews.31 2.) he invites judgment of his own war according to those same criteria, and
3.) he undermines both the physical wars and the wars of ideas by placing them at odds.
By instrumentally using norms meant to limit war-making power for the purposes
of expansion of power, Bush drew unprecedented attention to the contradictions between
the American values of rule of law, democracy, and the protection of human rights and
American aspirations for global hegemony. As Ikenberry explains, people feared that
Bush had abandoned the post WW2 social compact that allowed U.S. power to exist
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relatively unchallenged by the rest of the world because it rested on how actual, ordinary
people, that is, civilians, experienced American power.32 The precarious balance
previously employed by the U.S. through strategic restraint had rested on the
“institutionalization of hegemonic strategy, [which] serves the interest of the United
States by making its power more legitimate, expansive, and durable. The price is that
some restraints are indeed placed on the exercise of power.”33 As Ikenberry suggests, in
rejecting the restraints on its own power, the U.S. emphasized its “imperial face” over its
“liberal face,” which intensified insecurity and inflamed public opinion in many states
across the world.34 Anti-Americanism, which the War of Ideas was meant to remedy,
instead was fanned in the build-up to the invasion of Iraq.
This worsened as two of the three legs of the stool constructed by the
administration to justify its invasion disintegrated (Saddam Hussein’s alleged cooperation
with terrorists and his program of WMDs). This left only one leg, humanitarian
intervention, which meant that the legitimacy of U.S. military action in Iraq rested
precariously on the promise that the good of removing the previous regime would
outweigh the violation of Iraq’s state sovereignty, not to mention the destruction and
misery wreaked on its people. As damage to the U.S. reputation began to accrue in the
32
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larger international community,35 a legitimacy gap began to expand between the values
and identity promoted in the War of Ideas and the material reality of the physical wars.
With a unilaterally conceived and implemented foreign policy goal lacking international
support, particularly amongst foreign publics,36 the stated goal in Iraq became the
creation of a stable, democratic state that respects human rights and that would become
an ally in the war on terror.37 Hearkening back to the previous social compact of strategic
restraint, the material goals of the war were now firmly embedded within normative
claims about making life better for ordinary people through freedom, prosperity, and
human dignity.
The criteria by which to judge U.S. power and thus U.S. identity was promoted
by the U.S. itself through its attempt to establish its place within international society as a
global hegemon that was fierce to its enemies but protective of its friends. In using the
rhetoric of restraint and principle but appealing to the desire for destruction and revenge,
Bush set an emotionally powerful tone for the nation, including some in the military. As
my interviews with military personnel have revealed, Iraqi civilians came to be seen as
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the enemy by many in the early days of the war. As a result, the latent tensions regarding
the moral dimensions of the civilian immunity norm that existed pre-Iraq, between the
humanitarian justification for force versus the suffering it causes for innocent civilians,
would be amplified ten-fold.
What the U.S. civilian leadership did not yet understand, but what some in the
U.S. military would learn fairly quickly, is that the narrative (the actual story that
interprets and guides the ideas and perceptions of people about events) and the
legitimacy it confers or destroys, was not an ancillary rhetorical issue; rather, the War of
Ideas impacted directly on the material success or failure of a war waged on behalf of
democratic values and human rights, by a powerful Western democracy, against nonstate actors in a state it was responsible for “breaking.”38 What was just as important was
that, as in any war, the enemy was watching, listening, and behaving in a strategic
manner as well. Moreover, the enemies were multiple, and Al Qaeda, who had been
working out its own narrative of morality and legality about killing civilians, provided an
alternative narrative about the justness of killing civilians, aiming at the Achilles heel of
American legitimacy: its limited ability to see the gap between its own words and its
deeds. At the same time Bush was formulating his use of norms, al Qaeda’s official
spokesman, Suleiman Abu Ghaith, posted the following on al Qaeda’s web site in June
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2002. Using the same language of WMDs that Bush was using, he wrote a justification
for killing Americans based on American behavior toward Muslim civilians:
Due to the American bombings and siege of Iraq, more than 1,200,000
Muslims were killed in the past decade…The Americans have still not
tasted from our hands what we have tasted from theirs. The [number of]
killed in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are but a tiny part of
the exchange for those killed in Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, the Philippines,
Bosnia, Kashmir, Chechnya, and Afghanistan. We have not reached parity
with them. We have the right to kill four million Americans – two million
of them children – and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple
hundreds of thousands. Furthermore, it is our right to fight them with
chemical and biological weapons, so as to afflict them with the fatal
maladies that have afflicted the Muslims because of [Americans’]
chemical and biological weapons. America knows only the language of
force. America is kept at bay by blood alone.39
Iraq: Post Invasion 2003-4
The U.S. enjoyed its brief, shining moment in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of
the invasion, which was militarily successful by most accounts in the sense that it
achieved its goal of defeating and removing the previous regime. Cheers for the
liberators soon gave way to chaos, however, as it became apparent that there was a lack
of any real post-invasion plan or even capability for state-building. Thomas Ricks
documents the “fiasco” of those years when many ordinary Iraqis turned from optimism
to suspicion: a failure to police the unruly mobs who destroyed Iraqi cultural heritage; a
lack of civilian capacity to assist the military in building infrastructure and institutions;
de-Baathification and the dissolution of the Iraqi military by L. Paul Bremer produced
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angry, unemployed, and well -armed Sunnis who began resisting what they correctly
predicted would be a Shia-majority dominated government.40
What is less acknowledged by most accounts of the invasion and early postinvasion period is that the lack of planning included an absence of clear, unified
expectations and training on how to treat civilians. While the air strikes in the “shock and
awe” campaign employed precise weaponry and careful collateral damage planning, they
also used cluster munitions in residential areas.41 Civilian immunity considerations were
institutionalized in air strike targeting procedures, but how ground troops behaved toward
civilians fell to the ethical leadership exhibited (or not) by individual leaders. Though
some units were expected to (and did) exercise ethical judgment in distinguishing
between combatant and civilian, others describe a free-for- all environment in which, as
one soldier put it, the rules of engagement were to “kill anything that moves.”42 Others
described the mood as vengeful and dark after 9/11, and all agreed that force protection
was an absolute, unquestioned priority: “better to send a bullet than a soldier” was
mentioned as a common slogan of the time.
Despite the words of President Bush, who characterized the invasion as "one of
the swiftest and most humane military campaigns in history,"43 the reality of the war on
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the ground was experienced differently by many of those in uniform and the civilians
with whom they interacted. Bush, in an address to the nation (which was of course
transmitted throughout the world by global media), said “the people you liberate will
witness the honorable and decent spirit of the American military. In this conflict,
America faces an enemy who has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality.”
After condemning Saddam Hussein on the grounds of his violations of human rights,
Bush adds, “I want Americans and all the world to know that coalition forces will make
every effort to spare innocent civilians from harm.”44 In the meantime, the military was
not, as General Tommy Franks put it, “in the business of doing body counts,”45 but an
initial damage assessment by Human Rights Watch estimated that the invasion killed
thousands.46
In the face of the grave material disaster forming on the ground, the lack of basic
needs being met and the massive disruption to an already severely damaged society and
economy, the War of Ideas faded into the background. Neither the State Department nor
the DoD thought much about what would be required to implement it or even how it
would relate to the war on the ground. While the military had always engaged in
psychological operations, the goal of manipulating perceptions was negative: to support
the use of destructive force and defeating the enemy. The last U.S. experience with a war
44
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of ideas meant to promote positive U.S. values, identity, and power occurred during the
Cold War, when the state department ran a fairly vibrant public diplomacy effort. As was
the case with many of the other traditionally civilian responsibilities, this capability did
not exist early in the war. Perhaps more importantly, it was only gradually becoming
apparent that what happened on the battlefields and in the neighborhoods of Iraq had any
bearing on the larger ideological war of perceptions relating to the GWOT. As President
Bush had explained, the War of ideas was meant to address and remedy the fertile ground
for terrorism and anti-American feeling, yet those very enabling conditions were taking
root in Iraq.
In the meantime, the Project for the Means of Intervention continued to hold
conferences and meetings continued between a core of approximately 60 “veteran
participants” along with a diverse crowd described as consisting of “intergenerational,
international, senior to junior; analytic and operational, [and] “unusual” suspects.” Some
could be considered “norms entrepreneurs,” and others were not. As events in Iraq heated
up, the meetings became “informal, off-the-record, and intensive.” The causes of civilian
suffering and how to reduce it was the main topic of discussion, and assumptions and
perspectives of human rights experts and the military were far off. Issues were raised
about the utility and difficulty of keeping track of civilian casualties, along with
discussions about what was and was not within the control of the U.S. government. It was
noted that while the location, capabilities, and intentions of the adversary were not in
control of the U.S., the “rules of engagement (ROE), quality of intelligence, and strategy”
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were. No consensus, or even emphasis at this time suggested that both sides had decided
that civilian suffering was itself a strategic consideration, though it was assumed that the
issue was a matter that impacted the “Western ‘center of gravity’ in the sense of affecting
“local political and military allies, coalition partners, domestic political support, and
international legitimacy.”47
By 2003, the outcomes of the conferences showed an acknowledgement of the
salience of civilian casualties, and despite the tensions between a military that tended
toward the presumption that progress toward civilian suffering was already as good as it
gets, the results of the conference highlighted the need to


‘increase communication among military, political leadership,
human rights groups, and broader public’ about CD issues



Develop greater understanding of how conduct of U.S. military
operations and other factors affect civilians during war



Help make U.S. use of force as consistent as possible with
humanitarian principles



Make U.S. use of force more effective48

Back inside the military, it became clear to many that an insurgency was brewing
from the beginning, but that fact did not compel a unified doctrinal response.49 Rather, in
the absence of a clear doctrine to address such a contingency, early attempts at building
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infrastructure, providing basic services, and working to restore order and stability took
place within the context of a disintegrating relationship between soldiers and civilians.
Anti-occupation sentiment grew in key areas, and as soldiers experienced the terror tactic
of road-side IEDs, suspicion and tension built between the populace and the military.
Checkpoint incidences of killing civilians increased, and soldiers kept their physical
distance from the people, which exacerbated an already shaky foundation undermined by
poor communication, cultural distance, and the sense of soldiers as outsiders. The initial
euphoria about U.S. liberation that was touted (and by most accounts generally believed)
by the administration, was soon clearly being experienced as occupation by many
Iraqis.50 Promises of prosperity and freedom instead gave way to destitution, insecurity,
and growing chaos.
U.S. forces were trained for conventional war, in which destroying the enemy is
the goal, and civilians in many cases became indistinguishable from insurgents, both in
their physical appearance, but also, some interviewees suggest, in the minds of some of
the soldiers. One remarked: “we began to look at them as the enemy.” Lacking in training
and preparation for such a development, many confirmed a widespread mood of avenging
9/11. Other interviewees suggested that most events involving civilian casualties and
abuse were never brought to light by the media: “there are lots of things you’ve never
heard about on the news.” This is likely due to the practice of controlling the media by
50
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embedding reporters; one interviewee mentioned a specific incident in which a soldier
went on a rampage against civilians in the Iraqi town of Hit after losing several of his
buddies to an IED attack. According to this account, the soldier was prosecuted, but this
was not a big media hit, at least in the U.S. Two events that did attract global media
attention, however, were seen by most of the interviewees as tarnishing the reputation of
the military in a significant way,51 contributing to the spread of an already growing
insurgency, and represented a tipping point in the early stages of the war. These two
events both centered on perceptions of the unethical treatment of Iraqi civilians by
American soldiers: the scandal at Abu Ghraib and the first battle of Fallujah in April of
2004.
The scandal at Abu Ghraib resulted from the brutal, degrading, sometimes deadly
treatment of detainees that was captured in film clips, photographs, journals, stories, and
official reports by the ICRC and Human Rights Watch.
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The investigation began within

the military, but traditional media brought it to life—a special on 6o Minutes and then an
article by the famed journalist Seymour Hersh of the New Yorker.53 Photographs were
leaked and disseminated across the globe via the internet, and the world was shocked by
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the depraved, sadistic images of torture and sexual degradation against the prisoners.54
Further, it was mentioned that the released photos were relatively tame compared to the
still unreleased photos of rape, torture, beatings, intimidation, and death. Hersh notes that
military officials described American soldiers ‘severely beating an Iraqi prisoner nearly
to death, having sex with a female Iraqi prisoner, and ‘acting inappropriately with a dead
body.’ The officials said there also was a videotape, apparently shot by U.S. personnel,
showing Iraqi guards raping young boys.”55
Military officers describe this exposure as devastating to the war cause, but
interestingly, several sources note that the Iraqi reaction was not the main concern, since
this was not surprising to many of them—this was a surprise to those outside of Iraq.
Despite the public stance of the civilian administration that this was the result of a few
bad apples, one interviewee said that the abusive attitudes in Abu Ghraib reflected a
wider attitude toward civilians. He described his own reaction to the outing of Abu
Ghraib as consistent with the general reaction of those around him: “Well, we’d been
caught is what I thought when I first heard” he said. When asked if it was the global
public or the Iraqi public he was concerned about, he indicated it was the perceptions of
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the American audience they most feared: “we were afraid they’d find out we were acting
like animals.”56
The response of public officials at the time indicated grave concern that the
damage to the U.S. image undermines the war in a way that transcends domestic support.
TIME magazine published the following:
Senator Joe Biden, ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee
and a supporter of the decision to invade Iraq, characterized the
revelations of abuse as the single most significant blow to U.S. prestige in
the Arab world over the past decade. Anthony Cordesman, the widely
respected defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies was equally forthright: "Those Americans who mistreated the
prisoners may not have realized it, but they acted in the direct interests of
al-Qaeda, the insurgents, and the enemies of the U.S.," he said. The reason
is that they came at a point when U.S. standing in the Arab world was
already at an all-time low. Says Cordesman, "These negative images
validate all other negative images and interact with them." In other words,
they function as a multiplier by providing photographic "proof" of the
demonic picture of the U.S. painted by anti-American propagandists.57
As if Abu Ghraib were not bad enough, in the same month the U.S. became
embroiled in the single most damaging battle of the war thus far: Fallujah. Fallujah is a
city in Iraq that was initially friendly to U.S. forces. It eventually became a hotbed of
insurgency, however, fueled by anti-occupation resentment. An overwhelmingly Sunni
city, its residents suffered high unemployment from the de-Baathification policies
undertaken by the Coalition Provision Authority (CPA).58
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A series of incidents occurred that sparked mistrust and anger between the
soldiers and citizens. First, only a month into the invasion, 700 troops entered the city and
took over a local school as part of their base. Residents resented the closure of the school,
and within five days, protests around the school grew more ominous, with evidence of
rock-throwing by citizens, some children, and claims by soldiers that they were taking
fire. While other reports confirm sporadic violence against soldiers over time, Human
Rights Watch did not find credible evidence to support that soldiers were under fire on
the day in question. The event culminated with soldiers climbing to the roof and opening
fire on the crowds, resulting in about seventeen civilian deaths.59
As unrest and resistance grew over the next year, troops pulled out of the city,
and, in keeping with Bush’s policy goal to hand over control to local forces, Iraqi security
forces attempted to keep control. The situation grew more volatile as insurgents
massacred police, and as they gained mass support of the city’s residents. Moreover, the
lack of control in the city allowed it to become inundated with foreign fighters, most
notably Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).60 The event that sparked major combat operations was
when four American Blackwater contractors accidentally took a wrong turn into the city
and were killed by insurgents. Images of a cheering crowd who then mutilated the
corpses and hung them from a bridge enraged Americans, including President Bush and
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CPA head, L. Paul Bremer.61 Troops were hurriedly called in, before there was really
time to “shape” the terrain or empty the city of civilians, and the goal of searching out
and killing insurgents resulted in an estimated 700-2000 Iraqi deaths (some claim 700
civilians), and from 38-100 U.S. soldiers. The city was destroyed, and many of the people
displaced. Several of my interviewees confirmed a “shoot anything that moves” mentality
and noted that Fallujah is known for what was a common practice in the early days of
Iraq, which was to count all males of a certain age as insurgents. None of the soldiers I
spoke with were in the battle and instead relied on the internal accounts and stories
spread amongst soldiers. Such a characterization has become almost conventional within
the military because even some of the newer soldiers have been taught that Fallujah was
the antithesis of what good counterinsurgency should be. It is also known at this time that
white phosphorous was used to drive insurgents from houses, and an amateur American
filmmaker who entered Fallujah right after the battle interviewed residents, (and later
soldiers), who showed him hateful graffiti left by soldiers on the furniture of a resident: “I
hate Iraq and all Iraqis.”62
What is remarkable about the preceding events is not necessarily the brutality of
war, but the spirit of openness and self-reflection about such incidents that is increasingly
evident in the military today. The military literature is filled with monographs seeking to
make sense of such events in the interest of organizational learning. Major Sherry Oehler,
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for example, who writes on the unintended consequences of killing civilians, confirms
my own assertion that the instrumental use of international norms matters for what
happens on the ground: she notes that “the Bush administration’s policy on denying
“unlawful combatants” privileges as prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions
enabled troops freedom of maneuver to accomplish these missions, however, the policy
contributed to the ambiguity on the ground with regard to the treatment of civilians.”63
Bush at the time of Fallujah demonstrated little recognition of this, as evidenced by the
fact that his public comments leading up to Fallujah continued to justify force by
instrumentally employing the norms-language of democracy, civilian immunity, and
human rights: “they want to kill innocent life to try to get us to quit,” he said. Bush
promised that “U.S. troops will use whatever force is needed to quell uprisings in
Fallujah…and “we will deal with those who want to stop the march to freedom.”64
Bush’s determination to make an example of Fallujah for killing American
“civilians” and his stated willingness to use all available means suggest that he was no
longer concerned with the image of the U.S. military or state as being in line with civilian
immunity. His attempts to signal resolve are indicative of a sovereignty-oriented reading
of the CIN wherein military necessity enables more civilian casualties. I suggest that this
is a tipping point in the war whereby it became very clear that killing civilians entailed
damage to the U.S. social reputation, and that the importance of the War of Ideas was
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first connected to success in the physical war. This is so because, despite the tough talk
about force, the political pressure created by the carnage was immense, and it was
decisive in stopping the battle despite material definitions of “winning.”65
Some of the interviewees present in Iraq during the Fallujah period named
Fallujah as a tipping point: “We looked around, and we’d killed all these people, but now
what? What were we doing?” This was not lost on many Iraqis. One Iraqi man spoke to
the American press weeks after Fallujah, and
he recalls that his growing uneasiness with the US occupation turned into
something steelier a few weeks ago, when he saw the first images of
civilian casualties carried from Fallujah on the Arab satellite channels Al
Jazeera and Al Arabiya. ‘They showed us what they really are.’66
The military denied that there were many casualties or that ROE were broken, but
according to an intelligence report leaked to Wikileaks, it was immediately recognized
that the perception of civilian casualties had damaged the legitimacy of the American
mission by creating “political pressure” and building on anger already present from Abu
Ghraib.67
A very influential series of articles published in Military Review, the Army’s
internal journal, in 2005 demonstrate that the thinking of the leadership was in keeping
with both the general sentiment expressed by my interviewees and that of the intelligence
report. Metz writes
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U. S. forces unilaterally halted combat operations after a few days due to a
lack of support from the interim Iraqi Government and international
pressures amid unsubstantiated enemy reports of collateral damage and
excessive force. Marines won virtually every combat engagement
throughout the battle and did so within the established rules of
engagement. The missing element was an overall integrated information
component to gain widespread support of significant influencers and to
prepare key populations for the realities of the battle plan. Without such
advance support, the finest combat plan executed by competent and brave
Soldiers and Marines proved limited in effectiveness. The insurgent forces
established links with regional and global media outlets that had agendas
of their own. The failure to mass effects in the global information sphere
proved decisive on the battleground in Fallujah.68
Metz, who works in information operations, highlights that perceptions are
directly relevant to the larger war on terror, which now had direct links to the battlefields
of Iraq. He cites Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was writing to al- Zarqawi about the War of
Ideas from the perspective of Al Qaeda and now AQI as well, and that this was based on
civilian casualties: “. . . I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this
battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a
race for the hearts and minds of our Umma.”69 Metz adds that it is specifically the
perception “that combat operations are indiscriminate, disproportionate, and in violation
of the rules of war” that caused the failure of the April 2004 incursion into Fallujah.70 It
became quite clear after Fallujah that communication was seen as not simply words but
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as strategic interaction, and that winning the War of Ideas was now seen as directly
connected to winning the ground war.
Furthermore, the military began to realize what Bush did not: that the U.S. was
light years behind the enemy in acknowledging this basic fact: “[Our] units are facing an
adaptive, relentless, and technologically savvy foe who recognizes that the global
information network is his most effective tool for attacking what he perceives to be the
center of gravity- public opinion, both domestic and international.”71 By early 2006,
Bush’s own former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations,
Joseph Collins, published an open letter in the Armed Forces Journal warning Bush that
‘[i] f our strategic communications on Iraq don't improve, the strategy for victory will fail
and disastrous consequences will follow.’"72
Transitioning Counterinsurgency: Ideas within the Military
By 2004, post Fallujah, the insurgency was spreading, and now the multifaceted character of it was becoming clear. The Shiite cleric Muqtada alSadr’s faction had also revolted after L. Paul Bremer shut down his
region’s television station and arrested one of his men. 73 The battle was
not nearly as damaging as Fallujah because the civilians separated
themselves from the fighter and literally stood aside. As David Kilcullen
explains in the Small War Journal Blog, however, refraining from killing
civilians while going after the enemy is not the end of the road because
they still have to choose sides: “in that instance [in Sadr City], and a
couple of others, the local Shia population actually stood to one side and
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waited for us to secure them, but once they saw we weren't planning to
stay permanently they were too exposed to support us.”74
According to a Shiite cleric at the time, Fallujah had for a brief time united Iraq—
against the United States. “What happened in Fallujah made every Iraqi think it could
happen in their own town, and that united us.”75 The battle in Fallujah however, in
destroying much of the city, had displaced both insurgents and civilians, which
destabilized other areas in the North and contributed to later sectarian tensions.76
With Iraq further destabilizing and beginning to fragment, it became clear to
many in the military that the character of the conflict required a change in approach.
While information operations were about controlling the narrative and thus perceptions,
John Nagl, co-author of the final C.O.I.N. manual (FM3-24) attributes the need for a
change to the Information revolution’s effects not only on the image of the U.S., but on
the “nature of warfare, especially insurgency.”77 The debate within the military about
counterinsurgency began to view the actual place of the civilian and ethical treatment
toward them as a strategic matter. Despite popular conceptions, the foundations for the
C.O.I.N. manual were being laid months before General Petraeus took over the
Combined Arms Center and began the famous re-writing of the field manual.
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As I continue with my case, a caveat is in order: at the highest levels of the
military, I have not heard my thesis confirmed in public speech, though most lower and
mid-level military participants in my study78 confirmed the idea that civilian casualties
early in the Iraq conflict were a significant reason for the later change in doctrine toward
population protection, and many elaborated that the doctrine was needed to get soldiers to
“change their attitudes toward the Iraqi people and quit seeing them as the enemy.” “We
had to learn that they’re not all terrorists, that they have a culture of their own, and that
hurting them hurt the mission.” Nagl’s characterization draws a direct line between
civilian casualties and material effects on the battlefield, however, when he wrote in the
Small Wars Journal Blog that
the key to success in a counterinsurgency environment is not to create
more insurgents than you capture or kill. A stray tank round that kills a
family could create dozens of insurgents for a generation. Thus, it is
essential to use force as carefully and with as much discrimination as is
possible.79
Nagl also described the need for a change in doctrine as arising because
counterinsurgency was previously a special forces task. They needed to “reenergize the
force” as a whole. The “big army, conventional war-fighting army needed to be reminded
that fighting counterinsurgency” was their job, and the temporary manual that had been
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hastily put together in October 2004 was about to expire.80 What has been left unsaid by
military leadership is that the history of special forces and CIA running
counterinsurgency operations (in Latin America for example) were secretive and far
removed from both the spirit and letter of LOAC. The CIA “murder manual,” for
example, was described as a training manual for the Nicaraguan guerrillas in “how to
kidnap, assassinate, blackmail, and dupe civilians.”81
Counterinsurgency Debate: More Carrots, Less Sticks
The doctrinal change that eventually occurred addresses the deficit in military
culture toward civilians, and the debate leading up to the new manual in 2005 seemed to
recognize this deficit. What the debate in 2005 achieved was to help clarify the logic of
counterinsurgency in accordance with the changing political/strategic environment.
Ironically, while the public and legal discourse in the U.S. had exploded with questions
as to whether or not the civilian immunity norm was obsolete or should be discarded in
the face of irregular warfare, military insiders were carefully interrogating assumptions
about the use of force, exploring and explicating new goals, and starting to identify what
needed to change in order to reach those goals. The community of innovators that shaped
the debate engaged in a redefinition of some of the key counterinsurgency concepts in a
way that took into account the need to remedy the existing legitimacy gap with the moral
content of civilian immunity and by doing so, attempt to bridge the war of ideas with the
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war on the ground. The body of published works taken as a whole attempted to change
ideas about how to fight by matching them with revised interests and American identity,
creating a conceptual link between the ethical treatment of civilians and national security
imperatives and foreign policy goals.
In response to perceptions of failure associated with failing to live up to civiliancentered human rights norms, the debate found in the 2005 (post-Fallujah but prePetraeus period) issues of Military Review82 are indications that human rights demands
are having an effect: adaptation, moral consciousness-raising, argumentation, and
persuasion are all present. Processes of institutionalization and habitualization would not
be expected to come until later, after the adoption of C.O.I.N., which this chapter will not
cover.83
The first counterinsurgency manual put out in October, 2004 was a hurried
attempt to draw lessons learned from past counterinsurgencies.84 The manual shows that
prior ideas about how to manage insurgencies emphasize the tactical and operational
levels, but not the strategic level, which is the vital difference between it and the later
FM3-24. Meant for “division-level leaders and below,” it was not meant to challenge the
prevailing assumptions in the military about the utility of force and the way it should be
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employed. Furthermore, it reflected Rumsfeld’s priority that responsibility for the
aftermath of the Iraq War was to be shifted onto Iraq,85 the host nation (HN): “a basic
premise of counterinsurgency is that the ultimate responsibility rests with the HN.” And,
“one of the key recurring lessons is that the United States cannot win other countries’
wars for them, but can certainly help legitimate foreign governments overcome attempts
to overthrow them.” Lessons from past counterinsurgency experience were thus
interpreted in a manner meant to uphold current strategic assumptions, and despite the
change in circumstances, the manual reflected an understanding of the U.S. as having a
supporting role in the counterinsurgency (as it did in Latin America) rather than as a
primary actor: “the use of combat forces is a presidential decision and serves only as a
temporary or provisional solution until HN forces are able to stabilize the situation and
provide security for the populace.86 However, since the war was one of choice by the
U.S., and ostensibly for the purposes of humanitarian intervention, the situation in Iraq
hardly matched the traditional model of insurgency as resulting from the internal organic
uprising of elites with grievances. Instead, it was the result of an invasion and postinvasion policies, including the dismantling of its prior institutions.

85

Bob Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006-2008 (New York: Simon &
Schuster Paperbacks, 2009).
86

"Field Manual–Interim No. 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations," ed. Department of Army
(Washington, D.C.2004), vii, vi, vii.

174

Though the first manual contained the basic elements of C.O.I.N. in terms of
population protection as a goal,87 and it emphasized that officers should “prevent
indiscriminate use of force,” this is overshadowed by force protection. The manual notes
that human rights are a likely grievances and something to be taken into consideration,
but it sees them as competing with the use of force and kinetic operations:
“Counterinsurgency operations must balance elimination of grievances (that is, reform to
include elimination of human rights abuses) and security force action that eliminates the
insurgents.”88 The manual also emphasizes the media effects of collateral damage and the
psychological effects on the populace as damaging to the mission: “Do not hurt the
people, but kill the insurgents. Where US forces violate this dictum, US policies may
fail.”89 However, consistent with remarks by one of my interviewees that “civilians were
treated as objects, not human beings,” civilians are mentioned in the same subheading as
“Resource Control:” “Combat operations are developed to neutralize the insurgent and,
together with population and resources control measures, establish an environment
within which political, social, and economic progress is possible.”90 An entire section
discussed coercive practices toward civilians, which included the extreme measure of
forceable relocation of populations if deemed necessary.91
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In contrast to the inconsistent focus of the prior counterinsurgency manual, which
emphasizes that combat operations are in tension with population protection, the series of
articles published in Military Review during 200592 emphasize the importance of limiting
force and protecting the civilian, both for ethical and strategic reasons. In doing so, it lays
the intellectual groundwork for shifting the “center of gravity” from the insurgent to the
civilian.
The articles in the year preceding C.O.I.N. emphasize the synthesis of moral
identity, moral behavior, and strategic goals in the war in Iraq. There is an emphasis on
developing Information Operations capabilities, but also on how information operations
require challenging the assumption that force produces victory: “U.S. forces find, engage,
capture, and kill terrorists, but this traditional approach to counterinsurgency does not
adequately counter the insurgents’ information environment strategy.”93 There was a
growing recognition that all negative experiences and images of the U.S. hurt the
mission, but that changes are not simply about controlling the story through counterstories, but about changing the hearts and minds of soldiers as well. In acknowledging the
damage done by Abu Ghraib, the author emphasizes the changes that must occur as a
result: “The stark images from Abu Ghraib prison fade from the news only until the next
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U.S. soldier must answer formal charges for what happened there. The Army is ensuring
what happened will not happen again.”94
Competing perspectives appear on occasion, for example, one that argues for the
primacy of force protection. The author defends force protection as a strategic necessity
because of the casualty sensitivity of the American public: “the enemy also learned that
America’s vulnerable center of gravity is dead American soldiers.”95 The overwhelming
tenor of the publication at this time though is of change, not one of maintaining the status
quo. Part of this change is a concerted effort to explain the importance of ideas and the
physical war as being connected and of drawing distinctions between terrorists and
insurgents versus the U.S. military through their actions: “The United States must also
understand that when its forces react negatively and kick down doors in night raids, they
are helping the enemy improve his own information environment. Their actions will
annoy and alienate citizens who might no longer cooperate or who might begin actively
supporting the insurgents.”96
Others seek to bring the context of the current war back into its original
humanitarian framework: “If the military is to conduct the Global War on Terrorism in an
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effects-based campaign, then all military operations must become part of that plan.
Consider, for instance, the secondary effects of a humanitarian relief operation. As part of
the Global War on Terrorism, such an operation well executed serves the campaign
plan.”97 Even suicide attacks are explained, not as Arab or Muslim cultural defects—
which was common in the U.S. at the time, but as strategic aims of insurgencies,
including al Qaeda, which increased with anti-occupation resentments. The author argues
that closer engagement with the people could defuse the underlying conditions that give
rise to such strategies.98
A British officer, in a frank and rather controversial article, observed the effects
of U.S. military culture and made an explicit criticism: “It was apparent that many
considered that the only effective, and morally acceptable, C.O.I.N. strategy was to kill or
capture all terrorists and insurgents; they saw military destruction of the enemy as a
strategic goal in its own right.”99 Others attempted to show what went wrong in past
operations to demonstrate the strategic utility of ethical behavior and to counter the
tendency to rely on excessive force and permissive ROE. Brian Mcallister Linn drew
lessons from the Philippines counterinsurgency about the “necessity of having officers of
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character, initiative, and humanity in counterinsurgency operations.“100 Another author
discussed how important maintaining or repairing perceptions of moral character were in
British counterinsurgencies and yet another in the French Algerian War. Montgomery
McFate, an anthropologist working for the DoD, argued that as soon as coalition forces
toppled Saddam Hussein, they became de facto players in the Iraqi social system.”101 She
encouraged cultural knowledge, both in terms of understanding Arab culture and on
reflecting on the military’s own strategic character and how that affects outcomes: “the
American solution to the conflict [in Vietnam] was the use of overwhelming force in the
form of strategic bombing and the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, neither of which
resulted in victory.102
C.O.I.N. Revision
By the time David Petraeus was installed as the head of the Combined Arms
Center in November 2005, the raw mass of intellectual ideas that formed the foundation
of C.O.I.N. had been circulating throughout the organization. Petraeus almost
immediately announced that there would be a revision, and the process sped forward,
making extensive use of some of the articles already published in Military Review. He
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employed John Nagl as editor and Conrad Crane, the military historian, as primary
author.
The Human Rights Conferences at the Carr Center had, in the meantime, been
ongoing, and the mood had shifted within the meetings as well. The November 2005
meeting was attended by Petraeus, Crane, Susan Rice, and about 85 others. Participants
looked back at historical counterinsurgencies, seeking to learn lessons, and most agreed
that giving up on the idea of force used in a conventional way was a necessity. When
discussing how some states employed brutal methods against populations even within
counterinsurgencies, most agreed that this was no longer possible for “Western nations
prosecuting counterinsurgency campaigns as they would be viewed as collective
punishments that deny fundamental human rights to innocent populations.”103 Indeed,
“conference participants were generally critical of what they called ‘terrorism to fight
terrorism’ employed by the French in Algeria.”104 Not only were they critical in ethical
terms, but they spoke of past brutality as counterproductive: “in Vietnam, too,
indiscriminate force was counterproductive and undermined overall political
objectives.”105
The general feeling at this time was that political considerations required an
ethical stance and that this had to trump military considerations, and not vice versa.
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While some questioned the possibility that an insurgency could be eliminated without
dirty tactics, another claimed that such assertions being “floated around: were
“garbage.”106 As a consensus emerged about the limited utility of force in such situations,
the discussion turned to more technical aspects of putting counterinsurgency into
practice: how institutions were to be built, what was needed from the U.S. government,
and what difficulties lay ahead.
The relationships built between the human rights community and the military was
consummated with the C.O.I.N. revision conference in February 2006, when Crane and
Petraeus included the Human Rights Policy group as part of the 150 total academics,
journalists, CIA and State Department members that were invited to provide criticism and
feedback. Tyler Mozelle, of the Carr Center, says in an interview, “this work was a
major milestone in American history and throughout the world of military policy because
we were able to broaden the aperture of thinking about US national security to include a
more humane approach to thinking about war, civilian casualties, and the ethical
dimensions of US foreign policy.”107
The C.O.I.N. manual (FM3-24) was published a year later in December 2006, and
it was downloaded more than a million times. Sarah Sewall, of the Carr Center, wrote the
introduction for the University of Chicago Press version published shortly thereafter, and
she calls it “radical” in the way it challenges the “American way of war.” Sewall notes
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that the manual’s purpose transcends the immediate need to find a workable strategy and
claims that its direction “raises some fundamental questions about the legitimacy,
purposes, and limits of U.S. power.”108
The manual is directed toward practitioners, but its engagement in a redefinition
of interests and identity is clear: protecting the population is the new center of gravity,
and given the strength of the moral, human rights dimensions of civilian immunity, and
their instrumental connection to the justification of the war, this was the only possible
choice that allowed the U.S. to salvage its identity, other than walking away from the
fight. The War of Ideas and the war on the ground needed to be consistent; indeed,
Petraeus describes the shift in Iraq as a “surge of ideas.”109 Concerned about whether the
soldiers would embrace the ethical stance deemed necessary, he urged them to accept one
of the key tenets of the manual, which is to “live our values.”110 He states:
Realize that we are in a struggle for legitimacy that will be won or lost in
the perception of the Iraqi people. Every action taken by the enemy and
our forces has implications in the public arena. Develop and sustain a
narrative that works, and continually drive the themes home through all
forms of media….Live our values. Do not hesitate to kill or capture the
enemy, but stay true to the values we hold dear. Living our values
distinguishes us from our enemies.111
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In sum, I find strong support for my central hypothesis that civilian-centered
norms helped to shape the civilian-centric population protection doctrine known as
C.O.I.N.. Attitudes toward civilian casualties show movement ranging from early
sovereignty-based attitudes about military necessity and proportionality (collateral
damage as inevitable), even overtly abusive attitudes, toward an increasing emphasis on
distinction over time; this movement is relative to the political pressure resulting from the
civilian casualties that drew press attention. The result was a period of self-reflection in
which the U.S. foreign policy goal of instituting a democratic state friendly to the U.S.
and unfriendly to terrorist ideology was seen to be endangered. As it became clear that a
new doctrine was needed, members of the military and human rights experts, in
interaction, decided that this doctrinal change needed to be based on the moral or at least
ethical actions of the U.S. military regarding the treatment of civilians. My interviews
confirm this, with one recently trained cadet stating that they are now taught to be
extremely careful of civilian casualties because “we are the human instrument of U.S.
foreign policy, and everything we do reflects on the whole nation.” Compare this to some
of the stories told to me by enlistees—that he was never told what the Geneva
Conventions were, or that civilians were looked at as enemies. Emma Sky, adviser to
Petraeus and Odierno in Iraq, remarked that "the biggest mindset change was for the U.S.
to look at Iraqis as not the enemy, but to look at the Iraqis as people who needed
protecting.”112
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Further, it was recognition of the strength and salience of the norms protecting
civilians that drove concern for the presence of media rather than the other way around;
this is clear from the lack of concern about abuses before they hit the media. Media is an
empty vessel, but the strategic narrative that is woven from available norms can either
legitimize or delegitimize the actions of actors. Since the legitimacy gap was eventually
seen to fuel the insurgency, both global and local, the legitimacy gap created a crucial
juncture which required at some point either changing the U.S.‘s purported values—in
this case abandoning or at least downplaying identification with human rights and civilian
immunity, or changing behavior and thus the definition of what it means to “win.” My
argument is that the military took on the political burden handed it by Bush, and
attempted to change its behavior.
Furthermore, documenting the increasing interaction between human rights
organizations and the U.S. military reveals the diffusion of human rights norms,
beginning with the instrumental use of the CIN, to argumentation about civilian
casualties, to efforts to persuade members of the strategic value of abiding by a more
human rights-orientation toward civilians. Finally, I find support for the three conditions
under which this transformation in strategy occurs: the questionable legitimacy of the
initial invasion, the need to delegitimize terror, and the recognition of a loss of a
monopoly of force.

CHAPTER FIVE
AFGHANISTAN
While the invasion of Iraq was widely condemned as the aggressive, even illegal
use of force, the GWOT campaign in Afghanistan enjoyed a higher level of legitimacy
and enjoyed broad international support—at least in the beginning. Though polling data
suggests that many foreign publics would have preferred a law-enforcement rather than a
military approach,1 the general feeling was that, since the U.S. was attacked, the war
complied with the spirit if not the letter of international law by acting in accordance with
the right to self-defense, as defined in the U.N. Charter, Chapter I, Article 2 (4).2 This
initial legitimacy surplus, I argue, explains why civilian casualties, though politically
salient, were not perceived with the same urgency as they were in Iraq. Indeed, the crisis
in Iraq overshadowed Afghanistan, siphoning away resources, attention, and manpower,
creating the conditions for worsening civilian casualties over time. It was not until after
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the surge, when the level of violence in Iraq began to cool, that serious attention was paid
to Afghanistan, and civilian casualties were seen as a serious strategic threat. I will argue
that Afghanistan’s version of C.O.I.N. and its emphasis on the protection of civilians
served not only as an attempt to reverse the previous strategic failure, but also to repair
the American image and rebuild the legitimacy of the American use of force by regaining
what others have called its “moral authority.” Because of this, the military habitualizes
and institutionalizes civilian-centered human rights norms into its future vision of
American military culture and war-making. Moreover, since this case study is entangled
with that of Iraq because it constitutes a second theater of war within the overarching
GWOT, I will treat this case as distinct from, but overlapping with Iraq in terms of the
C.O.I.N. doctrine.
Early Invasion, 2001-2002: Framing and Legitimacy
In contrast to the unilateral approach in Iraq, President Bush emphasized global
unity in the days leading up to Afghanistan. Operation Enduring Freedom was
understood by many in the military as multilateral—a broad-based struggle against
terrorists, whose political program was delegitimized by their threat to the international
social order. This threat comes particularly from their rejection of international norms,
especially that of civilian immunity. Bush labeled terrorism not only in terms of a
strategy or behavior but also as an immutable identity of murderous “outlaws and killers
of innocents.”1 This notion of “outlaw” builds on contemporary ideas of terrorists as
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criminals and as such reinforces the idea of international society as the realm of law; but
as I argue in the previous chapter about Iraq, the reluctance to treat terrorists as merely
criminals triggers international humanitarian law, or the laws of war protecting innocents
and banning torture.
Moreover, as I explained in chapter two, the definition of terrorism is inherently
political in that its meaning has always been tied to legitimacy claims about the state
monopoly on the use of force; the anti-terror norm has therefore traditionally been
conceptualized as resting on foundational (or meta) norms of sovereignty. Even more
recent is the idea that terrorism, through the expansion of its destructive capability, now
constitutes a threat to the international order itself by threatening this monopoly. Since
the Munich Massacre of 1972, however, the anti-terrorism norm has been popularly
framed primarily in terms of the civilian immunity norm (as the killing of innocent
civilians). Since then, this definition of terrorism has been a crucial axis in the legitimacy
struggle between Israel and Palestinian resistance groups; the legitimacy of political
claims to disputed lands and rights to sovereignty have been constructed in close
alignment with identity based on the legitimate use of force. This particular conflict
draws from the larger international normative environment whereby newly independent
states sought recognition of anti-colonial resistance groups fighting wars of
independence. Such groups attempted to legitimize their own identity claims as legitimate
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fighters by asserting the priority of jus ad bellum, or just cause, over jus in bello.
Powerful states such as the U.S. worried that resistance groups would be effectively
granted exemptions from IHL and thus would gain an advantage in the battlefield, since
the legal strictures of civilian immunity seek to protect the principle of distinction by
demanding that combatants distinguish themselves from civilians through visible
symbols such as uniforms and openly carrying their weapons. The U.S. rejected certain
parts of the 1977 Additional Protocols not so much on the possible damage to civilian
immunity incurred by subordinating the jus in bello to the jus ad bellum, but on the
grounds that “terrorists” must not be legitimized as parties to a conflict at all. In order to
demonstrate its own support of the moral dimensions of civilian protection in
contradistinction to terrorists, and in affirmation of its innate liberal values/identity,
President Reagan promised that the U.S. would respect civilian immunity irrespective of
international law.2
In Afghanistan, President Bush builds on this already established civilian-centered
identity contest between states and non-state actors by defining the particular threat of
terrorism against the United States not only as a global threat in terms of its broad
territorial reach but as a universal threat in terms of the normative order of the entire
international society of states. By tapping into the larger normative context of terrorism
and civilian immunity, Bush, in the early post-9/11 days, ties the legitimacy of the initial
2
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Afghan invasion to the global interests of states and by extension to “innocent civilians.”
The legitimacy of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan is framed not only as a single act of
self-defense but as an act in the unified interests of the international order of states that
uphold civilian interests: “many nations understand what NATO expressed, that an attack
on us is really an attack on legitimate governments and on freedom.”3 The Taliban’s
draconian style of rule and blatant disregard for human rights made it easy to conflate it
with Al Qaeda and override concerns about sovereignty that intervention and “regime
change” would otherwise likely trigger. The legitimacy of the invasion of Afghanistan
was widely seen as just despite the fact that no state or regime had actually attacked the
United States. As Ballard, Lamm, and Wood write,
Though there are people who believe that the cost of war is never justifiable, the
campaign in Afghanistan will always stand out as one of the very few conflicts in history
that was avidly supported in its initial stages by most of the nations of the world. In the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, nearly seventy
nations actively voiced support for a response against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The
Taliban had been vilified in the international press and had twice before been sanctioned
by the United Nations. This was initially therefore both a just and internationally popular
war.4
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While Bush’s war plans found explicit support in the jus ad bellum traditions
ensconced in international law, jus in bello formed the normative background for not just
the defeat but the destruction of Al Qaeda. It would soon become the foreground as well
when Bush drew a sharp contrast between the Taliban and Al Qaeda on the one hand, and
American identity on the other by invoking the moral aspects of the jus in bello,
especially the principle of distinction. Clearly demarcating the line between civilian and
combatant, Bush promises the American people that even as the enemy is being pursued,
“at the same time, the oppressed people of Afghanistan will know the generosity of
America and our allies. As we strike military targets, we'll also drop food, medicine, and
supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and children of Afghanistan.”5
Though Bush does not explicitly promise at this time to minimize harm to civilians that
would result from the use of force, he reinforces the identity of the U.S. as the legitimate
protector of all, not just American, innocent civilians. The Afghanistan war thus begins
with a surplus of legitimacy, resting largely on the moral consensus regarding the
illegitimacy of the terrorists’ use of force as opposed to that employed by the coalition
led by the United States, and later the ISAF and NATO.
Early Attitudes Toward Civilian Casualties
During the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom, a mix of precision
weaponry was employed, and some interviewees with experience or opinions on
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Afghanistan characterized the initial airstrikes as precise and careful, while
acknowledging that, as one person put it, “it was shit for civilians.” The emphasis on
precision weaponry and careful targeting fits with the earliest attitudes of many military
personnel expressed in the Carr Center’s Human Rights Conferences, who saw criticism
of U.S. targeting practices as rather unfair, idealistic, and lacking in historical
perspective. According to reports published by Carl Conetta, civilian casualties in the
initial weeks of the invasion were estimated at 1000-1400 attributable to direct military
action.6 Conetta points out, however, that the rate of civilians killed per bomb dropped
was higher than would be expected when compared to the recent Kosovo conflict because
the “mission objectives, operational plans, and the character of the enemy might interact
to exert considerable upward pressure on the civilian casualty count.”7 Notably, since the
objective was regime change as well as rooting out and destroying Al Qaeda, targets
included residential areas where both groups lived and operated close to civilians.8
Targeting was not purposefully indiscriminate, but “targeting residential areas meant a
much reduced margin for error in attack, generally,” and extending the battle into
outlying areas as fighters fled endangered refugee flows. Cluster bombs were also
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employed to a greater extent in this conflict than in Kosovo two years before. Further,
relying on local intelligence meant that sometimes locals exploited or falsified
intelligence in order to bring harm to their own enemies. Strategically partnering with
the Northern Alliance, comprised mostly of ethnic minorities, against the Pashtun
Taliban, while pragmatic in the short run, facilitated brutality and human rights abuses
and exacerbated ethnic divisions between the Pashtuns on the one hand, who had always
ruled, and the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmen on the other.9
Although the earliest phases of the campaign were seen by many of those I
interviewed as relatively precise, attitudes at the highest levels indicate a recognition of a
conventional trade-off between military necessity and minimizing civilian casualties,
mediated by the emphasis on force protection. This is evidenced by the willingness to
incur more civilian casualties than would otherwise be necessary in order to
accommodate foreign policy objectives that saw the destruction of the enemy as the
overriding goal. The “nature” of non-state actors, who are intermingled with the civilian
population, was seen to some degree as an enabling rather than constraining factor in the
use of force. The New York Times published an investigative report of eleven bombing
sites over a period of six months and concluded that the focus on overwhelming force and
force protection, along with a reluctance to rely on ground troops for better intelligence,
meant that "the American air campaign in Afghanistan, based on a high-tech, out-ofharm's-way strategy, has produced a pattern of mistakes that have killed hundreds of
9
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Afghan civilians."10 The report also documented that denying civilian casualties was
often the first public response, even in the face of contrary evidence. Responding to the
Times article in a Pentagon briefing, Rumsfeld defended the performance of the military
regarding civilian deaths, insisting that the campaign represented historical progress in
minimizing civilian casualties. Thom Shanker, New York Times reporter, notes that
Rumsfeld appeared to balance the “tragedy of innocent civilian deaths” against the
accomplished goals of driving the Taliban and Al Qaeda from Afghanistan: ''Today the
Taliban are no longer in power; Al Qaeda is on the run,'' said Rumsfeld. ''The
humanitarian crisis has been averted, and the Afghan people have been liberated. And
Afghanistan is once again a free nation.''11
In the early years, since civilian casualties were viewed as an unavoidable cost of
doing business, little credence was given to the possibility that civilian casualties could
become more than a temporary public relations challenge. Interestingly, however, a small
number of enlisted soldiers reflected a “common sense” assessment that Afghans would
rebel against any force that killed its innocent bystanders. Higher level interviewees
(officer level) recalled little to no discussion in the early years about the idea that civilian
casualties might grow into a political problem that would reverberate directly back onto
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the battlefield, let alone a political problem that would affect the long term ability of the
U.S. to achieve its foreign policy goals in the region.
This was so despite the fact that civilian casualties became an issue for local and
regional audiences almost immediately, particularly in Pakistan. The Boston Globe
reported only weeks into the campaign that “the president, General Pervez Musharraf, is
under pressure both from fundamentalist political parties that have called on the army to
oust him and from some moderates who say he is ignoring Pakistanis' concerns for their
fellow Muslims in Afghanistan.”12 The New York Times report documented rising anger
in areas like the hamlet of Kakrat in Oruzgan Province where four entire villages were
strafed, and some Afghan officials warned of the resulting pressures on their ability to
govern: 'We have to be given a larger role,'' said Dr. Abdullah, the Afghan foreign
minister, in an interview. ''If things do not improve, well, I will certainly pray for the
Americans and wish them success, but I will no longer be able to take part in this.''13
Moreover, the earliest indications were that the enemy saw civilian casualties as a
propaganda tool, not only for a local audience, but for a regional, even global audience of
Arabs and Muslims who already believed in the U.S. willingness to kill their own kind.14
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The Taliban reported what the U.S. claimed were inflated civilian casualty figures,15
accusing the U.S. of intentionally killing civilians, and called it a “global bully. News
reports repeated the Taliban’s message that ‘urged Muslims to rise up against the United
States and to kill Americans wherever they can.’”16
Early assessments by some political and military personnel outside of the
immediate circle around Bush, however, did see civilian casualties as politically
problematic. Former assistant defense secretary under Reagan, Lawrence Korb, noted
two reasons to worry: "No. 1, we are a moral country. These people aren't aiding and
abetting bin Laden; they're terrified by him. And No. 2, the more you kill, the more you
run the risk of inflaming the Muslim world and breaking apart the coalition.”17 This
assessment competed with a more prevalent idea that held that civilian casualties required
merely the correct spin: one member of the House Armed Services Committee,
Representative Todd Akin, a Republican from Missouri, believed that the problem was
not casualties per se but the way they were being perceived. Urging the administration to
take notice, he stated,
I think we have to underscore the fact that the terrorists have intentionally
targeted civilian targets. They have intentionally done that, whereas we are
making every effort not to hit civilian targets. So there is a black-and-
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white contrast. We feel so strongly on this principle that we are even
assuming additional military risks.18
The response from the administration came mostly from Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, and echoed (or perhaps helped to construct) the prevailing attitudes of
some of the military participants in the Human Rights conferences at the time, who
believed that because the enemy manipulated and propagandized civilian casualties, it
garnered an unfair, even unjust advantage. This sentiment was reported by some of the
interviewees under study to be widely held. Emphasizing—even acknowledging in some
cases—casualties was seen as feeding into the enemy’s illegitimate and distorted
narrative. Nevertheless, the players were embedded in an identity contest, and
Rumsfeld’s response was thus to place the moral onus on the enemy, claiming that the
enemy was responsible for the civilian casualties that did occur and by implicating
civilians as cooperators or supporters of the regime:
There's no question but that people who were in close proximity to these isolated
ammunition dumps, who very likely were there for a good reason, because they were part
of that activity, may very well have been casualties ... They were not cooking cookies
inside those tunnels.19
Civilians who were acknowledged to be innocent were the victims of the enemy’s
unethical ways of war:
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Rumsfeld said that while the U.S. has been ‘very careful’ about avoiding
civilian casualties when possible, the Taliban is making it increasingly
difficult not to hit civilians. ‘They are systematically using mosques and
schools and hospitals for command-and-control centers [and] for
ammunition storage,’ Rumsfeld said. ‘They are placing artillery and tanks
and armored vehicles in close proximity to hospitals and schools and
residential areas.’20
Even so, the administration recognized the need to sway the populace, though
early attempts at hearts and minds were crude and took for granted that the claim that
killing was “unintentional,” a key concept in the civilian immunity norm that permits for
the possibility of foreseeable collateral damage, would absolve the U.S. from moral
culpability in the eyes of multiple audiences, including the local population. Planes
dropped leaflets “in an effort to reassure them the bombardment was not aimed at them.
One leaflet showed a western soldier in camouflage and helmet shaking hands with a man
in traditional Afghan dress in front of a mountain scene.” Other attempts used war planes
to broadcast news in Afghan dialects “in the ongoing battle for the hearts and minds of
the Afghan people.”21
With faith in the utility of conventional force and in the American attitude that, as
one interviewee put it, “we were so sure we were the good guys,” the war of ideas aimed
at only the vaguest goal of countering anti-Americanism. However, the U.S. information
Agency, whose once vibrant public diplomacy program was given short shrift once
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relegated to the State Department, was under-resourced and under-prioritized.22
Interagency cooperation attempted public diplomacy initiatives, but no meaningful
connection was made between the conduct of the military and the goals of antiAmericanism. For example, soon after the initial fall of the Taliban, when Al Qaeda had
retreated to Pakistan, President Bush announced that Radio America would be broadcast
and that the media infrastructure would be built up in the country. There was a notable
lack of any discussion within the administration that directly linked the use of
overwhelming force or civilian casualties to a damaged American image, nor was this
issue tied in any important way to battlefield conditions in Afghanistan. While discussion
between the military and the human rights workers at the Carr Center Conventions
focused on the trade-off between force protection and civilian casualties as a human
rights issue, no linkage was yet made between American interests and protecting
civilians. The separation between politics and military force was assumed, and according
to one high level military official, little thought was given to civilian casualties as one
factor contributing to the influx of Pakistani fundamentalist fighters crossing the border
to assist the Taliban.
Whereas initial indicators were that American image would suffer, politicians and
military decision-makers alike traditionally focus on domestic public opinion; the masses
make up the “passions” in what Clausewitz calls the trinity of war, providing the patriotic
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fervor, political and financial support to keep the war going. At this point, American
domestic public opinion gave little cause for concern. Though some peace-oriented
groups protested, expressions of mainstream public opinion demonstrated a tendency to
tolerate civilian casualties, a predictable pattern for the American public, who has proved
quite willing in the past to trade civilian lives for “security.”23 A letter to the editor
responding to the July 2002 New York Times report on civilian casualties captures the
mood of the country and its preference for force protection over minimizing civilian
casualties:
If only hundreds of Afghan civilians died as we liberated their country for
them, that's a relatively small price for them to pay. It was their country;
why should we take the ground losses? We must minimize mistakes, but
your article places more credence on the reports and opinions of a few
civilians with little knowledge of tactics of modern warfare than it does on
our own personnel who are risking and giving their lives for these people.
Like much of Europe and the Middle East, Afghans are biting the hand
that feeds them and frees them.24
Despite the mood of the U.S. public, the importance of civilian casualties for
America’s image and its ability to prevail in the long run was not lost on elected officials
like John Kerry who worried that “the U.S. appears to be losing the propaganda war in
Afghanistan and in the Arab world. Strikes that hit civilians, and bombing during
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Ramadan, they said, can do nothing for the U.S. case.”25 Stephen Tanner argues that the
damage to American image was in its loss of “moral authority.”
After a month of the U.S. bombing campaign rumblings began to reach
Washington from Europe, the Mideast, and Pakistan where Musharraf had
requested the bombing to cease. Having begun the war with the greatest
imaginable reservoir of moral authority, the U.S. was on the verge of
letting it slip away through high-level attacks using the most ghastly
inventions its scientists could come up with.26
Still, little evidence exists that civilian casualties were recognized at the time as a
strategic issue among those positioned as top decision-makers or even among junior
officers or enlisted personnel interviewed for this study. One special forces enlisted
soldier who was one of the first to land in Afghanistan remarked that he received no
training at all in complying with the Geneva Conventions, and indeed, was not even
vaguely familiar with the treaty throughout the duration of his service.
Even if the moral issue of civilian casualties contained the seeds of a broader,
strategic problem in the minds of some, this issue receded among coalition forces not
long after the Taliban had been toppled and al-Qaeda had been driven out. Just as nonstate combatants melted away only to recoup and return another day, the damage set into
motion by civilian casualties soon took a back seat to larger issues of legitimacy
concerning U.S. foreign policy, especially fears about its intentions to project its military
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power across the globe. It was only months after 9/11, in January 2002—before the
smoke had even cleared in Afghanistan—that Bush gave his State of the Union speech in
which he famously named Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as the “axis of evil.” As a result,
the image of the U.S. in the eyes of international publics suffered tremendously. Pew
reports a decline across the board in global public opinion toward the U.S. during the
Bush years but notes that the decline began in the early days of the Afghanistan and
continued through Iraq:
America won a measure of global sympathy after the terrorist attacks of
Sept. 11, 2001, but the inaugural Pew Global Attitudes survey showed that
by spring 2002 favorability ratings for the U.S. had already dropped in
many countries since the start of the decade. Surveys conducted after the
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 found further declines. Positive views of
the United States declined in 26 of the 33 countries where the question
was posed in both 2002 and 2007.27
The U.S. image suffered especially with the publics of some Arab and Muslim
countries, and this drop correlated with disturbingly high levels of confidence in Osama
bin Laden and higher than would be expected support for suicide bombings as a
legitimate tactic in war. The percentage of Jordan’s population that saw the U.S. in a
favorable light dropped from an already low twenty five percent in 2002 to a staggeringly
low one percent in 2003. Fifty three percent of Jordanian Muslims likewise expressed a
favorable view of Osama bin Laden, specifically responding in a positive way to the
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statement that “bin Laden would do the right thing in world affairs.”28 In Jordan in 2002,
forty three percent said that suicide bombing was often or sometimes justified, and that
number crept up to nearly the sixty percent mark until 2005, when it dropped
precipitously. Not coincidentally, 2005 is the year Amman experienced firsthand what it
means to be the object of terrorism when the Iraqi branch of Al Qaeda (AQI) bombed
three hotels in Amman, one of which was hosting a wedding party with hundreds of
guests. The bombing was said to be in retaliation for the Jordanian government’s
cooperation in the GWOT. The attack sparked massive public protests, but in a stunning
reversal, they were directed not toward government policy but against the attacks and alQaeda itself. Fares Braizat, a political scientist in Jordan University's Center for Strategic
Studies remarked that
in an opinion poll conducted [the year before] by his office, 67 percent of
Jordanian adult respondents had considered al Qaeda in Iraq ‘a legitimate
resistance organization’. That attitude may be changing, he said Friday,
explaining that he had spoken since the attacks to 10 survey participants
who held favorable views of al Qaeda; nine of them had changed their
minds.29
To the extent that the support of Arab and Muslim publics was seen as relevant in
the GWOT by both terrorists and their state foes, the Jordan case demonstrates the
centrality of civilian casualties to shifting the balance of legitimacy to either side in the
larger war of ideas. Yet, this was not apparent at the time and reflected a severe
28
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disconnect between the U.S. self-understanding about its own identity and the legitimacy
of its use of force versus that of others. Paul Rogers writes in February 2002 about the
“mood of the majority” in the global south as being fundamentally at odds with the U.S.
perception of its own actions: “The U.S. sees the legitimacy of a war on terror born of the
shock of its own vulnerability. Much of the rest of the world sees it as a further example
of the control of the international system by an elite minority.”30 Identity, however, is
inherently social and thus is negotiated, which means that one cannot simply assert
identity; rather, it must be accepted, or at least not contested. Since the war of ideas was
about countering anti-Americanism and promoting American values in opposition to that
of terrorists, civilian casualties in the early days of Afghanistan had already cost the U.S.
in the war of ideas with key audiences well before it appeared to be losing control of the
ground war in Afghanistan and even before the Iraqi insurgency—it just didn’t know it
yet.31
To what extent damage to a state’s image induces a change in behavior is another
matter. Anthony Cordesman, a respected military strategist writing in 2002 about the
lessons of the Afghanistan conflict, saw the potential for civilian casualties to become a
political problem for a global audience, but he also determined that when the world
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supports the use of force, they will also allow for a level of civilian casualties as a cost of
doing business:
The global reaction to the fall of the Taliban and Al Qaeda shows that the
United States and its allies can continue to act in spite of enemy
propaganda and the use of collateral damage as a political weapon, and
that media and human rights criticism that ignores reality and attempts to
make any use of military force impossible has little effect. The media and
the public will—and they should—react to every attack that produces any
form of civilian casualties, friendly fire, or collateral damage. If the world
accepts the need for military action, however, it will also accept the
inevitability of such losses.32
Translated in terms of this study, the willingness to incur civilian casualties is at
least partly a function of legitimacy, and reputational damage alone, among limited
audiences, did not necessarily equate to a loss of legitimacy. It is not until the U.S. sees
that reputational consequences deriving from civilian casualties impact its ability to
“win” the ground war, and no other options appear consistent with U.S. and military
identity, that the war of ideas is seen as essential to the war on the ground. Eventually,
what it means to win, however, will have to be redefined within the moral limits of
civilian immunity, at least in Afghanistan.33
Middle Years, 2003-2007: A Secondary Effort
If all signs pointed to the beginning of a downward slide in American image
among local and regional publics, the Afghanistan conflict nevertheless dropped out of
32
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the headlines once international attention shifted to Bush’s plans to invade Iraq. With the
Taliban initially defeated and Al Qaeda’s training camps and bases destroyed,
Afghanistan became, as one high-level military official put it, a “secondary effort” for
many years.34 In reality, as has been well documented elsewhere, the Taliban and Al
Qaeda both had merely retreated, and much of the leadership that remained had crossed
into the mountainous Pakistani Pashtun region known as the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA). Robert Cassidy documents the rise of the (neo)Taliban, writing
that Pakistan provided a safe haven whereby they recouped, assessed their losses, and
gathered up funds from people as geographically diverse as
‘businessmen in Karachi, goldsmiths in Peshawar, wealthy Saudis and
Kuwaitis,’ and even ‘sympathetic officers’ in the Pakistani army and ISI.
Pashtuns who resented the harsh treatment of Afghan civilians at the
hands of the Coalition forces and a host of new recruits were assembling
in the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province.35
Civilian casualties were therefore producing recruiting effects, but at this point in
the conflict, casualties were one of the many factors that made up the complex internal
political dynamics taking place between the Pakistani government and the Taliban, not to
mention the emerging Pakistani Taliban insurgency. Nevertheless, with popular support
for Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S. in the GWOT at only fifteen percent by 2007, it is
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reasonable to assume that civilian casualties were fuel for the fire, especially among those
predisposed to sympathize with Salafi-Jihadist movements.36
Against the backdrop of this “unfinished and temporarily forgotten war in
Afghanistan,” U.S. attention and energy was drawn into Iraq like moth to a flame. As I
have documented in chapter four, strategic failure in an invasion already lacking
legitimacy came to be defined increasingly in terms of a failure to view the population
protection as the goal. What was key in Iraq was that the humanitarian basis for the
invasion and foreign policy goal of democratizing the country and turning it into an ally
on the war on terror guided the idea that civilians themselves had to buy into the package
of ideas being sold to them by primarily the United States military. The fact that invading
Iraq at all was a priority so early in the beginning of the Afghanistan war, however, was a
political choice independent of effects induced by civilian casualties. What this meant for
Afghanistan was a shortage of troops and thus an excessive reliance on airpower, which
affected how and to what extent the military was able to pursue its goals of destroying the
al Qaeda and Taliban leadership, providing stability and security—the goal of ISAF
shortly after the initial invasion—and fighting the emerging insurgency as it became
evident that this was occurring. An overreliance on airpower constrained the decision
calculus toward more civilian casualties, and between the initial heavy bombing of
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Afghanistan and then Iraq, a dearth of precision guided munitions meant that other less
precise weaponry would be used as needed.37
The lack of resources and attention feeding into Afghanistan created optimal
material conditions for the gradual resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. As Richard
Holbrooke put it in an interview, Afghanistan “was abandoned a second time by the
previous administration more or less in 2004, 2005. The administration almost eliminated
the foreign aid assistance programs, went in the wrong direction, and the Taliban took
advantage of it. ...”38 Civilian casualties at this time worked to confirm the narrative of
the Taliban and Al Qaeda that had begun in the invasions, feeding into local and regional
recruitment efforts. 39 This assessment, however, is retrospective, for as will be detailed
below, it was not until 2005 that civilian casualties were seen as a “key operational
issue,” and Karzai began to complain privately.40 Even then, it was not until 2009 that the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which by then came under joint U.S.
leadership with Operation Enduring Freedom, consistently prioritized reducing civilian
casualties as the core of a population protection strategy.41
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Torture and Effects on Legitimacy
In the meantime, the U.S. suffered severe damage to its image among a broader,
global audience due to the infamous torture and illegal detainment debates associated
with Guantanamo Bay. While these issues may seem largely beyond the scope of this
study since they do not bear directly on the treatment of civilians, they do feed directly
into issues of legitimacy and the U.S. use of force. Torture and civilian immunity rest
side by side in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the third and fourth conventions
respectively, of the treaty at the core of contemporary international humanitarian law.42
Further, the debates surrounding torture formed the backdrop for U.S. decisions about
how to approach civilian casualties in the years leading up to an Afghanistan-specific
version of C.O.I.N..
The torture controversy affected U.S. reputation based on its conduct, its reversal
on customary international law, and its place in the larger international order.43 This
hinged on the fact that the U.S. staked its identity and force claims on its stewardship of
the international liberal order of law and rights on the one hand, while actively promoting
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the idea of a space free from the rule of law on the other. This hypocrisy was not lost on
many outside of the United States. Denying prisoners habeus corpus, detaining them in
Guantanamo Bay where U.S. laws of due process did not apply, defending “enhanced
interrogation techniques,” and then diverting detainees to more torture-friendly locations
via extraordinary rendition—all damaged the American image among friend and foe
alike. More specific to this study, it undermined the war of ideas by confirming the
strategic narrative of Al Qaeda that U.S. values are hollow and particularistic in that they
do not apply to Muslims. An assessment by Dennis Blair, Director of Intelligence under
Obama, confirms that the U.S. government gradually came to this perspective. Blair,
participating in a review of interrogation methods used by the CIA on high-value
individuals suspected of terrorism during these years (between 2002 and 2006), wrote a
memo summarizing his conclusions: "The bottom line is these techniques have hurt our
image around the world," and "the damage they have done to our interests far outweighed
whatever benefit they gave us and they are not essential to our national security."44
While the torture and illegal detainment issues were not immediately related to
the civilian casualties issue, the attempts to carve out legitimate space—through legal
counsel, that is—for unrestrained state action in the international realm, while denying
both criminal and legal combatant status to prisoners, triggered intense focus on both IHL
and Human Rights law (IHRL). The public debate about the Geneva Conventions in
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particular had the effect of encouraging scrutiny of the contradictions and tensions in
U.S. words versus deeds. John Yoo, the Bush administration’s Chief of Legal Offices
famously authored the Torture Memos, laying the groundwork for a legal defense against
charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.45 Yoo claimed that the conflict in
Afghanistan was exempt from the Geneva Conventions because al Qaeda is a "violent
political movement" and, as a nonstate actor, cannot be a party to a treaty. Further, the
Taliban is not a legitimate government since it presides over a failed state and is
“functionally indistinguishable" from al Qaeda, "to the extent that the Taliban militia was
more akin to a non-governmental organization that used military force to pursue its
religious and political ideology than a functioning government."46 Moreover, Yoo
contended that the President was not bound by international law, nor even by domestic
law in cases of security: "customary international law, whatever its source and content,
does not bind the President, or restrict the actions of the U.S. military" and is strictly a
matter of the President's ability to interpret such law.47
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While IHL is specific to warring parties, any remainders are swept into the
jurisdiction of IHRL,48 which claims the “equal and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family” and as such “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment.”49 A memo signed by Bush was circulated in
response to the torture memos in 2002, which demonstrates some rhetorical recognition
of this fact as well as a desire to reinforce the notion that U.S. values are aligned with
international human rights. Without acknowledging that detainees have human rights,
Bush invokes the language of human rights and aligns himself, however imperfectly, with
the “spirit of the law.”50
Of course, our values as a Nation, values that we share with many nations
in the world, call for us to treat detainees humanely, including those who
are not legally entitled to such treatment. Our Nation has been and will
continue to be a strong supporter of Geneva and its principles. As a matter
of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees
humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military
necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.51
This memo, made public in June 2004, was written as an acceptance of the legal
positions asserted in the Torture Memos. It was completely declassified and made public
in June 2004 just as the Torture memos were leaked to the press. Meant to balance the
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harsh legal position with a reassuring statement of the persistent U.S. commitment to
international morality (if not law per se), the effects of such a statement are to thrust even
greater attention and scrutiny on the American reputation and on its identity alone as a
guarantor of moral behavior.
The administration continued to cling to its position even in the wake of public
furor, however, and it was not until the 2006 Supreme Court case, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
that it was forced to modify its stance.52 Hamdan essentially overturned the
administration’s official position—ruling that the Geneva Conventions do indeed apply.
Even in its acceptance of the ruling of the Supreme Court, the administration was sure to
invoke both the sovereignty and human rights aspects of international law as the moral
basis for the illegitimacy of non-state actors (and even state actors in the case of the
Taliban). Dan Bartlett, legal counsel speaking for the Administration, stated:
We strongly believe that terrorists picked up off the battlefield -- who
don't represent a nation, revel in killing the innocent, and refuse to wear
uniforms -- do not qualify for protections under Geneva," [the] White
House counselor said. "Five members of the Supreme Court disagreed. As
the president said, we will comply with the ruling.53
The administration was thus legally coerced to alter its stance, and as such lagged
well behind the military, which had already undertaken what the Washington Post called
“wrenching internal and public debate since the Abu Ghraib prison scandal came to light
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in 2004.”54 Importantly, the Torture Memos were only made public in June 2004, shortly
after Abu Ghraib, which intensified an already feverish legitimacy crisis, affecting the
image of the U.S. and by extension, that of the U.S. military.
The torture debate, in drawing attention to the Geneva Conventions and the
“moral character” of the U.S., highlighted the fragility of the international legal order,
particularly the laws of war. Bush, in his statement accepting the core of Yoo’s legal
position on Geneva, had called for “new thinking in the laws of war” where terror is
concerned.55 This was made more salient as a result of the Israel-Lebanon War of 2006.
Israel, whose tendency had long been to interpret IHL in an expansive manner in order to
loosen constraints in fighting irregular wars, helped to contribute to this “new thinking”
as it sought to undo the damage to its own reputation wrought by global perceptions that
it had disproportionally harmed civilians when fighting Hezbollah. Embroiled in its own
legitimacy struggle concerning the use of force, Israeli scholars closely linked to the
Israeli government and the IDF produced reports that sought to direct "truth-seeking
audiences," to the correct conclusions and to provide direction on the issue of how killing
civilians fits into the larger war on terrorism.56
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The IDF's air strikes and ground attacks against Hezbollah targets located
in population centers were carried out in accordance with international
law, which does not grant immunity to a terrorist organization deliberately
hiding behind civilians supporting it, using them as human shield.57
Israel’s stance demonstrates the elasticity of the norm in the sense that it can
enable or constrain—note the framing of the issue at hand as the immunity of the terrorist
rather than the immunity of the civilian. Placing all blame on Hezbollah also echoes
Rumsfeld’s rhetorical strategy of holding the Taliban and al Qaeda responsible for all
civilian casualties.
Perhaps most importantly as it pertains to this study, three things happen within a
short time span (in 2006): Public and intellectual debates about the ability of anti-torture
norms to withstand U.S. attempts to bend them to “military necessity” reach a zenith.
Second, increasing civilian casualties begin to accompany a resurging Taliban in
Afghanistan. Third, the civilian immunity norm debate begins to follow in the wake of
the torture debate: interested parties begin to debate whether to loosen civilian immunity
to confront the increased scope and urgency of the terrorist threat.
Helen Kinsella, scholar of international law and normative political theory, is one
of the few to take notice of the close connection between the third (torture) and fourth
(civilian immunity) conventions.58 She argues that the Bush administration’s willingness
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to violate prohibitions on torture was seen through the lens of the Civilization versus
Barbarism discourse, which enables (or expands the space for) non-compliance with
international law. In keeping with historical precedent, since the identity of terrorists has
been constructed as barbaric, they are seen as outside of the laws that govern civilization.
On the other hand, the concept of the “civilian” is essential to the very idea of
“civilization,” and Kinsella argues that Bush’s policy was very careful to strengthen and
abide by the norms protecting civilians in order to reinforce the exemption of terrorists
from the protections of international law. On Kinsella’s account, the variance in
compliance between the third and fourth Geneva Conventions is thus explained by the
need to reinforce the notion of terrorists as manifesting a wholly illegitimate identity in
order to neutralize any justice-oriented political claims that might otherwise merit
consideration.59
While I accept Kinsella’s argument in its basic formulation, she does not account
for variance in attitudes and policies toward civilian casualties over time. Since, as was
documented in the Iraq chapter, an important part of Al Qaeda’s (and later the Taliban’s)
strategic narrative is based on the U.S. treatment of Muslim civilians, my argument is that
the reputational damage incurred as a result of the torture issue created more pressure for
the U.S. to strengthen its position vis a vis civilians, in order to counter the opposing
narrative in the war of ideas.
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The U.S. image of illegality that was central to its disadvantage in the war of
ideas in Afghanistan derived from both its international reputation (damaged by the Iraq
War and the torture issue),60 as well as its local interactions with Afghans, which would
be felt locally but viewed and interpreted by distant audiences through various media. As
military scholar Robert Cassidy points out, the mere fact of occupying a foreign,
culturally distant land provides opportunities for the enemy to attack the legitimacy of the
mission, irrespective of the legitimacy of the initial invasion. Insurgents and terrorists
rely on the constant stream of media images that highlight their own deeds and the deeds
of the occupier:
The recurring images of Western soldiers and combat vehicles
maneuvering through the streets of Muslim villages represent an illegal
occupation of the Ummah by infidels to radicalized audiences in Muslim
countries. Likewise, repeated images of uniformed Western troops and
Muslim casualties animate opposition, if not hatred, for such endeavors.61
Making the decision to protect civilians, in addition to calming the insurgency,
provides a legitimacy bridge by helping to repair the damage done from all sources to
both the U.S. image in a broad sense as well as the U.S. military’s professionalism more
specifically, as I will argue below.
Driven more by concerns about counterinsurgency in Iraq than in Afghanistan,
attempts to reform military culture in the direction of respect for civilian immunity and
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human rights took place within the military in the interim period of the Afghanistan
conflict (2005-2007). While the C.O.I.N. manual was meant to shift military culture
toward a new kinder, gentler, American way of war, in reality, the thinking behind the
C.O.I.N. handbook was driven by the urgency of Iraq’s particular situation. Military
leadership had been increasingly convinced of the necessity to win hearts and minds by
shifting the emphasis from winning the war of ideas as a secondary matter to a primary
goal—one that would take precedence over and even, at times, supplant traditional ideas
of “winning.” As I argued in the previous chapter, the sustained interaction between high
level military personnel with the human rights community evidenced the shift toward a
human rights-centered civilian immunity norm. Moreover, this normative orientation was
central to what Petraeus called the “surge of ideas” whereby winning demanded paying
attention to competing perspectives in order to get the “big ideas right.”62 The big ideas
increasingly focused on the international normative context as constraining the strategic
options. The idea that the military could revert to punitive population-centered strategies,
which was considered legitimate not so long ago, was no longer the case. John Nagl
acknowledges that civilian protection is not the only strategic option insofar as it does not
flow directly out of the material conditions of counterinsurgency:
The history of counterinsurgency campaigns tells us that the way to
succeed -- there are two options. You can either conduct the Roman
method, where you kill everybody, sow the fields with salt and prevent
62
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anybody from living there again. That defeats the insurgency, but it's
illegal and immoral and absolutely not a solution we can think about.63
Rather, he states, population protection “is the only way to succeed in the modern
era, in a CNN era.”64 Nagl, a key figure in the writing of C.O.I.N.—and along with
Petraeus one of its most visible public champions—thus sees the international normative
context regarding the treatment of civilians as directly constraining the range of possible
strategies to those which are moral and consistent with U.S. identity. As in Iraq, early
interagency early efforts at counterinsurgency in Afghanistan attempted
counterinsurgency goals such as training the Afghan army (ANA) development, and
diplomacy, but without resources or a coherent campaign plan, this was done alongside
“punitive displays of lethal force.”65 As Colonel Robert Cassidy writes, “perception
creates reality and that perception stems from consistency in deed and message.”66 The
population must perceive the host nation’s government and its partners as legitimate.
Information operations must understand the strategic nature of perceptions, since this is
true not only for the U.S. and coalition forces, but for the insurgents and terrorists as well.
Asserting certain criteria for legitimacy through the war of ideas also draws attention to
inconsistencies in deed, which is exploited by the opposition.67
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Habitualizing: Changing Attitudes Through Identity
The backdrop to this study, which has been the subject of much recent attention
for military scholars and journalists, is that the military also struggled to reform its own
culture to align with the new doctrine.68 Though insights gained in Iraq would not be
applied directly to the Afghanistan conflict until later, how force was used increasingly
came to be seen as directly relevant to the maintenance of an effective military. The
willingness of the military to eventually embrace instead of resist the demands of the
human rights community was therefore motivated at least partly by what Sarah Sewall
calls its desire to protect its own professionalism.69

In order to support what the new

military leadership saw as the diminished utility of force and, as a result, its own
transformed role in the implementation of foreign policy, it would need to learn some of
the discarded lessons of Vietnam.70 The military would also need to bring the lessons of
Vietnam into the present by taking stock of the changes in the post-Vietnam normative
context.
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The evidence suggests that it gradually became accepted among many in the high
levels of the military, particularly among those whose work pertained to international
law, that the strengthened civilian immunity norm had become an increasingly powerful
symbol of international morality. According to Charles Dunlap, who looks at
international law from a military perspective,
The practical impact of law on the war on terror is also well understood
today. No observer of the post-9/11 era fails to recognize that the most
serious setbacks for the American military involve not an adversary’s
battlefield successes, but rather alleged violations of the law by the U.S.’s
own forces...for members of the American military profession who came
of age in the era between Vietnam and September 11, the significance of
legal legitimacy at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels had
become virtually axiomatic.71
What is less evident in this characterization is that the demands of moral
legitimacy can transcend even that of legal legitimacy, defined by compliance with
LOAC. This shift toward legal legitimacy may have begun post-Vietnam, but military
culture lagged behind the normative environment in terms of recognizing the significance
of the moral and ethical dimensions of civilian immunity. Further, Dunlap expresses
typical assumptions within military culture that see civilian casualties as relevant
primarily because of the democratic character of the domestic public. This focus on the
domestic public to the exclusion of foreign publics that was seen early on missed the
point of what David Kilcullen, top counterinsurgency advisor to David Petraeus, termed a
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“global insurgency.”72 The excessive focus on domestic public opinion also reinforces the
primacy of force protection since domestic publics tend to be more casualty sensitive
toward their own soldiers than toward foreign civilians.73 Take, for example, the
“immaculate war” of Kosovo, so named because of zero troop casualties. Such a war only
appeared immaculate from fifteen thousand feet in the air, but it was instrumental in
ushering in a new optimism about war fighting based on perceptions that war would be
freed from its vulnerability to losing domestic public support as a result of troop
casualties.74 This is exactly the sort of thinking that distinguishes pre-C.O.I.N. from postC.O.I.N.; that is, perceptions of domestic audiences matter, but the civilians of foreign
publics were not of great concern. Once top-level officials began to recognize the current
human-rights centered international normative environment as a defining and permanent
feature of the security environment, it became evident that a fundamental cultural shift
within the military would have to be nurtured.
Whereas the issue of discrimination between combatants and noncombatants had
previously been viewed through the prism of collateral damage modeling, targeting
procedures, and the development and acquisition of precision weaponry, it became
increasingly evident that the issue of civilian deaths was not merely technological nor
72

Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,”
www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf.
73
74

See Feaver, Gelpi, and Reifler, 2006.

Martin L. Cook, for example, sees the controversy about intervention in Kosovo as primarily about the
“moral contract” between a state and its own soldiers. “'Immaculate War': Constraints on Humanitarian
Intervention,” Ethics and International Affairs, vol 14, 2000.

221

even doctrinal; the basic attitudes of soldiers on the ground lagged behind. In the
confusion of two wars with vague, shifting objectives, attitudes toward civilians had
deteriorated, and consistent with interviews performed for this study, the priority of force
protection had been thoroughly internalized. What became evident was that
implementing a civilian-centered, human rights-based strategy was dependent on
transforming military culture all the way down.
Appeals to civilian immunity as part of the core values and identity of the military
began in earnest in 2006, after General David Petraeus was shocked to hear the results of
an internal study that showed hostile attitudes toward civilians and indicators of high
levels of acceptance for violations and abuse of civilians among enlisted members of the
military. In response, Petraeus set into motion the later steps in the process of human
rights diffusion known as habitualization and institutionalization.75 Attempting to
convince the troops that fighting effectively is contingent on “living our values,”
including respecting civilian immunity and rejecting torture, he writes:
Our values and the laws governing warfare teach us to respect human
dignity, maintain our integrity, and do what is right. Adherence to our
values distinguishes us from our enemy. This fight depends on securing
the population, which must understand that we - not our enemies - occupy
the moral high ground. This strategy has shown results in recent months.
Al Qaeda's indiscriminate attacks, for example, have finally started to turn
a substantial proportion of the Iraqi population against it. In view of this, I
was concerned by the results of a recently released survey conducted last
75
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fall in Iraq that revealed an apparent unwillingness on the part of some US
personnel to report illegal actions taken by fellow members of their units.
The study also indicated that a small percentage of those surveyed may
have mistreated noncombatants. This survey should spur reflection on our
conduct in combat."76
Note especially that the hallmark of terrorism—“indiscriminate attacks”—is
emphasized in order to differentiate the virtuous U.S. soldier from what Bush had earlier
called outlaws and enemies of civilization.
This effort to appeal to a soldierly ethic consistent with American values was not
limited to Petraeus as a personality, but rather points to a concerted move that cut across
the branches of the armed services. James Mattis, Petraeus’s counterpart in the Marines
and co-leader of the combined forces effort that led to the C.O.I.N. manual, gave the
annual Stutt Lecture on Ethics in 2006, around the same time as Petraeus’s “Open
Letter.” The lecture was notable for its intended reach; while the Stutt lectures were
generally attended by the small numbers of soldiers taking ethics courses, the emphasis
on ethical decisions in combat was held to be so important at that time that the entire
brigade was required to attend. Speaking on the importance of morality and values as
integral to military identity, Mattis was introduced as the embodiment of the just war
values the military wanted the rank and file to internalize:
He [Mattis] has inspired his men and women, in the midst of intense
combat, to engage the brain before the weapon and, above all else, to
76
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demonstrate chivalry, decency, and soldierly compassion for both friend
and foe.77
As Mattis spoke in his straightforward style, he urged the audience to plan ahead
for moral dilemmas and to never cross the line between killing innocents and combatants
in order to maintain their own and their country’s honor. Specifically relating being a
moral soldier to the interests of the U.S., Mattis cites de Toqueville: “America is a good
country, and if America ever ceases to be good, she will cease to be great.”78 Noting the
examples of Abu Ghraib and its deleterious effects on efforts in Fallujah, as well as the
French Algerian experience, he tells the soldiers that a lack of moral behavior has
negative reputational effects that are strategically damaging and thus an affront against
one’s peers and one’s country:
There is no one harsher about what those soldiers did in Abu Ghraib than
your fellow sailors, Marines, and soldiers on the ground in Iraq right now.
No one. There was no call for it. It was a bunch of punks is all it was, but a
lack of moral fortitude cost our country greatly. If you read what happened
to the French army in Algeria, the 10th Parachute Division breaks the back
of the terrorists there, but does so in a way that the government falls, and
France is held up to scorn and ridicule around the world. You must make
certain that you never do something that brings that sort of scorn or
ridicule on our own country.79
Mounting Casualties in Afghanistan
By 2005, as demonstrated in the previous chapter on Iraq, attention within the
U.S. military had begun to intensively focus on the problem of civilian casualties as
77

Center for the Study of Professional Military Ethics, “Ethical Challenges in Contemporary Conflict: the
Afghanistan and Iraq Cases,” February 23 2006, 6.
78

Ibid. 15

79

Ibid. 15-16

224

anathema to the war of ideas and thus the war on the ground in Iraq. It was also at this
time that civilian casualties in Afghanistan were starting to be recognized as an
“operational issue” by ISAF.80 By 2006, the Taliban had definitively re-emerged with a
new strategy:
By 2006 there were clear signs that the Taliban were becoming an integral
part of a wider supranational jihadist movement, to a much greater extent
than the “older Taliban” ever were. They increasingly appeared to believe
that the decisive factor in winning the war would not be Western public
opinion…, but the support of their Muslim brethren...their priority would
be to mobilize Muslim public opinion worldwide as a source of funding,
moral support, and volunteer[s].81
At this point, the face of the conflict was international, because of the coalition,
but also American since U.S. and British troops shouldered much of the burden for
ongoing combat operations in the ongoing OEF.82 While the international presence may
have diluted responsibility for (and therefore legitimacy problems associated with)
civilian casualties, the “Americans” remained very much the face of the war to ordinary
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Afghans.83 As civilian casualties increased, the Afghani population gradually became
seen as increasingly strategically important, particularly since Karzai, President of
Afghanistan, made first private, and then public statements condemning the killing of
civilians.84
As it became apparent that the insurgency was emerging in full force, more
careful attention was paid to estimating the effects of fighting on civilians. Initial reports
highlighting civilian deaths came not from the U.S., however, but from international
concerns about the deteriorating security environment and its effects on the stabilizing
mission of ISAF. The Joint Coordinating and Monitoring Board, “made up of the Afghan
government, its key foreign backers and the UN” reported that in 2006, nearly four
thousand people were killed in the fighting, with about one thousand thought to be
civilians. Results of the report were publicized by the BBC, which noted that both
corruption of the Afghan government and civilian casualties were “alienating” Afghans
and “hampering those fighting the insurgency.”85 Nevertheless, international support
persisted, and pursuing kinetic operations to defeat the insurgency was seen as legitimate
by many at this point. The Japanese ambassador Kenzo Oshima, part of the Security
Council delegation,
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told reporters in Kabul that the most important challenge was the fight
against the Taleban insurgency, and that opium production, which was
fuelling the violence, was also a major problem. But he added that the
international community would continue to support Afghanistan in its
efforts towards peace and reconstruction.86
Even in the face of civilian casualties, then, and with the growing recognition of
an insurgency, the conflict in Afghanistan produced nowhere near the intense
international pressure as did the war in Iraq. This was not clearly an issue of American
legitimacy; corruption in the Afghan government meant that finger-pointing by Karzai
about civilian casualties was tainted by his own efforts to deflect from more fundamental
issues of governance and legitimacy that he faced.87 The leadership of the ISAF, though it
had been led by NATO since 2003, was changing frequently, which made it difficult to
coordinate a sustained response. Probably most importantly, however, the U.S. was not in
any position, because of the crisis in Iraq, to consider any large-scale strategic changes.
The impetus toward C.O.I.N. and population protection in Afghanistan thus severely
lagged behind material conditions. As one high level military official put it, it was not a
conscious doctrinal decision to tolerate civilian casualties, but rather a response to a
limited scope of alternatives. In terms of this study, the credibility and legitimacy issues
associated with failure in Iraq, which at this point was disintegrating into civil war,
crowded out that of Afghanistan, and therefore material factors such as a lack of
resources took precedence in shaping operations.
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2007-2012: From Iraq to Afghanistan
By 2007, Iraq was beginning to turn because of the theater-wide adoption of
C.O.I.N., the surge in troops, and the Anbar Awakening, and at the same time, civilian
casualties in Afghanistan were becoming higher profile. Three things had occurred by
November 2007: U.N. figures showed that in 2007, more civilians were killed by proAfghan government forces than by the Taliban; 2) a U.N report showed that civilian
casualties were the most important factor motivating suicide bombings in Afghanistan.
Furthermore, suicide bombers did not favor targeting civilians, creating an unfavorable
juxtaposition between terrorism and military behavior. 3) Finally, support for the
coalition presence was disintegrating within Afghanistan.88 Unlike the old Taliban, the
neo-Taliban had become quite adept at using media to their advantage. Cassidy writes
that after 2002, the group quickly adapted to the information environment and “now
recognizes the importance of news media in determining the outcome of an irregular war
of ideas.” He explains
Learning from al-Qaeda’s successes with information warfare, the neoTaliban now relies on media as a powerful instrument in waging
psychological warfare. The Taliban’s global media campaign has two
audiences: their supporters and potential guerrilla recruits, and the
populations of their enemies. The number of Coalition-induced “civilian
casualties” has become an important focus of the Taliban’s information
operations. In some instances, Taliban spokespersons have called the
international media in Kabul within minutes of a NATO airstrike, thus
getting their message on civilian casualties out before the official
Coalition statement and shaping the information environment to fit the
88
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Taliban narrative…In Afghanistan, the first messages, whether correct or
incorrect and regardless of the means of transmission—tend to stick and
create a perception of reality.89
At this time, however, most attention was still directed to Iraq. Early efforts to
mitigate casualties were piecemeal and not successful.90 According to the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the numbers of civilians killed in 2008 was 839,
nearly three hundred more than in 2007. This was less proportionately than the Taliban,
who had begun direct intimidation tactics against civilians, including using suicide
bombings in residential areas.91 Though the scales were tipped in the identity contest
between pro-government forces and the Taliban, it was still a lose-lose since the aim of
pro-government forces is to not only refrain from casualties but to provide protection
from insurgents.92 Even with the change of leadership to General McKiernan, who
recognized the problem as a strategic one, the central problem was still seen as the
necessity to militarily destroy the insurgency.
The Carr Center Conferences Conclude
In the meantime, the series of Human Rights conferences led by Sarah Sewall had
been focused largely on Iraq. As the series came to a conclusion in 2008, the sentiments
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expressed by military, human rights, and at this point even government participants
showed a remarkable convergence, especially considering the distance in perspectives
that marked their beginnings in 2001. Specifically, the conference saw an emphasis on
the strategic aspects of following civilian-centered human rights norms, with moral
behavior and its importance to identity now seen as central rather than collateral to
military operations. Legitimacy is now specifically seen as the key concept linking the
moral and strategic aspects of civilian casualties:
Human rights embody the ideals of justice and fairness which should
animate and undergird an “American version of COIN” – including when
America provides support for countries carrying out COIN operations.
Liberal, democratic countries face specific problems during COIN
operations as they balance the competing demands of human rights,
liberty, security, and violence. However, it is in the strategic and moral
interest of liberal, democratic countries to affirm their adherence to human
rights and civilian protection when carrying out COIN operations
otherwise they risk forfeiting moral and political superiority and thus
legitimacy.93
Importantly, this last conference seeks to “learn lessons” that extend beyond Iraq
and Afghanistan to carry into future operations. One of the lessons discussed is that the
use of American force is tied to an ongoing problem of perceptions about its ideology,
identity, and place in the larger international order. One discussion focused on power
issues that form the context for C.O.I.N.:
American irregular warfare and COIN are often viewed as subsidiary to
the question: is the United States a modern imperial power? American
93
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irregular warfare and COIN can be viewed as manifestations of
Imperialism and thus can garner anti-imperial or at least anti-hegemonic
responses.94
Recognizing the war of ideas as an enduring feature of the new political
landscape, some participants noted that “the liberal, democratic worldview must enter
into the realm of debating opposing ideologies connected to the problem of political
legitimacy.”95 One participant put it this way: “there is one golden rule in COIN: does
the government or the insurgent have greater legitimacy or a ‘credible vision of the
future’?96 Someone from within the government posed the question as to how ideologies
are best countered. A panelist responded by saying: “we should embody our ideals in the
actions of our soldiers on the battlefield by ensuring that they conform to the rule of law
and human rights.” Another participant noted that COIN should focus on discrediting
insurgents by demonstrating how they harm civilians which can contribute to
undermining the appeal of their movement.97
Still others noted the need for thought directed toward non-military strategic
communication efforts. The danger of concentrating this issue within a military context
lies in the inherent tensions in using force as an instrument for what are primarily moral
and ethical problems, which means that though “moral and ethical issues lie at the core of
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COIN thinking, [they] are often relegated to the sidelines in favor of “harsher force.”98 A
more comprehensive and far-reaching conception of the war of ideas was discussed
wherein “the liberal, democratic countries…consolidate and articulate a broadly
appealing worldview that does not focus solely on the benefits of capitalism.” 99
C.O.I.N. Goes to Washington: Diffusion of Ideas
Other developments within the government show the diffusion of the ideas
developed in dialogue with the military and human rights communities. One example is
the increasing strategic concern for public opinion viewed through the idea of a strategic
narrative focused on civilians as the key to winning the global war on terror. The annual
security threat assessment delivered by the National Intelligence Director to the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence echoes the concerns of the military:
Are the United States and its allies losing the war of ideas to the virulent
message of the terrorists? Does the continued existence and operation of a
separate CIA system of -- for terrorists employing secret interrogation
techniques undermined our moral standing and the willingness of other
countries to cooperate with us? Is our continued military presence in Iraq
generating more terrorists and more Islamic radicals around the world than
we are capturing or that we are killing?100
Though the statement mentions Iraq, the global political implications rather than
just theater implications are being emphasized. Furthermore, al Qaeda begins to re-enter
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the conversation about public opinion and civilian casualties, and connections are made
between regions and theaters:
We have seen notable progress in Muslim opinion turning against terrorist
groups like al-Qa’ida. Over the last year and a half, al-Qa’ida has faced
significant public criticism from prominent religious leaders and fellow
extremists primarily regarding the use of brutal and indiscriminate
tactics—particularly those employed by al Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) and alQa’ida in the Lands of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)— that have resulted in
the deaths of Muslim civilians. Given the increased pressure posed by
these criticisms, al-Qa’ida leaders increasingly have highlighted enduring
support for the Taliban and the fight in Afghanistan and Pakistan and in
other regions where they portray the West being at war with Islam and alQa’ida as the vanguard of the global terrorist movement.101
The Obama/McChrsytle Era and Afghanistan’s C.O.I.N.: 2009-2010
Regardless of the growing recognition of civilian casualties as a core strategic
problem, it was not until 2009, when Obama’s foreign policy reprioritized Afghanistan
and General Stanley McChrystal assumed command, that Afghanistan got its own
population-protection centric C.O.I.N. strategy. One participant interviewed for this
study suggested that as more attention was paid to the perspectives and beliefs of
Afghans themselves, it became evident that Afghan perceptions of the U.S. were shaped
against the backdrop of the memory of past experiences with a foreign presence,
especially of the harsh, punitive strategies adopted by the Soviet Union against the
population, and of the U.S. abandonment after the Soviet withdrawal. A deficit of trust
and legitimacy thus already existed to some extent in the local population, made worse by
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the civilian casualties over time. Moreover, the strength of the U.S. and its ability to
protect the population from the Taliban was seen as key to changing perceptions of the
Afghans toward the national government and the entire state system they were trying to
implement.
As part of the institutionalization of C.O.I.N. principles, in 2009, the Marine
Corps University and Marine Corps Foundation co-hosted a symposium focused on the
importance of leadership in counterinsurgency operations. In attempting to apply lessons
from Iraq to the ongoing challenges of “winning” in Afghanistan, a renewed emphasis on
the war of ideas as crucial to the war on the ground was articulated in terms of a
redefinition of “strength” as communication via deeds:
Convincing these ultimate arbiters—the Afghan people—and defeating
the Taliban’s strategy requires an effective communications strategy. The
difficulty of persuading local populations and communicating effective
messages of strength and resolve in a foreign culture cannot be overstated.
An effective communications strategy can only be delivered by Afghans
themselves—and must be underwritten by coalition deeds and acceptable
behavior, not just hollow rhetoric. Actions inevitably speak louder than
talking points. The most powerful message is the conduct of the various
actors on the ground: U.S., Afghan, and Coalition security forces.102
It was against this backdrop, along with the change in administrations from Bush
to Obama, that General David McKiernan, who had framed he fight in conventional
terms of destroying the enemy, was replaced with General Stanley McChrystle.103 In
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McChrystle’s recently published memoirs, he tellingly introduces his experience in
Afghanistan by way of Thomas Hobbes’s Behemoth: “The power of the mighty hath no
foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people.”104 McChrystle went further than
had even David Petraeus in Iraq in attributing failure on the battlefield to civilian
casualties. One of the first things he did when arriving in Afghanistan was to consult with
Karzai, who immediately told him that civilian casualties were the biggest threat to
success. While Karzai’s assessment alone may have been regarded with some suspicion,
and indeed he was considered by Karl Eikenberry to be the main impediment to success
in Afghanistan,105 McChrystle also listened intently to public opinion within Afghanistan,
which overwhelmingly suggested a lack of trust based on civilian casualties. The
reasoning within the population was that since the U.S. could avoid casualties with its
precision weaponry, it must have therefore not valued Afghan lives in comparison to
American lives.106
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McChrystle’s earliest response was to publish a “Tactical Directive” meant for
both American and ISAF personnel, imploring them to “avoid the trap of winning tactical
victories—but suffering strategic defeats—by causing civilian casualties or excessive
damage and thus alienating the people.”107 McChrystle’s reasoning evidenced little
concern for the effects of casualties extending beyond the local Afghan audience, though
portions of his Directive were publicly released “to ensure a broader awareness of the
intent AND SCOPE OF General McChrystle’s guidance to ISAF and USFOR-A forces.”
What is notable is that he internalizes Petraeus’s new civilian-centric counterinsurgency
logic and pushes it even further, defining victory108 as contingent on the moral
perceptions of the Afghan people:
While this is also a legal and a moral issue it is also an overarching
operational issue—clear eyed recognition that loss of popular support will
be decisive in this conflict. The Taliban cannot defeat us but we can defeat
ourselves.109
While McChrystle does not articulate a connection between the moral, legal, and
operational issues, his statements support my argument that the normative (especially the
moral) environment provides the crucial social context in which the fight occurs and
therefore becomes imbued with strategic weight.
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One interviewee conducted for this study stated that the perspective of some
within the military is that McChrsytle’s Directive may even have overplayed the case for
civilian casualties. His particular reading of civilian casualty mitigation was controversial
because it was too restrictive about the use of force, allowing little room for flexibility
and judgment, for example requiring special permission for operations involving “air to
ground munitions and indirect fires against residential compounds.”110 McChrystle
wanted his men to understand the idea that civilians were the new center of gravity, and
so soon after the Directive he released the ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency
Guidance, which specifically addressed the identity contest between the intervening force
and the insurgents as dependent on a contrast between those who hurt civilians and those
who protect civilians:
If civilians die in a firefight, it does not matter who shot them-we still
failed to protect them from harm…Think of counterinsurgency as an
argument to earn the support of the people…We must undermine the
insurgent argument while offering a more compelling alternative.”111
In his Initial Commanders’ Assessment, the study resulting from Obama’s
ordered strategic review, he “redefines the fight” calling for a more highly resourced
C.O.I.N. strategy. In his bid for more troops and a new direction, 112 he specifically
addresses the war of ideas and its reliance on deeds:
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Many describe the conflict in Afghanistan as a war of ideas, which I
believe to be true. However, this is a 'deeds-based' information
environment where perceptions derive from actions, such as how we
interact with the population and how quickly things improve. The key to
changing perceptions lies in changing the underlying truths. We must
never confuse the situation as it stands with the one we desire, lest we risk
our credibility.113
McChrystle, it should be noted, is hardly a proponent of nonviolence. Rather, he
was a Ranger whose most notable accomplishment in Iraq was supervising the killing of
AQI’s al Zarqawi as well as Saddam Hussein’s sons Uday and Qusay. It is safe to
assume, then, that McChrystle’s emphasis does not derive from a personal preference;
rather, he emphasizes that the goal must change to recognize the increased importance of
the social aspect of military behavior in counterinsurgency, and that military culture in
Afghanistan must change to accommodate the goal: “Pre-occupied with protection of our
own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us -- physically and
psychologically -- from the people we seek to protect.”114
Obama’s approved strategy called for a mixture of force, both in rolling back the
momentum of the Taliban and in going after Al Qaeda, and improving governance, with a
very short timeline in which to accomplish any gains at all. Creating a sense of legitimacy
about the behavior of the intervening forces is supposed to work in partnership with
improved governance and increased training of the Afghanistan Security Forces.
Legitimacy problems in Afghanistan were not limited to the issue of civilian casualties,
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however, and so McChrystle’s emphasis on this aspect came to be seen by some as an
over-emphasis. Even Sarah Sewall agreed.
Petraeus, head of CentCom at this time, suggested that McChrystal allow an
independent team to assess the conditions concerning civilian casualties on the ground.
Sarah Sewall, the human rights scholar who partnered with Petraeus in leading the
C.O.I.N. revision conference, was to lead the team, and McChrystle accepted her offer,
hoping to gain insight as to why some of his men did not seem to understand or embrace
his Counterinsurgency Guidance. While Sewall had long worked for and appreciated the
measures implemented to protect civilians, she noted the “toxic” atmosphere of fear
about civilian casualties that had been created by too restrictive guidelines. 115
Attributing the atmosphere to groupthink at the highest levels, she boldly told the General
that he had forgotten to include force in the equation. Kaplan describes it vividly:
Sarah Sewall, the Ivy League human –rights scholar and the only woman
in the room, looked unblinkingly at Stan McChrystal, the peerless
professional killer, and said, “General, counterinsurgency is a combination
of offense, defense, and stability operations. Don’t forget the offense.
McChrystal growled, “Don’t tell me how to run my war.”116
When McChrystle resigned summarily in 2010 for a media scandal involving an
article published by Rolling Stone magazine,117 Petraeus took over. Obama had earlier
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declared Afghanistan as a “necessary war” as opposed to Iraq as a “war of choice.”118
This necessity was framed in terms of Afghanistan’s dire condition providing a safe
haven for terrorism. With time running out, Petraeus emphasized attacking al Qaeda and
the Taliban directly (CT or counterterrorism), while still trying to lessen civilian
casualties. Civilian casualties figured into the calculus, but the goal became making
whatever progress was possible, and so Petraeus issued a new tactical directive loosening
the guidelines.119
2012: Institutionalization Continues post-C.O.I.N.
It soon became evident that Afghanistan held poor prospects for a successful
counterinsurgency. This was partially seen as a lack of time commitment, given that
NATO countries were losing public support for the war effort, but also because the aims
of the intervening forces to create a stable government that the local tribes could support
and identify with appeared to be at odds with the power-maintenance goals of Karzai.
Beyond Karzai himself, corruption pervaded nearly every aspect of rule— in many ways
it formed the foundation for whatever order did exist. Moreover, the mountainous terrain
and the fact that Pakistan provided a safe haven, with some elements supporting the
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Taliban and al Qaeda, meant that it was impossible to fully defeat the insurgents, who
could always retreat and reappear. 120
As troops were reduced and counterinsurgency goals took a back seat to
counterterrorism,121 the military’s efforts to institutionalize the lessons learned about
civilian casualties continued. The Afghanistan Handbook of Civilian Casualties was
published in 2012, and in contrast to McChrystal’s emphasis on only local effects of
civilian casualties, this handbook takes a longer, broader view of its effects on American
war-making. Emphasizing civilian immunity as a core value, it begins by stating that
The U.S. military has long been committed to upholding the law of armed
conflict and minimizing collateral damage. This includes the killing or
wounding of noncombatant civilians — described in this handbook as
civilian casualties or CIVCAS — as well as damage to facilities,
equipment, or other property.122
Importantly, the handbook links the need for altered behavior toward civilians to
the larger normative context, which has become strategic because publics now know
what happens on the battlefield due to communications technology:
Due to several factors, the impact of CIVCAS has increased to the point
that single tactical actions can have strategic consequences and limit
overall freedom of action. These factors include: the increased
transparency of war, where tactical actions can be recorded and
transmitted worldwide in real time; increased expectations for the United
States’ conduct of war in light of improved precision and overall
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capabilities; and the enemy exploitation of CIVCAS to undermine U.S.
legitimacy and objectives.123
Note that the legitimacy problem is seen as directly attributable to the identity
contest on the ground, and it is connected to American image and the use of force in the
larger, global sense.
The military has also worked to institutionalize the lessons learned about civilians
in a way that looks past Afghanistan to the future of war, regardless of whether it is
counterinsurgency or not. Working with human rights groups such as the Center for
Civilian Protection, founded out of the specific experience in Iraq and Afghanistan,
various doctrinal materials have integrated “best practices” on civilian protection. The
organization notes its involvement with the military in developing these plus the first
handbook on civilian casualty mitigation, which came out in July 2012:
We were the only NGO on the drafting committee of the US Army’s first
handbook on the protection of civilians The US Army Civilian Casualty
Mitigation ATTP (Army Tactics Training Procedures), published in July
2012. We are working with the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, the
US Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, and the Joint
Center for Operational Analysis to insert civilian protection concerns and
amends throughout all relevant publications.124
The Civilian Casualty Mitigation Handbook seeks to make sense of the issue of
civilian casualties in terms of broad effects. Much like the Afghanistan handbook, it first
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appeals to the ethical identity of the soldier and then states that what is legally
permissible is not always the issue:
Protection of civilians is at the heart of the profession of arms. Consistent
with law and ethics, a Soldier must balance the necessity of using force
with the likely effects of using force. While the use of force may be
legally justified, not all permissible force is necessary in every case, and
forces must also consider second-order effects. A U.S. legal investigation
summarized this point: “Just because we can shoot does not mean that we
should shoot.”125
Viewing the normative environment as inherently part of the strategic
environment, the handbook expresses recognition of the social-political aspects of war:
Army units conduct unified land operations in complex and populous
environments. To the extent possible, civilians (including those loyal to
the enemy) must be protected from the effects of combat. In addition to
legal and humanitarian reasons, Army units must mitigate CIVCASs
because they create lasting repercussions that impair post-conflict
reconstruction and reconciliation. CIVCASs lead to ill will among the
host-nation population and political pressure that can limit freedom of
action of military forces. If Army units fail to protect civilians, for
whatever reason, the legitimacy of U.S. operations is likely to be
questioned by the host nation and other partners. CIVCAS mitigation is
critical to ensure that Army units uphold Army values and comply with
legal authorities while conducting operations… Focused attention on
CIVCAS mitigation is an important investment to maintain legitimacy and
ensure eventual success. Failure to prevent CIVCASs will undermine
national policy objectives as well as the mission of Army units, while
assisting adversaries. 126
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Conclusion
The postponed adoption of a variant of C.O.I.N. focused on civilian protection
(and the waning commitment to the more difficult long term goals of C.O.I.N. soon after
it was adopted) presents an interesting contrast to Iraq. While the Iraq case study
represents the early phases of human rights diffusion that occurred early in the
development of C.O.I.N. doctrine within the military at large, I find evidence that the
later years of the Afghanistan conflict see a continuation of human rights diffusion in the
form of habitualization and institutionalization, which was particularly evident in the role
that human rights groups assumed (as advisors on the ground rather than as partners in
dialogue). Appeals to military values and identity were employed to promote the
processes of habitualization of civilian immunity within the military. I find little support
for the direct influence of the human rights community in shaping the adoption of
Afghanistan’s version of C.O.I.N.; however the presence of human rights scholars in the
later phases of norm diffusion were noted, particularly in the institutionalization of the
norm through tracking, assessing, and documenting lessons learned. Earlier forms of
human rights diffusion are present in this conflict as well, but not definitive. The
instrumental use of CIN was employed early in the Afghanistan conflict, but the
perception across two administrations was that the legitimacy of the invasion in
Afghanistan was not in question (even though the later growing civilian casualties did
present legitimacy problems).
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Evidence for the conditions under which civilian protection occurs is mixed. As
the recognition grew that a loss of monopoly of force could not be overcome by
escalation of force alone, and that attempting to regain control would entail unacceptable
levels of civilian casualties and increase oppositional recruiting, efforts to shape strategy
and doctrine in keeping with civilian protection took root. Based on the evidence
presented about perceptions of some important actors within the military as well as nonmilitary personnel involved in the C.O.I.N. efforts, I find strong support for the argument
that material conditions alone do not determine the content nor adoption of innovated
doctrine. In fact, material conditions were thought to run counter to a successful
counterinsurgency campaign, particularly the geopolitical complications of a hostile
population and porous border in neighboring Pakistan. However, material conditions did
matter insofar as a lack of resources created the conditions for increased civilian
casualties for many years. Moreover, it was only with the risk of failure in Afghanistan
that other strategies were considered.
The evidence presented supports the argument that ideational factors associated
with civilian casualties were seen as a primary driver in the strategic choice of C.O.I.N..
Furthermore, empirical evidence supports the argument that the civilian immunity norm,
as embedded in the global normative environment, constrained counterinsurgency options
to those in line with its legal strictures and especially its moral spirit, even beyond what is
required by law. Finally, I find mixed support for my main thesis that legitimacy based
on a strategic narrative in the context of the war on terror is a primary factor driving the
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content and adoption of a population protection strategy in Afghanistan. Evidence of a
concern for strategic communication is definitely present, but legitimacy in Afghanistan
was more variable and complex than this study had anticipated—the surplus of
legitimacy present in the beginning did not carry through the conflict. Legitimacy issues
that might have concentrated on the U.S. alone were spread amongst many actors in
Afghanistan—coalition partners and the leadership and power brokers within Afghan
society, Pakistan, the Taliban itself. Despite the state of legitimacy concerns at any given
point in the conflict, the overall thrust of the military was to recognize civilian casualties
as an enduring issue of legitimacy whenever force is used.

CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
As has been shown in the previous chapters, in two theaters of war in the last
decade, the U.S. military changed its attitudes toward civilian casualties, demonstrating a
profound and significant movement from pushing the limits of civilian immunity by
favoring the norm’s sovereignty dimensions toward interpreting the norm through a
human rights lens, transcending even its legal requirements under IHL. In each case, the
campaigns were both considered conventional successes in the invasion phase, when
toppling the regime was the goal. Each experienced local resistance combined with
foreign “terrorist” intervention, and both went through a difficult period in which a lack
of initial planning for post-invasion stability operations contributed to inconsistent and
ineffective responses to what would grow into full-blown insurgencies. Most importantly,
all of this took place within the context of globalized communications media that
produced multiple audiences for the United States, its allies, and its foes.
Key leaders within each campaign read the signs of impending strategic failure
long before the actual strategic failure. A core group within the human rights community
participated in assessing each conflict, although in different ways—as part of shaping the
initial C.O.I.N. doctrine in Iraq and as part of the assessment of the situation on the
ground in Afghanistan.1 As summarized in Table 2 (below), I have identified a crucial
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juncture in each case that preceded a shift in doctrine, and in both cases, this juncture was
defined by an increasing concern for and emphasis on the effects of civilian casualties on
the ability to prevail according to the foreign policy commitments defined by the civilian
administration. Whereas civilian casualties were seen as collateral damage in the initial
phases of each conflict, such casualties became seen as a key issue of legitimacy as each
war progressed.
In order to assess the significance of the empirical chapters, I will break down the
claims and compare each. Since both Iraq and Afghanistan were fought under the
overarching framework of the Global War on Terror, an overall pattern of becomes
evident when the cases are shown side by side. In this sense, each case impacts the other,
and the U.S. military demonstrates an overall organizational shift toward defining human
rights as a strategic concern rather than as a constraint that entails strategic costs. Further,
the relationship between the cases is important to consider since they competed for the
attention and resources of the same institution, and involved many of the same personnel.
Regulative Effects
Regulative effects of the CIN were indicated by the movement in attitudes toward
civilian casualties. When a norm is treated as a variable, the norm itself cannot be
measured through behavior, so attitudes about behavior were used. The invasion of each
conflict was used as a baseline, and in both conflicts, sovereignty-based, or enabling
attitudes were present toward civilian casualties. This was evident in the early rhetoric
1

Interestingly, the agenda of the human rights community most closely involved in shaping doctrine
followed the priorities of the military. Afghanistan was barely mentioned in the conference records, for
example, while Iraq was the primary focus of the military. It was only when the military shifted toward
Afghanistan that key human rights advocates were invited to conduct civilian casualty reports.
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and public statements in response to criticism about civilian casualties. A temporal
element is also present and is supported by the identification of crucial junctures at which
civilian casualties were seen to be strategically problematic by at least some in the
military. These crucial junctures preceded the innovation process as well as the attitudes
toward civilian casualties. The innovation process likewise was also identified as a key
marker for each case, since this study is not about the actual increase in resources that
marks a “surge” or visible strategy change but rather the shift in perception and analysis
that triggered the process of adopting a civilian-protection focus.
Table 2 shows that both cases went through a similar process in terms of an
invasion that was uneventful in terms of civilian casualties (that is, from the perspective
of the military at the time,). Both experienced a turning point in the war marked by a
growing concern for civilian casualties (CIVCAS), followed by a concern for a
legitimacy crisis in terms of damage to the American war-fighting image, and then both
underwent a process of doctrinal innovation. The differences in time are striking,
however. In Iraq, the rising civilian casualties, the crucial juncture and the legitimacy
crisis are compressed and intensified within a short time frame. The innovation process
begins in earnest within the organization within a very short time after the crisis is
perceived.
In Afghanistan, on the other hand, the time frame stretches out over a decade, and
there is a significant period of almost no attention to civilian casualties in the global
press, nor any real sense that the war had reached a crisis in any other way during that
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time (about 2002-2004). The table above shows a lag; the period of growing concern for
civilian casualties was relatively long ( 3-4 years), and the innovation response was slow.

Table 2. Summary of Findings

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

2006

IRAQ: SOVEREINGTY ATTITUDES
HUMAN RIGHTS ATTITUDES
Baseline
Iraq
*Crucial
Persuasion
Doctrinal
Attitudes
Invasion:
Juncture:
Within
Innovation
Toward
CIVCAS
Fallujah
Military:
Civilian
and Abu
C.O.I.N.
Casualties
Ghraib;
revision
and Human
legitimacy
with human
Rights
crisis
rights
Community
community
AFGHANISTAN: SOVEREINGTY ATTITTUDES
Afghanistan Afghanistan’s “Forgotten Years”
CIVCAS
Torture
invasion
memos;
values
studies of
soldiers

2007

2008

2009

Surge (full
adoption
phase not
covered by
this study)

Attempts to
reduce
CIVCAS
unsuccessful

2010

2011

2012

Institutional Change Continues

Growing
CIVCAS

*Crucial
juncture:
legitimacy
crisis:
Human
rights
community
does
CIVCAS
study

HUMAN RIGHTS ATTITUDES
Population
Counterterrorism
protection
And C.O.I.N. mixed
adapted to
Afghanistan

Institutional
Change
continues
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Overall, civilian casualties appeared to be perceived as a less urgent problem than
in Iraq. Below I will examine whether the same is true of the constitutive effects.
Constitutive Effects
Constitutive effects were supported by analysis of some of the key points of the
narrative; specifically I looked for whether and how the constraining normative
environment came to be seen as a key part of the security environment. Since a narrative
is the way actors literally tell the story of events in a way that creates meaning, these do
not represent variables because they are not independent. Rather, they rather represent
overlapping, mutually constitutive relationships. Indicators included the use of the
language of CIN, the invocation of identity in relation to interests, and the eventual
connection between words and deeds in the form of linking the outcome of the war of
ideas to the outcome of the operational war.
The use of CIN language (just war, civilians, rule of law, et cetera) indicates a
constitutive effect insofar as it is seen as a legitimizing resource by which to locate one’s
actions and interests in relation to one’s identity within the social order. This was
demonstrated to be the case in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, I argued that the
constitutive effects of the CIN are such that the legitimizing language creates both a
positive resource and a potential rhetorical trap. This was also found to be the case in
both theaters. Specific articulations of the connection between identity and interests were
made in response to the legitimacy crisis suffered as a result of civilian casualties (as
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explained above). The rhetorical trap2 was created through the appeal to CIN early on by
the civilian leadership. The threat to reputation or identity pertaining to civilian casualties
was increasingly seen as problematic over time, and interests were redefined in each case
to support a definition of “winning” that was consistent with civilian-protection.
Moreover, the effect of this was not only in language but in action, since the language
was followed by actual changes in policy, as well as attempts to institutionalize those
changes in policy and in attitudes within the organization.
Finally, the interpretive analysis found evidence that the war of ideas was
increasingly seen as important, not just for ideological advantage and for curbing antiAmericanism in general, but for how perceptions about American values and identity
affected support for the opposition. Civilian casualties were seen as the key link between
the two in Iraq, particularly since targeted audiences for the war of ideas existed at the
local, regional, and even global levels. Direct material results in Iraq were evident in the
form of foreign fighters feeding into Iraq to support AQI. In Afghanistan, however, the
connection between the war of ideas and the war on the ground is not as strong. The
reason for this is that, although the local population was seen as important to win over—
and reducing civilian casualties were definitive in this regard, a lesser degree or intensity
of concern was conveyed about the effects of losing the war of ideas for regional
audiences (the Pakistani audience, for example, who did provide a source of foreign
fighters).
2

Rhetorical trap refers to the position created when a party employs a norm strategically and then is
pressured to live up to the norm. This is a term used by Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap:
Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," International
organization 55, no. 01 (2001).
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I suggest two possibilities for the exertion of uneven effects: first, strategic
distinctions were made about audiences in terms of fence-sitters versus irreconcilables.
Anti-American sentiment in Pakistan, especially in the FTA, was already extremely high.
Identity loyalties may already have been decided and so “hearts and minds” may have
been calculated to already have been lost. Second, the conflict in Afghanistan was truly
an international effort, especially as time progressed. This means that responsibility for
casualties is dispersed, along with damage to image or reputation. This also means that
the attention of global audiences would likely be diffuse as well; in other words, with so
many horses in the race, many different possible focal points exist, or a single diffuse
focal point, such as N.A.T.O., for example. While foreign audiences focused
responsibility for the war almost exclusively on the United States in Iraq, domestic
audience costs within member states would likely figure more highly in Afghanistan. 3
One other possibility will be discussed below.

3

Domestic audience cost is a term originally employed by James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences
and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (1996).
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Conditions
Table 3. Conditions of Strategic Effects
Iraq

Afghanistan

Loss of Monopoly on Force

High

Moderate

Legitimacy of Invasion

Weak

High

Need to Delegitimize Terror

High

Moderate

The above table summarizes my findings on the three conditions I identified as
impacting when the CIN becomes seen as part of the strategic environment. My
argument was that, based on a social conception of power, state interests change over
time and that this is evident as sovereignty-based attitudes toward civilian casualties
move toward a more constraining, human rights-based outlook. I identified three
conditions under which this occurs: when the normative/discursive framework of
protecting civilians is seen as essential to delegitimizing the enemy; when the legitimacy
of the initial invasion is in question, and civilian casualties are seen as damaging to the
international image by increasing that gap; finally, when regaining a monopoly on force
is seen as impossible to achieve through material force alone because civilian casualties
increase support for the insurgency. I argued that, together, these provide the conditions
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under which aligning with human rights-centered norms eventually comes to be seen as
the only viable strategy in fighting insurgencies.
Aspects of the normative environment highlighted in this study derive from the
observation that terrorism, which has been discursively shaped in recent decades by the
U.S. and Israel in their attempts to maintain control over the strategic narrative about
illegitimacy of force as used by opposing non-state actors. Drawing on the normative
strength of the CIN to rhetorically strengthen anti-terror norms has resulted in global
publics that increasingly accept the definition of terrorism as “killing civilians.” The first
condition posited in this study was that CIN would be seen as part of the strategic
environment when drawing attention to enemy violations of the CIN is seen as crucial to
delegitimizing terrorism—and thus the ends, means, and identities of enemy non-state
actors. The rhetorical trap is created when a state fails to live up to its own rhetoric—
when words do not match the deeds. The evidence suggests that targeted publics and
those who identify with them are quick to recognize the contradiction, even hypocrisy of
applying double standards. While in the past, states have found plenty of room to
maneuver within the norm through the “collateral damage” claim, the war on terror has
forced powerful states such as the U.S. to clarify its own moral purpose, and by
extension, its own claims to the use of just force.
The strategic use of the norm thus creates pressure to live up to the standards
previously identified as morally non-negotiable. The evidence presented in this study
supports the conclusion that this was the case in Iraq because AQI and its foreign fighters
were creating anti-American and anti-government alliances in the Sunni triangle. For
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regional and global audiences, the fact that the conflict in Iraq had become characterized
by an actual war on terrorists needed to be brought to the fore. It was also necessary to
delegitimize terrorists based on their identity as killers of civilians in Afghanistan
because of the alliances between al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Pakistani Taliban. I list
this condition as weak or variable in the case of Afghanistan because of the previously
mentioned reason that delegitimizing terrorism was not as urgent in Afghanistan because,
relative to the U.S. identity, the Taliban was already widely considered as illegitimate
because of the group’s proximity to the events of 9/11.
I find that the recognition of the loss of a monopoly of force coincided with the
shift toward the recognition of the importance of ideational/ethical factors within the
normative environment, specifically CIN. For Afghanistan, however, the shift away from
conventional force may have been less complete because although avoiding civilian
casualties was an important focus of doctrinal change, the physical destruction of al
Qaeda was the original legitimating discourse for the war. This leads to the next
condition, the impact of the legitimacy of the war itself.
First, I argued that the recognition of the loss of a monopoly on force was one of
those conditions. This refers to a shift in attitude rather than a material loss—as well as
an acceptance that exerting more force was an insufficient strategy to regain that
monopoly. This shift was seen within the military as a gradual understanding of the
evolution of the character of war that renders political solutions more important than
purely military solutions. This understanding as it applied to the particular conflicts came
earlier in Iraq than in Afghanistan. In Iraq, the intensity and spread of the violence was
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seen as creating conditions for political failure, and adding to civilian casualties was seen
as contributing to the chaos, for example in Fallujah. In Afghanistan, however, late in the
war (especially after the departure of McChrystle in 2010), counterterrorism was pursued
alongside counterinsurgency, and that strategy, as directed toward al Qaeda, was
conventional in its goals (search and destroy). As such it reflected a more sovereigntyoriented approach by attempting to regain a monopoly on violence, at least as it pertains
to terrorist foreign fighters. In such cases, no political solution was seen as a possibility,
and the existence of such groups remained unacceptable, leaving as the only possibility
conventional defeat through destruction.
I find that the legitimacy of the initial invasion in each conflict, while initially
used in this study to provide a baseline level of legitimacy, may weigh more heavily than
I initially thought. In Iraq, the legitimacy of the invasion was extremely low, and the
damage to the image of the U.S. was high and became higher throughout the war as
conditions worsened. The rhetorical trap was stronger because the humanitarian
rationalization for the war (liberation from tyranny and democratization) left few options
for “winning” in a conventional sense, that is by destroying the enemy. The “enemy” was
an elusive term because many fighters began as civilians and later became fighters. The
enemy that emerged after the invasion was created out of the occupation that was waged
for reasons that increasingly were seen as illegitimate, for example, the WMDs that failed
to materialize. Thus killing civilians was especially egregious given this lack of
legitimacy for the initial invasion. This left few avenues to repair the credibility and
restore the moral authority of the U.S. other than to embrace a more ethical stance that
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helped to define its own identity post-invasion. “Protector of civilians” was strategically a
better identity because it was consistent with the humanitarian rationalization of the
invasion, and it provided a communicative bridge between multiple publics—the Iraqi
public, the Arab/Muslim public, the domestic public, and even the larger global public.
As one of the strongest of all international norms, the legitimating power of the CIN
provided a core moral purpose on which all could agree.
In Afghanistan, the initial invasion did not suffer from the same legitimacy deficit
as Iraq, and this is found to be correlated with a weaker commitment to innovating
doctrine toward population protection. The invasion was broadly construed as legitimate
since the Taliban openly defied demands to turn over al Qaeda after 9/11. Thus the
justification of the Afghanistan conflict was more persuasively part of the “Global War
on Terror” in that it involved terrorists and their allies. However, as time went on, and it
became apparent that the long term foreign policy outcome was in question (bringing the
war to a successful conclusion by producing a stable, democratic Afghanistan), the
original legitimacy surplus became less of a factor. As in Iraq, killing civilians worked
against the desired political outcome. As I stated above, however, when the conflict was
finally given attention and resources, the original legitimation for the war—destroying al
Qaeda—was invoked once again.4 In Afghanistan, a sovereignty-orientation was
reasserted based on that original just cause. Thus, the rhetorical trap set by strengthening
the association between terrorism and CIN violation produces uneven effects, as

4

Further research might examine whether or not Obama’s refocusing the war on the destruction of Al
Qaeda contributed to a widened berth for civilian casualties in the FATA of Pakistan.
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evidenced by the relative weight and urgency assigned to civilian casualties in both
conflicts. While the evidence suggests that protecting civilians is a way to remedy a
legitimacy gap, the gap is not attributable directly to the contradiction between words and
deeds; rather, indications are that it is mitigated or aggravated by just cause (the jus ad
bellum). Thus the initial legitimacy undergirding the purpose of the entire war weighed
more heavily than was originally anticipated
Material Factors
Finally, though this study aimed to background material factors, one of the
limitations of foregrounding ideational factors is that the material factors are assumed to
be present but not independent. So while this study did not seek to measure the impact of
material factors in such a way, it became apparent from interviews and other sources that
in Afghanistan, the lack of material resources devoted to the war effort was a major factor
in tolerating civilian casualties for a much longer time than in Iraq. Air power was
employed in direct relation to the paucity of ground troops available, and while air power
is more discriminate than some alternatives in the context of conventional wars, civilian
casualties are hard to avoid in the context of using air power in insurgencies. Moreover, a
fully resourced C.O.I.N. strategy in Afghanistan was only considered once there was a
change in civilian leadership. Even then, the timeline for achieving results would be
extremely short. All of these material conditions helped to shape what was possible in
terms of implementing a civilian-centered strategy.
Still, if one looks at the situation as two interrelated cases (occurring within a
single organization), the two wars were competing priorities, and Iraq took the lion’s
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share of attention and resources. Viewing this through the lens of legitimacy, however,
Iraq could have been made a bigger priority over time because it was a bigger risk for
U.S. reputation. If so, legitimacy would still be the driving factor, with material
conditions an intervening factor.
Material factors also formed the background to these cases in the sense that global
communications technology allows for a more potent counter-narrative to the one being
offered by powerful states. The U.S. military came to realize that the ability to control the
narrative was no longer possible and that civilian casualties were a major strategic boon
to the other side. One former intelligence person interviewed told stories of the Taliban
rushing to the site of an aerial bombardment, killing civilians and their bodies in the
wreckage, then using cell phones to spread the images—all before the U.S. military even
knew what had happened. Strengthening the CIN becomes a sort of damage control and
prevention in the face of such pressure. Without a strong norm, however, and without
identity claims resting on the norm, such images would have less import.
Comprehensive Timeline of Both Cases: Sovereignty versus Human Rights
The last visual representation below shows an overall timeline of the events
covered in both cases. I had argued earlier that I expected to see a shift in attitudes over
time from a sovereignty orientation toward civilian casualties to a more human rights
orientation toward civilian casualties. The key indicator used was not based on numerical
outcomes of civilian casualties due to highly problematic data collection issues,5 but

5

See discussion about this. (docs on HR conferences plus email documenting problems. Plus reports of
what does exist).
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rather on what arguments were made about behavior toward civilians and whether the
interpretation of civilian immunity was made in enabling, expansive ways (military
necessity) or in constraining, minimizing ways (emphasizing precaution and distinction).
Critical discourse analysis6 was employed in order to separate the always problematic
issue of reading intention into arguments and claims about behavior. This is not as
problematic in this study as it might otherwise be since the premise of this study is that
ethical arguments relating to identity claims are used strategically, but that ultimately this
has a constraining effect. My findings are that each conflict demonstrates the predicted
shift from a sovereignty interpretation of CIN to a human rights interpretation of CIN.
As I argued in chapter two, the CIN is one of the constitutive norms of warfare
and thus of the international order that is produced within the context of warring states,
their soldiers, and non-state actors, both combatants and civilians. The struggle for power
between states and non-state actors is material but also social in that each seeks the
recognition of and cooperation with civilians. The struggle for legitimacy is thus an
important part of the social relations between states and their non-state challengers, and it
is thus to be expected that the norms of war will evolve according to the political-social
context. The shift from sovereignty attitudes toward human rights attitudes is visually
demonstrated in Table 3.

6

Explanation of critical discourse analysis and its hermeneutic aim of discerning social and power
relations.
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Further Research and Implications
The implications derived from this study are that morality and ethics have
constraining effects even in the realm of political behavior most closely approximating
anarchy. Power in this case is shown to entail social dimensions articulated by the
constructivist paradigm but still not adequately accounted for in positivist approaches to
international relations. This study has attempted to bridge the divide between rationalism
and constructivism through the examination of one norm in an important set of conflicts.
One of the more striking observations I made about the orientation of military decisionmakers is that they are often much more attuned to war as a human endeavor and in many
ways seem to intuitively reject theories of state behavior that abstract too much from this
basic fact. Therefore, many in the military demonstrated a surprising openness to
considering the ethical aspects of war—indeed, some of the early fascination I had with
military perspectives grew out of discussions with military scholars about just war theory.
Furthermore, one implication that derives from the exploration of ethical aspects
of power is that intervention itself means intervening into a social and political setting.
Again, a striking observation made about how doctrinal innovation developed has to do
with how the military eventually sought help from anthropologists, human rights
organizations, and other academics in order to better understand and perform as a social
actor within not only local social settings, but global ones as well. Implications are that
IR theory about state behavior and interests has much to gain from considering the role
the military plays not just as an instrument of foreign policy but as an actor in foreign
policy, especially regarding its role as a strategic communicator. Perhaps the most
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important policy relevant implication is that reputation, especially among foreign publics,
matters for democracies when using force, with the result that perceptions of the
illegitimate use of force profoundly affect the scope and range of military options
available in cases of intervention and long term occupation.
The limitations of generalizing from this study are great since it looks at the
behavior of a single state, in a single time period, within a single overarching political
context (the GWOT). It may well be that the extraordinary turn taken by U.S. foreign
policy in the post 9/11 years will not be repeated. Areas of further research suggested by
this study would entail comparing cases with more variation on the dependent variable, as
well as cases that are not fought as counterinsurgencies. Furthermore, one might see more
variation among states that are not superpowers and that do not rely as heavily on their
moral identity claims in order to maintain their positions within a given international
order.
While the generalizability of the two cases I examine may be limited, the basic
question asked in this study is part of a growing inquiry about the relationship between
morality and power more generally, and the role of the civilian in defining the limits on
the use of force more specifically. An interesting comparison might include the relative
effects of the war on terror on the strategies and doctrines of Israel versus the United
States since Israel’s own struggles with legitimacy have been caught up in a similar net of
terrorism, civilian casualties, and public opinion. A just released study on the impact of
international criticism about civilian casualties in Israel echoes to some extent the
findings of this study. Yagil Levy commented on Israel’s forced reckoning with its own
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“hierarchy of death” as a result of international pressure, and its resulting relative
restraint in its November 2012 operations against Gaza, Operation Pillar of Defense:
Three years after Operation Cast Lead, Israel could no longer shift the risk to the
Gazan noncombatants—that is, it could not reduce the soldiers’ exposure to danger by
using a liberal fire policy that could potentially claim more Gazan civilian casualties. The
international community has grown more vocal in its opposition to ground operations,
and Israel more sensitive to a changing post-revolution Egypt. No less important, Israel
learned to exercise some caution after the UN-commissioned Goldstone Report accused it
(along with Hamas) of war crimes during Operation Cast Lead.7 Such cases call for a
more thorough testing of all alternative explanations. For example, Downes’ findings that
states will victimize civilians when they wish to annex land may suggest a relative
weighting of the competing foreign policy goals of legitimacy versus expansion.
Finally, the constraints democracies face based on the identification with human
rights norms may loosen in the case of interstate war. Interstate war provides the basis for
more permissive sovereignty-based legitimacy claims about how and when force is used.
What the findings of this study does support is that the use of force takes place within a
social context, and that norms provide the resources and limitations by which states claim
the legitimate use of force.

7

Yagil Levy, "Israel’s New Hierarchy of Death," Moment(January/February 2013),
http://www.momentmag.com/opinion-israels-new-hierarchy-of-death/.Accessed 5-4-2013. The author’s
full academic argument is made in Yagil Levy, Israel's Hierarchy of Death (New York: New York
University Press, 2012).
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